St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2014

Bad Tax Shelters - Accountability of the Lack Thereof: Ten Years
of Tax
Jacob L. Todres
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

BAD TAX SHELTERS — ACCOUNTABILITY OR THE LACK THEREOF:
TEN YEARS OF TAX MALPRACTICE
Jacob L. Todres*

I. Background Principles .................................................................608
A. Elements of a Malpractice Cause of Action ....................608
B. Measure of Damages .......................................................610
II. Generic Tax Shelters ...................................................................612
A. Introductory .....................................................................612
B. General Background ........................................................615
C. Prototype Generic Tax Shelter Scenario .........................620
D. Cases................................................................................625
E. Analysis ...........................................................................649
III. Other Tax Malpractice Developments ...................................654
A. Preliminary ......................................................................654
1. Scope of Engagement ................................................654
2. Conflict of Interest .....................................................665
B. Tax Filing and Tax Preparation .......................................669
1. Late Filing and Non-Filing ........................................669
2. Negligent Preparation ................................................676
C. Taxpayer Representation Before IRS and Courts ...........689
D. Personal Tax Planning.....................................................694
1. Income Tax ................................................................694
a. Litigation Settlement Advice ...............................694
b. Long Term Capital Gains.....................................695
c. Divorce Related ...................................................696
d. Offshore Trusts ....................................................697
e. Miscellaneous ......................................................700
2. Estate, Gift and GST Tax Planning............................702
a. Introductory—Privity...........................................702
* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the very able research assistance of Eric Dostal, class of 2013, and Chelsea Marmor, class of
2015.

2014]

BAD TAX SHELTERS

603

b. Planning Errors ....................................................705
c. Drafting Errors .....................................................711
E. Business Related Tax Planning .......................................715
1. Benefit Plans ............................................................715
2. S-Corporations .........................................................732
3. Tax Benefits and Elections .......................................735
4. Tax-Free Exchanges .................................................738
5. Disposition/Acquisition of Property.........................741
6. Method of Accounting .............................................743
7. Stock Redemption ....................................................744
8. Tax Exempt Bonds ...................................................746
9. REMICs ....................................................................746
10. Miscellaneous ...........................................................748
IV. Conclusion .................................................................................752
Despite the existence of state rules governing attorney conduct, state bar
ethics committees, similar conduct guides for CPAs and the IRS office of
Professional Responsibility, the ultimate deterrence to negligence by a tax
professional is the threat of a lawsuit for damages caused by substandard
conduct. This lawsuit also represents the only means by which a client may
obtain redress for the damages caused by the negligence. The principles
governing malpractice therefore function in a regulatory capacity to assure
that professionals act with diligence and appropriate due care. If the
professional does not meet the required standards, she or he must bear the
consequences and compensate the client for the damages caused by the
substandard conduct.
Tax is a very complex and technical area of law. Previously, as a
practitioner, and now, as a long-time teacher in the area, I was always
concerned whether the incidence of malpractice liability exposure was
especially high in this area of legal practice. And, if yes, whether it was
possible to identify which areas of tax law were most prone to generate tax
malpractice claims. In two earlier studies, I allayed my worst fears that tax
was so dangerous an area to practice in that it would be foolhardy to do so.1
No, there were not reported tax malpractice claims under virtually every

1

Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in Which
Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Malpractice I]; Jacob L. Todres, Tax
Malpractice: Areas in Which It Occurs and the Measure of Damages—An Update, 78 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1011 (2004) [hereinafter Malpractice II].
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section of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). In Malpractice II, which was
published in 2004, I concluded that the estate planning/estate and gift tax
area probably generated the most tax malpractice claims during the previous
half-decade.2 Beyond that, the areas generating the most claims involved
late filing, non-filing, and negligent tax return preparation.3 The errors in
these areas, though, were not so much errors of tax law, but rather were
general sloppiness and inattentiveness that occurred in a tax context — such
as missing time deadlines and not following instructions.4
By the mid to late 1990s and probably continuing until around 2004 or
2005, the tax landscape had become overrun with tax shelter promoters
aggressively marketing tax shelters to very wealthy individuals.5 The
shelters were very aggressive and highly technical structured transactions
that purportedly could eliminate millions, tens, and even hundreds of
millions of dollars of taxes on demand. These shelters were mass marketed
to many taxpayers. The shelters, which, at best, were of doubtful validity,
were really of the too-good-to-be-true variety. Probably starting in the late
1990s, and certainly by the early 2000s, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) was actively and vigorously cracking down on the investors and
purveyors of these flawed tax shelters.6 Ultimately, many of the purchasers
of these tax shelters conceded the invalidity of the shelters and availed
themselves of IRS amnesty and settlement initiatives.7 As a result, there
were numerous predictions that a wave of malpractice suits against the tax

2

Malpractice II, supra note 1, at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
4
Id.
5
For excellent overviews of tax shelters see, e.g., Eric Solomon, A Short History of Tax
Shelters, in 1 The Partnership Tax Practice Series: Planning for Domestic and Foreign
Partnerships, LLCs, Joint Ventures & Other Strategic Alliances chap. 238, (Louis S. Freeman ed.,
2014); and Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today’s
Thoughtful U.S.Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No”, in The Corporate Tax
Practice Series chap. 442 (Philip B. Wright et al. eds., 2014).
6
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gary, Year In Review: Tax Shelter Crackdown Efforts Steer
Government Policy, 102 TAX NOTES 35, 35 (2004); see also, generally I.R.S. News Release IR2003-51 (Apr. 15, 2003).
7
2,000 taxpayers were reported to have participated in one IRS global settlement initiative.
Stephen Joyce, About 2,000 Taxpayers to Pay $2 billion in Global Settlement Initiative, Everson
Says, 59 DAILY TAX REP. (Mar. 28, 2006). In response to a different program for “Son of BOSS”
tax shelters over 1,200 taxpayers participated. I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-87 (July 1, 2004)
(over 1500 taxpayers filed Notices of Election to participate); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-72
(July 11, 2005) (Over 1200 electing taxpayers qualified to participate in the settlement).
3
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advisors involved with the invalid shelters would result.8 After all, the
shelters, which were very expensive, were invalid and worse than
worthless. In addition to unwelcome and unwanted IRS scrutiny, the shelter
investors incurred significant costs as a consequence of their shelter
investments. These included interest expense, often penalties, and
professional fees to correct erroneous tax returns and for representation in
connection with IRS (and state) audits and claims. In addition, the basic tax
the shelter purchasers were seeking to avoid also had to be paid.
The purpose of this article is to review the developments in the tax
malpractice area during roughly the last decade. The goal is to determine
how the substantive law in this area has evolved, what damages may be
recovered when malpractice has occurred, and whether it is possible to
identify particular areas of tax law or practice that are more likely than
others to result in tax malpractice claims. Initially it was expected and
hoped that the predicted wave of tax malpractice litigation against the
sellers of the bad tax shelters during this period would be a fertile source of
substantive developments in this area. Paradoxically, this has not occurred.
While there are many cases arising from the bad tax shelters, to date very
few have focused on substantive tax malpractice issues and only one,
decided in late 2013, has gone to judgment on the merits.9 Most of the
reported cases have focused on procedural issues such as whether the
disputes must be arbitrated,10 statute of limitations,11 jurisdiction in federal

8

See, e.g., Allen Kenney & Lee A. Sheppard, Korb Predicts Shelter Malpractice Suits, 2005
TAX NOTES TODAY 216–2 (Nov. 9, 2005); David Cay Johnston, Wealthy Sue Accountants Over
Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003 at C1. See generally Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice
Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267 (2008).
9
Soled, supra note 8, at 274–75 (reporting that “there is not a single reported decision
determining whether a particular defendant committed malpractice.”). The one reported case that
reached judgment on the substantive tax malpractice issue is Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No.
07-CI-2647 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/ Publications/
Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf.
10
See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 625 (2009); Chew, Jr. v. KPMG,
LLP, 407 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792–93 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood,
L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 925 A.2d 22,
24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Conwill v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 820 N.Y.S. 2d 842, *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
11
See, e.g., Malone v. Ahrens & DeAngeli, PLLC., 445 Fed. App’x 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2011);
Soward v. Deutsche Bank AG, 814 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Moorehead v.
Deutsche Bank AG, No. 11 C 106, 2011 WL 4496221, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011); Corporex
Cos. v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 713 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (E.D. Ky. 2010); Hutton v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Kan. 2008).
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versus state court,12 and various other non-substantive tax malpractice
issues.13 In addition, since many of the tax shelters were mass marketed to
many purchasers, several class action suits resolved what otherwise could
have resulted in many hundreds of individual cases.14 These class action
cases were all settled, so they do not add much to substantive tax
malpractice law, aside from confirming that normal class action principles
apply, and a class action suit may be maintained where the same defective
tax shelter is sold to many purchasers in the same way.15 Presumably, many
of the invalid tax shelter controversies were also resolved by arbitration,
settlement, or in non-reported litigations.
Despite the dearth of tax shelter cases focusing on substantive tax
malpractice issues, it is safe to conclude that tax professionals who render
incorrect opinions that an invalid tax shelter is likely valid will most
assuredly be the target of a tax malpractice suit brought by the disappointed
purchaser of the tax shelter. When the tax professional’s involvement with
the marketing and sale of the tax shelter is as extensive as occurred in many
of the “generic tax shelters,” investigated by Congress, liability seems
reasonably certain.16 Where the tax professional’s involvement is limited to

12

See, e.g., Affco Invs., LLC v. KPMG, LLP, Civ. A. No. H-07-3379, 2009 WL 3248052, *2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009); The Hoehn Family, LLC v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, No. 070069-CV-W-DW, 2007 WL 1028768, *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2007); King v. Lincoln Fin.
Advisors Corp., Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1626-G ECF, 2006 WL 2067835, *1 (N.D. Tex. July 25,
2006) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
13
See, e.g., Conwill, IV v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., Civ. A. No. 09-4365, 2009 WL
5178310, *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2009) (personal jurisdiction); Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F.
Supp. 2d 710, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (personal jurisdiction and arbitration); RA Invs. I, LLC v.
Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446, *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6,
2005) (RICO) (mem op., not designated for publication); Ling v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 04 CV
4566(HB), 2005 WL 1244689, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005); Malone v. Nuber, No. C072046RSL, 2009 WL 1044586, *1–6 (W.D. Wash. April 16, 2009) (miscellaneous); Shalam v.
KPMG LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (miscellaneous).
14
See, e.g., Simon v. KPMG LLP, Civ. A. No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048, at *5 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2006) (250 class members); Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566(HB),
2006 WL 290477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (complaint alleges 175 transactions, Complaint,
2004 WL 1735243 at ¶ 49 (6/16/04)); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (1100 clients).
15
See, e.g., Simon, 2006 WL 1541048 at, *5; Ling, 2006 WL 290477, at *1; Denney, 230
F.R.D. at 330.
16
The term “generic tax shelters” follows terminology in two reports on the invalid tax
shelters that were widely sold during the decade starting roughly around the mid-1990s that are
focused upon herein. In describing the abusive tax shelters under investigation, both reports used
very similar language and referred to generic tax products or generic tax shelters. These shelters
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rendering an opinion on a transaction with which he or she has no personal
interest, the likelihood of liability is probably lower.
Apart from the tax shelter situations, a number of cases have arisen
during this past decade in the benefit plan area. Although treated separately
from the tax shelter area, a number of these cases could reasonably be
considered part of the same general tax shelter phenomenon as the generic
tax shelters. Here too, many overly aggressive benefit plans were sold as
valid, though they went beyond the limits of what was permissible.
However, since these cases involved violations of specific statutory
sections, they are treated separately from the generic tax shelters.
Besides the generic tax shelters and the benefit plan areas, no single area
stands out prominently as being especially likely to generate tax malpractice
claims. As was the situation previously, a number of cases arose in the
scope of engagement area (i.e., what exactly did the tax professional
undertake), non-filing and late filing, and the estate and gift areas.
This study focuses solely on reported cases. It examines instances of
claimed malpractice involving federal income, estate and gift taxation. No
situations involving federal generation skipping taxes were discovered.
While other taxes were not intended to be focused on, a number of the cases
discussed involve federal payroll taxes and state and local taxes. While I
believe I have located most of the significant cases, I do not delude myself
into believing I discovered all the cases. I have intentionally omitted many
of the tax shelter cases that do not focus on the substantive tax malpractice

were described as complex transactions used to obtain tax benefits in a manner never intended.
The transactions have neither economic substance nor any business purpose other than tax
savings. These shelters, rather than being custom-designed for a single user were “prepared as a
generic ‘tax product’ available for sale to multiple clients.” Minority Staff of the Perm. Subcomm.
On Investigations of the Comm. On Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate, U.S. Tax Shelter Industry:
The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP,
OPIS, BLIPS and SC2, S. Rep. No. 108–34, at 2 (2003); Perm. Subcomm. On Investigations of
the Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate: The Role of
Professional Firms In The U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109–54, at 1 (2005).
These shelters have also been referred to as “technical” tax shelters. Del Wright Jr., Financial
Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil The IRS (And How The
IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 614–15 (2013). These shelters “were structured to
exploit, yet purportedly stay within the bounds of, the tax laws.” Id. at 614. A practical definition
of these shelters attributed to former Treasury Assistant Secretary Eric Solomon is that they are a
“tax-engineered transaction normally with little business purpose except to save taxes with
minimal risk or profit potential often designed to create a tax loss without an economic loss or in
some cases to make income nontaxable.” Id. at 615.
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issues, though they do assert malpractice or professional negligence claims,
since to do so would be unproductive.
Both attorneys and accountants are focused on in this study. While it
might be theoretically desirable to focus on these professions separately,
pragmatically this is not possible. The dividing line between the work of the
tax attorney and tax accountant has always been murky.17 In extending the
traditional attorney-client privilege to accountants and other tax
practitioners in 1998, Congress likely made the dividing line even
murkier.18 In many situations, the defendant tax practitioner could just as
easily be from one profession as from the other.
As a framework for the ensuing discussion, Part I of this article will
briefly review the general background principles governing tax malpractice,
such as the elements of the cause of action and the damages recoverable.
Part II will focus on the generic tax shelter cases of the past decade. Part III
will then review the other tax malpractice developments of roughly the past
decade. Part IV will offer concluding observations.

I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
A. Elements of a Malpractice Cause of Action19
Civil actions for tax malpractice are usually based on either traditional
tort or traditional contract theories.20 Under traditional tort principles, a
professional has a duty “to exercise the level of skill, care and diligence. . . .
normally exercised by other members of the profession under similar
circumstances,” whereas traditional contract principles impose the
obligation to perform the task undertaken diligently and competently.21 In
practice, these two standards, though emanating from different areas of the
law, are virtually identical.22 The professional, therefore, must exercise
reasonable competence and diligence to avoid malpractice exposure.23

17

See generally, e.g., National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Lawyers and Certified
Public Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional Relations, 36 TAX. LAW. 26, 27, 30–31 (1982).
18
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–206
§ 3411(a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (adding IRC § 7525).
19
This section is adapted from Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 552–53, though certain
footnotes have been updated.
20
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 601.1 (6th ed. 2004).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.

2014]

BAD TAX SHELTERS

609

While the basic standard of care is almost identical under tort and
contract theories, other aspects of the causes of action and/or defenses
thereto may differ depending on which theory is utilized.24 Differences are
usually encountered in the statute of limitations (both how long and when it
commences), the measure of damages, to whom liability extends (i.e.,
privity), and evidentiary matters, such as the need for expert testimony. 25
Normally, the malpractice tort asserted against an attorney is a specific
application of the ordinary tort of negligence.26 The attorney must act as a
reasonably competent and careful professional would act under similar
circumstances.27 Since tax law generally is perceived as a specialty, the
standard of care may be higher than in other attorney malpractice
situations.28 To establish a prima facie cause of action, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) a duty owed by the attorney to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that
duty; (3) injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) a proximate cause between
the injury suffered and the attorney’s breach of duty.”29
The standards for accountants are similar to those for attorneys.
Accounting is a learned profession and practitioners must act as would a
reasonably competent and careful member of the same profession under the
same circumstances. The elements of the prima facie cause of action against
the accountant are the same as those listed above against an attorney.30
Many cases simply equate the elements of the causes of action and the
standard of care in accountant and attorney situations.31 Nevertheless, there
are differences between the two professions that must be kept in mind. For
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. § 601.2.1.
28
See id. § 603.3; see also 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH WITH ALLISON D.
RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 35:3 (2014 ed.); Malpractice I, supra note 1, at 553–54.
29
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 601.2.1 (citations omitted). The essence of the cause of
action is comprised of the four elements listed despite the fact that some courts sometimes list
only three elements. See, e.g., Montes v. Asher & Co., C.P.A., 182 F. Supp. 2d 637, 638 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (listing the elements as duty, breach, and injury or damages); Boardman v. Stark, No.
20911, 2002 WL 1625617, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2002) (duty, breach and causal
connection between the conduct and the damages); Jones v. Bresset, 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 60, 70 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) (duty, breach and proximate cause). Similarly, in other contexts, a fifth
element (causation in fact) is added. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2000).
30
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 601.2.2.
31
See Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 551 n.13; see also Hnath v. Vecchitto, No.
X03CV930502910, 2003 WL 1995440, at *8 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2003) (adopting same
accrual of cause of action date for accountant as for attorney).
25
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instance, there might be different statutes of limitations32 and, since the
precise nature of the work each professional is called upon to do may differ,
a suit against an attorney and an accountant stemming from the same set of
facts might have different outcomes.33
While the normal malpractice cause of action involves the tort of
negligence, other torts are also encountered. Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc. is
a good illustration containing, in addition to negligence and breach of
contract claims, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, professional
malpractice, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional or negligent
misrepresentation, and false and deceptive trade practices under state law.34
Alleged violations of federal securities laws35 and RICO violations36 may
also arise, especially with generic tax shelters.
Since the tort of negligence is normally encountered in tax malpractice
cases, unless specifically indicated otherwise, it will be assumed herein that
this is the tort alleged.

B. Measure of Damages
The general tort measure of damages, which also applies in tax
malpractice situations, allows a plaintiff to recover for all injuries
proximately caused by a defendant’s negligent conduct. The plaintiff may
recover the difference between his or her present economic position and the
position he or she would have been in absent the negligence.37 The most
direct type of damages encountered in tax malpractice situations consist of
additional taxes resulting from the malpractice, interest and penalties
imposed on the additional taxes and corrective costs in attempting to

32
See, e.g., Inphoto Surveillance, Inc. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 788 N.E.2d 216, 218 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (interpreting Illinois’ “statute of repose” applicable to accountants: 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/13-214.2 (West 2002)).
33
Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 468, 472 (Haw. 2001) (The cause of action against the attorney
was permitted to proceed (no privity/lack of standing defense rejected) while the cause of action
against the accountant was not permitted to proceed (no-privity defense accepted).).
34
Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689
*3–4 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002). There was also an allegation of loss of consortium. Id.
35
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.3; Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 634.
36
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.3.
37
Id.§ 605.1.1; Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 643–45.
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eliminate or mitigate all or some of the foregoing damages. 38 As the
determination of recoverable damages is a matter of state law, differences
among the states exist.39 While penalties and corrective costs seem to be
generally recoverable, the situation concerning taxes and interest is
different.40 As to taxes, it seems that most states allow the recovery of any
additional taxes caused by the malpractice,41 though not in New York.42
With regard to interest imposed on a tax underpayment, there are three
approaches. One approach, which is the traditional and majority view,
permits the recovery of such interest.43 The second approach, which is a
distinct minority view, denies the recovery of any such interest.44 The third
approach, which is in-between the other two and represents the most recent
and growing view, permits the recovery of interest but only to the extent the
interest paid the government exceeds the interest earned by the plaintiff on
the underpaid taxes.45
All damages caused are recoverable, even indirect or consequential
damages, as long as they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
negligence.46 However, most courts do not award damages for emotional
pain and suffering where, such as in the tax malpractice area, the basic
injury suffered is only an economic one.47 To be recoverable, the damages
must be actually incurred, not merely speculative ones that may arise in the
38

This paragraph is adapted from Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A
Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 712 (2007) [hereinafter
Tax Malpractice Damages].
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. It should be emphasized that only additional taxes are addressed, not the basic taxes that
are inevitably due. For instance, if the correct taxes due are $100,000 and, due to an error by the
tax return preparer, taxes of $110,000 were paid and can no longer be recovered by simply filing
an amended tax return, it is the recovery of the additional $10,000 that is addressed.
42
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
My view is that Alpert is incorrect when applied to recoveries for negligence causes of action. See
Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 714–15; Jacob L. Todres, New York’s Law of Tax
Malpractice Damages: Balanced or Biased? 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 143, 160 (2012) [hereinafter
NY: Balanced or Biased].
43
Jacob L. Todres, Recovery of Interest on a Tax Underpayment Caused by a Tax Advisor’s
Negligence, 26 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Recovery of Interest] (tally of states
following each view, id. at 30).
44
Id. at 3–4.
45
Id. at 4.
46
Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 771.
47
Id. at 743; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 422 (Or. Ct. App.
1998).
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future.48 Additionally, under appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff may be
entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages.49 The normal duty
generally imposed upon a plaintiff, to mitigate damages resulting from a
defendant’s negligence, is also applicable.50 Similarly, under the so called
“American Rule,” attorney’s fees incurred to bring the malpractice action
are not generally recoverable.51 Such non-recoverable litigation costs should
be distinguished from normally recoverable damages, such as attorney or
accountant fees and other costs incurred to correct, or attempt to correct, the
effects of the defendant’s negligence.52

II. GENERIC TAX SHELTERS
A. Introductory
This part of the article focuses on the generic or technical tax shelters.
No reported cases were located that addressed other types of shelters during
the decade under review, except, perhaps, several arising in the employee
benefit area that are discussed subsequently.53 Although many thousands of
such invalid shelters were sold,54 paradoxically, there are only a handful of
reported cases that address any issue that can even charitably be
characterized as substantive to tax malpractice jurisprudence. Except for
Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP,55 decided in November, 2013, which reached
a judgment on the merits, the statement made by a commentator in an
article in 2008 that with respect to these cases there then was “not a single
reported decision determining whether a particular defendant committed
malpractice” is by and large still true today.56
48

See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.1.1.
Id. § 605.1.3; see also Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, 201 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf. ($80
million punitive damages).
50
See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.2.
51
Id. § 605.1.1.
52
Id.; see also Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 644.
53
See infra Part III.E.1.
54
S. Rep. No. 108–34 at 20 (2003) (IRS data from October 2003 identified 6400 individuals
and corporations that had purchased abusive tax shelters); See Joyce, supra note 7 (Two thousand
taxpayers reportedly participated in an IRS global settlement initiative and twelve hundred in a
Son of Boss settlement initiative. The extent of overlap of these numbers is unknown.).
55
Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, 201 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at
http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf.
56
Soled, supra note 8, at 275.
49
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While the principles governing other types of tax malpractice would be
expected to apply in this area as well—and the few cases that have
addressed tax malpractice issues seem to have done so—I believe the matter
is more complicated.57 As described in the 2003 Senate Shelter Report, in
the generic tax shelter area the tax professionals were not acting simply in
their customary role as independent advisors but were often really the
creators and purveyors of the shelters.58 While in form they rendered
opinion letters, they were really either the sellers of, or among a small
group involved in the sale of, a bad product who created an elaborate
scheme to defraud the purchasers.59 Essentially, the opinions were used as
marketing tools. The Senate report views the tax professionals involved as
principals.60 As such, the causes of action asserted in these situations
focused more on allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary obligations
than normally encountered in other tax malpractice contexts.61 Also, in light
of the off-the-shelf, multiple sales of the same type of scheme to many
purchasers, apart from any possible class action status, the primary focus
for recovery was really the federal RICO statute with its allure of the
possible recovery of treble damages plus legal fees incurred in bringing the
damage suit.62 Concomitant with the asserted RICO cause of action, it was
also necessary to determine whether the underlying claim could be brought
as a federal securities law violation, for if it could, the RICO claim was
precluded.63 These cases therefore involve a mix of causes of action that is
different from what is usually encountered in other tax malpractice
contexts.
To simplify the ensuing discussion, cases arising from generic tax
shelters but involving primarily non-tax malpractice issues will be ignored,
even though they may contain some tangential reference to tax
57

See, e.g., Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 948 N.E.2d 132, 165–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011);
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 760–65 (9th Cir. 2007); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C., 341 F .Supp. 2d 363, 374–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIVRYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *9 (S.D. Fla. December 10, 2002).
58
See S. Rep. No. 108–34 at 11–12 (2003).
59
Id. at 11–12, 20.
60
See id.
61
See S.E.C. v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (The S.E.C. alleged
KPMG partners engaged in accounting fraud at Xerox Corporation.); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 88
So.3d 327, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (Plaintiffs alleged negligent misrepresentation, violation
of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, professional malpractice, and aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.).
62
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012).
63
See id. § 1964(c).
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malpractice.64 Also, since the underlying fact patterns in most of the cases
are very similar, even when the specific tax shelter product was different,
there will not be any attempt to focus on the specific facts of each case
discussed. Instead, a prototype generic tax shelter situation will be assumed
based on two cases that are quite representative of this genre of cases. The
pattern in these cases is remarkably similar to the situations described in the
2003 Senate Shelter Report as well as in the 2005 Senate Shelter Report.
To avoid a lengthy and distracting foray into complex and esoteric
technical tax matters, there will be no attempt to delve into the underlying
technical aspects of any of the generic tax shelters, though an exception is
later made with respect to the recent Yung case.65 Instead, it will be assumed
herein that a patently ineffective product was sold as a supposedly viable
and valid shelter. Evidence that these tax shelters were patently invalid
abounds. First and foremost, after extensive investigation, the 2003 and
2005 Senate Reports on the generic shelters so concluded.66 Also, when
KPMG and Ernst & Young entered into criminal settlements for their
involvement with these shelters, in addition to agreeing to pay very
substantial amounts to the government, they admitted these shelters were
fraudulent.67 In addition, when the IRS started to pursue the shelter
investors, most participated in various IRS settlement initiatives rather than
litigating.68 If there was a reasonable possibility the shelters were valid,
many more of the purchasers, who by definition were quite wealthy,
successful business people, could have been expected to litigate.
Furthermore, if the tax shelters were even plausibly valid, it seems unlikely
64

See, e.g., supra notes 10-12.
See generally Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013)
available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf; See infra Part 2.D.
66
S. Rep. No. 108–34 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54 (2005). The gist of both reports is that the
bulk of the generic tax shelters or products are invalid.
67
See I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-83 (Aug. 29, 2005) (KPMG agreed to pay $456 million
and “admitted that it engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion dollars in phony tax
losses.”); Dept. of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement With Ernst & Young
LLP to Pay $123 million to Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investigation (March 1, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March13/EYNPAPR.php?print=1. It
also should be noted that the seventh-largest U.S. accounting firm in 2011, BDO USA, admitted
criminal wrongdoing in connection with its sales of tax shelters, agreed to pay $50 million, and
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government. Dena Aubin, BDO to Pay $50
Million in Tax Shelter Case, REUTERS (Jun. 13, 2012) http://www.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=USL1E8HDHHV20120613. See also Sheryl Stratton, Nine Tax Professionals Indicted;
KPMG Admits Shelters Were Fraudulent, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005 at 167-1.
68
See Joyce, supra note 7.
65
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that any of the promoters would have faced anything other than some sort
of civil penalty for their roles in the creation and/or sale of these shelters.
Instead, a number pled guilty to criminal offenses69 and others were found
guilty after trial.70 Finally, and very pragmatically, there were too many
such products and permutations of products to even begin to attempt such
an analysis. The 2003 Senate Shelter Report indicated that at one point the
accounting firm of KPMG alone had almost 500 of such tax shelter
products in various stages of development.71

B. General Background
These new shelters had very exotic sounding names such as FLIP,
OPIS, BLIPS, COBRA, BOSS, Son-of-BOSS, etc.72 They ultimately ended
up costing the government billions of dollars in lost tax revenues.73 The
new shelters were different from the previous types of shelters. The Senate
Shelter Reports focus on two such differences. First, the prior shelters
involved instances in which advantage was taken of “specific tax benefits
explicitly enacted by Congress to advance a legitimate endeavor, such as
the low income housing tax credit.”74 Also, the Reports suggest that the
69

See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Tax Attorney Pleads Guilty on Charges Linked to Fraudulent
Tax Shelter Activities, BNA Daily Tax Rep. No. 202 at p. K-1 (Oct. 21, 2010) (referring to guilty
pleas by Erwin Mayer (former Jenkens & Gilchrist partner), Charles W. Bee Jr. (former BDO
Seidman vice chairman) Michael Kerekes (former BDO Seidman principal), Adrian Dicker
(former BDO Seidman vice chairman), Robert Greisman (firmer BDO Seidman partner) and Mark
Bloom (former BDO Seidman partner).); Andrew Velarde & Kristen A. Parillo, Daugerdas
Convicted of Tax Shelter Charges, Tax Notes 574 (Nov. 11, 2013) (Donna Guerin (former
Jenkens & Gilchrist partner) pled guilty after having a prior conviction overturned due to juror
misconduct.).
70
See Velarde & Parillo, supra note 69, at 574 (among those convicted are Paul M.
Daugerdas,former Jenkens & Gilchrist partner); see also Second Circuit Affirms Convictions of
Former KPMG Executives, Finds Error Regarding Fine, BNA Daily Tax Rep. No. 166 at p. K-3
(Aug. 30, 2010) (refers to convictions of Robert Pfaff (former KPMG tax partner), John Larson
(former KPMG senior tax manager) and Raymond J. Ruble (former Brown & Wood partner)).
71
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 3 (2003).
72
The acronyms stood for: Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP), Offshore Portfolio
Investment Strategy (OPIS), Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (BLIPS), Bond and Options
Sales Strategy (BOSS), Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives (COBRA). S. Rep. No. 10834, at 3 (2003) (FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 78 (2005) (COBRA), 88 (BOSS).
73
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee the U.S. General Accounting Office
estimated the potential tax loss as of September 30, 2003 at $85 billion. U.S. G OV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-104T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CHALLENGES REMAIN
IN COMBATING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS 11 (2003).
74
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003).
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prior shelters involved a response by a tax professional to an inquiry by a
single client.75 In contrast, according to the Reports, the new shelters were
complex transactions with no economic substance or business purpose other
than the reduction of taxes.76 Also, the new shelters involved “generic tax
products” affirmatively developed by a firm and marketed to numerous
potential buyers.77 The 2003 Report further bemoaned the fact that
“[d]ubious tax shelter sales . . . [were] no longer the province of shady, flyby-night companies” but instead became big business involving top
professionals from the country’s largest accounting and law firms,
investment advisory firms, and banks.78
To somewhat concretize how the generic tax shelters worked, assume a
taxpayer sold his business and realized a very large gain. If the taxpayer did
not seek out a tax shelter on his own, an accountant,79 banker,80 or someone
else aware of the large impending gain might introduce the taxpayer to a
seller of shelters who was often an accounting firm,81 banker82 or financial
advisor.83 After being repeatedly assured that the shelter was completely
legal and valid and that opinions to this effect would later be available from
either a CPA firm and prominent law firm or from several prominent law
firms, the taxpayer would agree to purchase the shelter at a very significant
cost. The legal opinion(s) often required additional fees. After purchasing
the shelter and signing the documentation presented to him or her, a series
of transactions would be orchestrated by the shelter seller with the aid of
one or more banks (to make loans) and certain other intermediaries/
facilitators to take whatever steps were to be performed. The taxpayer was
passive and had no real understanding or involvement in what was
happening. While some taxpayers might have been told there was a chance
75

Id. See also S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9 (2005). This seems to ignore the fact that previously
there were syndicators who sold shelters to a number of customers.
76
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005).
77
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005).
78
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 5 (2003).
79
See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) amended on reconsideration, 03 CIV. 6942 (SAS), 2004 WL 2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
2004).
80
See, e.g., Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2002).
81
See, e.g., Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 363; Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *4.
82
See, e.g., RA Inves. I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL
1356446, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005).
83
See, e.g., Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP, 623 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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of actually earning real money from the shelters, most were only interested
in obtaining the large losses that had been promised to offset the income
that was sought to be sheltered. These losses were then reported on the
appropriate tax returns. While the transactions may or may not have
actually been effectuated, there was no real business purpose for them, they
involved no real risk of loss nor possibility of gain, and they did not have
any real economic consequences to the taxpayer apart from generating the
promised tax losses.
Many different promoters sold a number of different types of tax
shelters. While there were differences in precisely how each promoter
structured and effectuated the transactions, essentially most of the technical
generic tax shelters were fundamentally very similar. The Senate
Committee’s detailed description of what occurred in one type of
transaction is therefore quite informative of how most of the shelters
operated at the basic level.
The 2003 Senate Shelter Report focused on four shelters developed and
marketed by the big four accounting firm of KPMG, which was probably
the largest purveyor of the generic shelters.84 In analyzing the circumstances
surrounding the development and sale of these tax shelter products, the
Report indicated that KPMG’s involvement with the product did not end
with the sale of the product.85 Complex financial steps and investment
activities needed to be performed to effectuate the shelter transactions and
KPMG enlisted the intermediaries and helped orchestrate all the necessary
steps.86 With respect to the tax opinion letters, the Report noted that KPMG
worked closely with the law firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, which
issued over 600 opinion letters supporting 13 questionable shelter
products.87 KPMG initially prepared a prototype tax opinion for each of the
products, which then became the template for the opinion letters it issued to
its clients.88 It collaborated with the law firm before selling any product to

84

S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 3 (2003). It was indicated that at one point KPMG had over 500 of
such tax products in inventory. Id.
85
Id. at 9.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 10–11. Actually the Brown & Wood law firm was involved with the shelters. S. Rep.
No. 109-54, at 96 (2005). It later merged with the Sidley Austin firm with the surviving firm
called Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. Apparently the Sidley Austin firm was not involved with
these shelters, though, after the merger, some work of this type was still engaged in by certain of
the old Brown & Wood attorneys (R.J. Ruble) contrary to the policy of the new firm to no longer
engage in such work. Id. at 100.
88
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 11 (2003).
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assure the law firm would supply a favorable opinion letter.89 KPMG and
Sidley actually exchanged copies of their draft opinions, and their opinions
ended up having numerous identical paragraphs.90 KPMG directed its
shelter clients to Sidley, which provided nearly identical opinions to the
clients that included no individualized legal advice.91 In many cases Sidley
issued the opinion without ever having spoken to the client.92 Also, the
factual representations underlying the opinions, which purportedly were
made by the client, KPMG, the intermediary financial advisors/facilitators
and the banks, were actually drafted by KPMG.93 Many of the important
representations made by the clients, such as that they independently
investigated the transactions and believed there was a reasonable
opportunity to earn a profit, were drafted by KPMG and were false.94 In
addition, there was evidence that with respect to one of the four shelter
products focused on by the Senate Report, Sidley was paid a fee whenever a
client was simply informed that a second opinion letter endorsing the
validity of the product was available from Sidley, even if the client never
purchased the opinion letter.95 In light of the relationship between KPMG
and Sidley, the Senate Report’s conclusion in this portion of the Report
seems somewhat understated: “This type of close, ongoing, and lucrative
collaboration raises serious questions about the independence of both
parties and the value of their opinion letters in light of the financial stake
that both firms had in the sale of the tax product being analyzed.”96
Once the IRS realized the extent and nature of the generic tax shelter
epidemic, it proceeded with a carrot and stick approach. For the stick, as it
became aware of the different types of shelters being marketed, it issued
announcements designating them as listed transactions, thereby imposing
requirements on taxpayers utilizing such shelters to report on their tax
returns their participation in such tax shelters97—thereby pretty much
89

Id.
Id. at 11–12.
91
Id. at 12.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
I.R.C. § 6011 (2012). The early Notices issued by the IRS that are mentioned in a number
of the cases are I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761 (Tax Avoidance Using Distributions of
Encumbered Property) (“BOSS Notice”); and I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (Tax
Avoidance Using Artificially High Basis) (“Son of BOSS” Notice). Examples of other Notices are
90
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assuring an audit. The designation also imposed record-keeping
requirements on the promoters and sellers.98 The IRS also announced
repeatedly it would vigorously pursue shelter participants.99 In tandem with
these steps, the IRS periodically issued disclosure or settlement initiatives
whereby those taxpayers who would either voluntarily come forth and
disclose their participation in certain shelters or who would agree to settle
based on the terms of the initiative would obtain favorable settlement
terms.100 These initiatives required full payment of any tax underpayments
together with interest, but typically would waive all or some portion of the
full forty-percent penalty.101 Many taxpayers took advantage of these
initiatives.102 Thus, when a tax shelter product was designated by the IRS as
a reportable transaction, or when it was the subject of an IRS disclosure or
settlement initiative, another issue or set of issues arose. The issues concern
whether the tax professionals and /or the others involved in selling the tax
shelters were obligated to inform the purchasers of the IRS designation or
initiative, whether they did or did not inform the tax purchasers about these
designations or initiatives, and whether any advice they rendered in this
regard was proper.103

I.R.S. Notice 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 828 (S Corporation Tax Shelter); I.R.S. Notice 2002-65,
2002-2 C.B. 690 (Passthrough Entity Straddle Tax Shelter); and I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2
C.B. 129 (Basis Shifting Tax Shelter).
98
I.R.C. §§ 6111–6112 (2012).
99
See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release, Tax Day Reminder: Treasury & IRS Continue Crackdown
on Abusive Tax Shelters, IR-2003-51 (Apr. 15, 2003); I.R.S. News Release, Strong Response to
“Son of Boss” Settlement Initiative, IR-2004-87 (Jul. 1, 2004) (“‘We will vigorously pursue all
those who participated in Son of Boss deals but did not take advantage of the settlement
initiative.’” (quoting Commissioner Everson)) (“‘For those who haven’t come forward and intend
to take the IRS to court, we plan an aggressive litigation strategy.’” (quoting IRS Chief Counsel
Don Korb)); I.R.S. Announcement 2002-96, 2002-2 C.B. 756 (“The Service will vigorously
defend or prosecute all future COLI [corporate owned life insurance] litigation.”).
100
See, e.g., IRS Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304 (disclosure initiative – section
6662(b) (1)–(4) penalties waived for taxpayers who disclose participation in tax shelters); IRS
Announcement 2005-80, 2005-2 C.B. 967 (settlement initiative for a number of shelters); IRS
Announcement 2002-97, 2002-2 C.B. 757 (settlement initiative for basis-shifting transactions).
101
See, e.g., IRS Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304; IRS Announcement 2005-80,
2005-2 C.B. 967; IRS Announcement 2002-97, 2002-2 C.B. 757.
102
See Joyce, supra note 7.
103
See, e.g., Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 948 N.E.2d 132, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)
(accountant advised plaintiff not to participate in amnesty program); Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476
F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (accountant and attorney advised plaintiff to participate in amnesty
program); Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (defendants
advised plaintiffs not to participate in amnesty program); RA Invs. I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG,
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C. Prototype Generic Tax Shelter Scenario
Loftin v. KPMG LLP104 is a good illustration of the operation of a
generic tax shelter. In Loftin, the plaintiff sold stock in 1997 and 1999 and
netted capital gains of $30 million and $65 million, respectively.105 On
depositing the proceeds from the 1997 sale, the plaintiff’s banker
encouraged him to retain the accounting firm of KPMG for tax planning
purposes regarding the $30 million capital gains.106 The plaintiff met with
KPMG and was presented with the FLIP (Foreign Leveraged Investment
Program) tax planning strategy.107 If effective, the FLIP strategy would
generate large capital losses to offset the capital gains, thereby saving
Loftin the tax on the capital gains.108 KPMG assured the plaintiff that the
FLIP strategy complied with IRS rules and regulations and would withstand
an IRS audit.109 The plaintiff decided to use the FLIP strategy.110 He then
retained KPMG as well as another firm knowledgeable about the strategy to
act as intermediary.111 KPMG required him to retain this intermediary to
implement the strategy.112 KPMG was also retained to prepare his 1997 tax
return.113 The FLIP strategy was implemented in a number of steps taken
from September 16, 1997 to December 22, 1997.114 In June of 1998, the
plaintiff received opinions from KPMG and the law firm of Brown & Wood
that the FLIP strategy was “more likely than not” to be considered

No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005 (some plaintiffs
not informed of amnesty program, others advised not to participate); Stechler v. Sidley, Austin
Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(attorneys advised plaintiff of
amnesty program and advised them to consult with their accountants who advised against
participation).
104
See generally Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2002). The discussion of Loftin is adapted from Jacob
L. Todres, Investment In A Bad Tax Shelter: Malpractice Recovery From The Tax Advisor Is No
Slam-Dunk, Tax Notes, April 11, 2005 p. 217, 219, 225–26.
105
Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 at *4,*7.
106
Id. at *4.
107
Id. *4–5. It should be noted that Loftin also referred to a BLIP shelter strategy for 1999,
but never discussed nor described the BLIP strategy. Id. at *7–8.
108
Id. at *5.
109
Id. at *5.
110
Id.
111
Id. at *4–5.
112
Id. at *7.
113
Id. at *4–5.
114
Id. at *5–6.
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proper.115 A similar scenario occurred in 1999 regarding the plaintiff’s 1999
capital gains.116
The FLIP strategy proved ineffective. The IRS commenced an audit of
the plaintiff’s 1997 tax return in October 2000117 and later issued an
announcement challenging the efficacy of all such types of transactions.118
KPMG encouraged the plaintiff to settle with the IRS.119
Loftin later filed suit again KPMG, Brown & Wood, and the other
participants in the FLIP strategy.120 The complaint included allegations of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, malpractice
against KPMG and Brown & Wood, and a RICO claim. 121 Most of the
court’s opinion in Loftin addressed whether the RICO claim was barred by
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and ultimately held
that it was.122 Insofar as the other causes of action were concerned, the court
held all of them were premature because Loftin had not yet settled with the
IRS and therefore there were no damages, the presence of which was an
essential element for all the other causes of action.123
Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. is similar to Loftin and illustrates
both the typical generic tax shelter scenario and also many of the legal
issues raised in this area.124 In Seippel, William Seippel was a senior
executive at a Virginia company.125 In 1999, Mr. Seippel was planning to
change jobs.126 In connection with the change, he exercised stock options
and sold the resulting stock for a gain of at least $12 million.127 Ernst &
Young was his employer’s auditor and had provided tax advice and
financial services to the senior executives of his employer, including Mr.

115

Id. at *7.
See id. at *7–8.
117
Id. at *8.
118
I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129.
119
Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *8.
120
See id.
121
Id. at *8–9.
122
Id. at *10–21.
123
Id. at *21–25 (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); *25–27 (breach of fiduciary duty);
*27–29 (malpractice).
124
See generally Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
amended on reconsideration, 03 CIV. 6942 (SAS), 2004 WL 2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004).
125
Id. at 368.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 368–69.
116
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Seippel.128 Ernst & Young therefore knew of Mr. Seippel’s plans and of his
substantial taxable gain.129
Late in 1999, Ernst & Young convinced Mr. Seippel to engage in a
COBRA (“Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives”) tax shelter
transaction involving the purchase and sale of options on foreign currency
to shield his $12 million gain from taxation.130 According to the complaint,
Ernst & Young convinced Mr. Seippel that the COBRA shelter was
completely legal and even conservative.131 He was informed by Ernst &
Young that it had developed the COBRA shelter and that two blue-chip law
firms, Jenkens & Gilchrist132 and Brown & Wood, would provide opinion
letters as to the propriety of the COBRA shelter.133
From the opinion it appears that the various steps of the COBRA
transaction (really a number of transactions) were effectuated during
December 1999.134 Defendant Deutsche Bank was used to effectuate some
of the transactions.135 In February 2000, Mr. Seippel received an opinion
letter from Jenkens & Gilchrist stating that the $12 million of losses
generated by the COBRA transactions were legally deductible.136 A similar
opinion was received from Brown & Wood in March 2000 that also
indicated that the IRS should not be able to successfully assert any penalties
as a result of the tax positions taken by Mr. Seippel in the COBRA
transactions.137 Ernst & Young prepared the 1999 and 2000 tax returns for
Mr. and Mrs. Seippel reporting the COBRA transactions.138
On December 27, 1999, the IRS issued Notice 1999-59 informing the
public that “certain types of transactions . . . being marketed to taxpayers
for the purpose of generating . . . artificial losses are not allowable for

128

Id. at 368.
Id. at 368-69.
130
Id. at 369.
131
Id.
132
As part of its settlement with the government for its role in the proliferation of fraudulent
generic tax shelters, in addition to agreeing to pay a fine of $76 million, Jenkens & Gilchrist
agreed to disband. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007); Press Release, U.S.
Attorneys Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Attorney Enters Non-prosecution Agreement with Jenkins
& Gilchrist in Connection with its Fraudulent Tax Shelter Activity (Mar. 28, 2007).
133
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 370.
129
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federal income tax purposes.”139 The plaintiff alleged that Notice 1999-59
likely applied to the COBRA transaction.140 The plaintiff further alleged
that Notice 2000-44, released on September 5, 2000, specified that the
precise transaction marketed as the COBRA transaction was not properly
allowable for tax purposes.141 In all the communications Mr. Seippel
received from the defendants the only mention of either of these Notices
was contained in the Jenkens & Gilchrist opinion letter, which stated only
that Notice 1999-59 did not apply to the COBRA transactions.142
In March 2002 Ernst & Young informed Mr. Seippel that it had received
subpoenas in connection with an IRS investigation of COBRA.143 Mr.
Seippel retained new tax and legal advisers in July 2002 and then
discovered the alleged fraud.144 The present suit was commenced on
September 10, 2003.145
The allegations against the defendants in Seippel are representative of
the generic shelter area. According to the complaint, the attorney
defendants, Jenkens & Gilchrist146 and Brown & Wood, actually developed
and promoted the COBRA shelter as well as many other tax shelters.147 To
operate, market and promote these shelters they entered into an alliance
with a number of accounting and financial services firms.148 They had the
accountant, here Ernst & Young, assert that it had developed the shelter to
give the impression that the attorneys were exercising independent
judgment in rendering their opinions.149 That also enabled both attorneys to
charge substantial fees for what were essentially “canned” opinions
requiring little, if any, additional work.150 The opinion letters would attest to

139

I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761.
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 369–70.
143
Id. at 370.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 366.
146
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the legitimacy of the shelter and if the shelters were found to be invalid,
protect the participants from the imposition of penalties by the tax
authorities. In what seems like a very macabre twist that could only protect
the attorneys from liability while undercutting the value of the opinion
letters, the defendants would receive the opinion letters only after they had
engaged in the shelter transactions.151 Also, the accountant, here Ernst &
Young, or other firm soliciting prospective shelter participants, allegedly
was to over-represent the positives of the shelter (i.e., it was “100 percent
legitimate”) while understating risks, such as by failing to disclose authority
to the contrary.152 Finally, the defendants allegedly agreed among
themselves that the accounting firm would assert to potential participants
that the proposed shelter transaction was proprietary and confidential and
could not be taken to the potential participant’s attorney or accountant for
independent review.153
In Seippel, the plaintiff sought to recover the following types of
damages: (1) cost of retaining tax and legal advisors to discover the fraud
and to rectify the problems created by their participation in the shelter; (2)
additional federal and Virginia taxes they were promised they would not
have to pay; (3) interest and/or penalties on the underpaid taxes; (4) losses
incurred when they had to liquidate assets at fire sale prices to meet their
tax obligations; and (5) loss of alternative legitimate tax saving
opportunities.154 He also sought rescission of his fee agreement with the
defendants and recovery of the fees paid.155
The causes of action asserted in Seippel are typical of those asserted in
the generic shelter cases. They include assertion of RICO act violations and
recoveries for breach of fiduciary duties, inducing breach of fiduciary
duties, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, malpractice,
unethical, excessive illegal and unreasonable fees and unjust enrichment. 156
The complaint brought in federal district court involved both federal and
state law questions.157

paid to the lawyers were $338,880 to Jenkens & Gilchrist and $21,180 to Brown & Wood. Id. at
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D. Cases
In focusing on the professional malpractice causes of action in the
generic tax shelter area, a threshold issue immediately arises. While the
rendition of incorrect tax advice could certainly be the basis for a
malpractice suit against an attorney or accountant, could it be the basis for a
suit against another type of professional? The issue arises because in a
number of instances the sellers of the shelters were financial advisors,
banks or other non-accountants and non-attorneys. Similarly, banks and
other intermediaries were involved in virtually all of these transactions. If
for some reason they could not be held liable under another cause of action,
could they be held liable under the malpractice cause of action? This issue
depends on state law and differences among the states are likely. In a nongeneric tax shelter case involving incorrect tax advice given by an insurance
agent/financial planner, a federal district court specifically sidestepped the
issue of whether New York law recognized a professional malpractice cause
of action against financial advisors.158
This issue arose in Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, and the court held such
a suit against another professional was permissible.159 In Khan, the
plaintiffs purchased tax shelters in 1999 and 2000 from its auditors,
defendant BDO Seidman.160 The present case involved only Deutsche Bank,
which acted as an investment bank that entered into certain option
transactions with the plaintiffs, and the accounting firm of Grant Thornton,
LLP, which had reported certain of the shelter losses on the tax return of
one of the plaintiffs’ corporations, which losses then flowed through to the
plaintiffs’ tax returns.161 At the trial court, the causes of action against these
two defendants were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.162 On this
appeal, the appellate court reversed the dismissal on statute of limitations
grounds.163 The Deutsche Bank defendants argued that the Illinois
malpractice rules did not apply to them because they were not
accountants.164 They argued that “tax advice, even if given negligently,
cannot rise to a malpractice claim unless given by a professional tax
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Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *11–12 n.7
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advisor.”165 The court gave short shrift to this argument and held that “[o]ne
does not have to be an accountant to incur liability for giving negligent tax
advice.”166 The court adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts that liability is incurred if six conditions are met:
(1) the defendants gave the tax advice in the course of their
business or in a transaction in which they had a pecuniary
interest;
(2) the defendants gave the tax advice for the plaintiff’s
guidance in his business transactions;
(3) the tax advice was false;
(4) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining the tax information or in
communicating it to the plaintiff;
(5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the tax advice; and
(6) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss as a consequence.167
Other fundamental issues that must be carefully delineated in the
malpractice context are the role of the tax professional and exactly when the
tax professional became involved in the transaction. While the Senate
Shelter Reports investigating the generic tax shelter phenomenon seemed to
focus on instances in which the accountant or the attorney was really in the
group creating and marketing the shelters and was not acting as an
independent professional, this is not how all such situations occurred.168 It is
certainly possible, and even likely, that a potential purchaser of a shelter
would retain an independent professional to review the proposed transaction
and advise whether it was effective. In Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green &
MacRae, L.L.P., after deciding to participate in a tax shelter for 2001, the
plaintiffs engaged an accountant to review the shelter, provide independent
and objective advice of the tax risks, advise on proper tax treatment, and
prepare the plaintiffs’ personal federal and New Jersey tax returns for 2001
and 2002.169 The individual accountant was retained in November 2001
and, in the first half of 2002, became affiliated with an accounting firm that
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was one of the defendants in this litigation.170 In denying the defendant
accounting firm’s motion to dismiss the complaint against it, the court did
hold that there was no basis to hold the defendant accounting firm liable for
the two investments in the shelter scheme made before the defendant came
onto the scene in the first half of 2002.171 They could, however, face
potential liability for the plaintiffs’ later investment that was made after
they were advising the plaintiffs.172
In Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., the court also took
careful note of when the attorney-client relationship arose.173 The court held
this occurred on March 8, 2002, after the plaintiff purchased the shelter in
late 2001, but before the tax return for 2001 was filed.174 The court granted
defendant Sidley Austin’s motion to dismiss a fraud and fraud-related
causes of action that predated the attorney-client relationship.175 However, it
refused to dismiss a malpractice cause of action against Sidley Austin based
on actions occurring after the attorney-client relationship arose, since the
relationship imposed duties and responsibilities on the attorney that did not
previously exist.176 Quite properly, in this portion of the opinion when the
court referred to potential damages that might be recoverable, it included
only damages arising from claiming improper deductions on a tax return,
but none relating to the cost of purchasing the invalid tax shelter.177
In Affco Investments, LLC v. KPMG, LLP, after investing in a tax
shelter, but before reporting the losses on their tax return, the plaintiffs
became concerned that under two notices recently issued by the IRS they
would need to report their participation in the shelter on their tax return. 178
After the first notice was issued they obtained an opinion from the New
York law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP that the plaintiffs’ transactions were
not substantially similar to any transactions prohibited by the IRS and that it
was therefore unnecessary to report the shelter transaction on their tax
return.179 After the second IRS notice, the plaintiffs obtained a supplemental
opinion from Proskauer reaffirming the continued validity of the original
170
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opinion.180 The plaintiffs followed this advice, which was consistent with
the advice they received from the seller of the shelter, KPMG, and the
Sidley law firm, and claimed the shelter losses on their tax returns but did
not report their participation in the shelter on their tax returns.181 As a
consequence, they eventually ended up paying additional taxes, interest and
penalties.182 Because they did not report their participation in the tax shelter
on their tax returns, they were ineligible to participate in the IRS amnesty
program for this type of shelter.183 The opinion did not address the
substance of this claim, since the court dismissed all federal causes of
action asserted against Proskauer and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims.184
As noted previously, at various times the IRS made amnesty and
settlement offers to taxpayers who utilized various types of generic tax
shelters.185 A number of cases mentioned whether the tax advisor did or did
not inform the plaintiffs of these programs and whether they advised them
to participate in these programs.186 However, none of the cases reached the
stage of focusing on the substantive repercussions of the tax advisor’s
conduct in this regard. The issue did arise but in a rather unusual posture in
Rosenbach v. The Diversified Group, Inc.187 In Rosenbach, the plaintiffs
were successful in an arbitration proceeding against the sellers of a bad tax
shelter.188 The defendants then brought a third party claim for contribution
against the plaintiffs’ tax counsel and plaintiffs’ accounting firm that filed
the tax return on which the shelter loss was reported.189 The claim against
the tax counsel was that it failed to disclose material information to the
plaintiffs in advising the plaintiffs whether to apply for amnesty.190 The
claim against the accounting firm was that it lacked a reasonable basis for
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believing the tax shelter loss was valid and would be accepted by the
IRS.191 While it seems ludicrous and the height of “chutzpah” for the seller
of a bad tax shelter who repeatedly vouched for the efficacy of the shelter to
be able to claim the purchasers’ tax return preparer should have known
better than to believe him, the New York intermediate appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the third party defendants’ motion to
dismiss this claim for contribution.192
One aspect of Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP is
worthy of note.193 Carroll involved the final stage in a litigation by the
purchasers of a bad tax shelter.194 The action was resolved against all
defendants other than the promoter (and two related corporations) who sold
the shelter to the plaintiffs.195 It did not involve any tax professionals. The
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the
complaint because the plaintiffs did not establish their fraud claim against
the defendant.196 In discussing the viability of the fraud cause of action, the
court held the plaintiffs had not proven any injury.197 Although the plaintiffs
reported the tax shelter losses on their 2001 tax return, they later filed an
amended return eliminating the shelter losses and paid the additional taxes
and interest.198 By voluntarily taking a less risky approach, the plaintiffs
were held to be unable to demonstrate that they suffered any injury caused
by the defendants.199 While this type of holding might make sense under
appropriate circumstances, it seems incorrect here. Throughout 2001 to
2003 the IRS was vigorously pursuing tax shelter investors. Many of the
shelters were determined by the IRS to be illegal, or potentially so, and
many were designated as listed transactions. To force a taxpayer to file a tax
return claiming invalid losses in order to be able to recover the damages
caused by the invalid shelter seems wrong. If anything, by amending their
tax return the plaintiffs were reducing their potential damages. Mitigation of
damages is a longstanding and almost universal requirement of tort law.200
191
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Sound policy would seem to require rewarding the plaintiffs for their
conduct limiting potential damages rather than penalizing them.
Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP raises several
fascinating issues, though the case is purely procedural, addressing the
production of documents in the face of claims of attorney client privilege.201
In Christenbury, in October 2002 a Texas attorney advised the plaintiff of
the Nevis Asset Protection Trust, an insurance-related product offered
through Fidelity Insurance Co. Ltd. and another company.202 The product
was recommended in response to the plaintiff’s inquiry about obtaining a
tax-favorable insurance and financial product.203 On the plaintiff’s behalf,
the Texas attorney obtained an opinion from the defendant law firm that the
proposed transaction would qualify for an income tax deduction and did not
constitute a tax shelter.204 The opinion was dated December 18, 2002 and
was based on a number of factual representations, most of which were
supplied by Fidelity.205 As Fidelity was also a client of the defendant law
firm, the defendant obtained a conflict waiver, after it represented that its
representation of Fidelity was on unrelated insurance matters.206 The
plaintiff subsequently purchased the financial product from Fidelity.207
In September 2003 the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant
informing him that certain material facts concerning the product were not as
originally represented and that they were retroactively withdrawing their
earlier opinion.208 Upon receiving this letter the plaintiff attempted to
terminate his Nevis Trust and recover his $2.5 million investment.209
Fidelity offered to refund the investment less a contractually provided
redemption or termination fee of $370,000 and in exchange for an
agreement releasing Fidelity from any liability.210 The plaintiff refused and
instituted a suit in the Nevis courts against Fidelity that was still pending at
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the time of trial.211 The plaintiff sued the Texas attorney, and that suit was
resolved pursuant to a confidential agreement.212
The plaintiff subsequently instituted this action against the defendant,
seeking $2.5 million in damages.213 Among the causes of action asserted are
breach of contract to perform legal services for the plaintiff, professional
negligence in performing the legal work for the plaintiff and negligent
misrepresentation in that false information was supplied in the tax opinion
and in the conflict waiver.214 Among the defenses asserted by the defendant
is plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages by rejecting Fidelity’s redemption
offer.215
While the substantive issues concerning the effect of the withdrawal of
an opinion and mitigation seem most intriguing, the opinion focuses solely
on legal privilege and its waiver. The defendant sought to obtain documents
relating to the plaintiff’s investment decision, including communications
with the Texas attorney, and also post-transaction documents relating to tax
filings and the plaintiff’s decision to reject Fidelity’s redemption offer.216
The court ordered the production of documents related to the plaintiff’s
decision to invest but not of any post-transaction documents.217 The plaintiff
sought discovery of the defendant’s entire client files relating to Fidelity
and the other company,218 but the court denied this.219
At present,220 Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP seems to be the only
reported generic tax shelter type case that has gone to judgment on the
merits.221 Yung is especially significant not just for being the first, but for
the magnitude of the total damages awarded ($100 million),222 the fact that
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punitive damages of $80 million were awarded as part of the damages, and
the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct.223 The judge found the
defendant’s conduct to be not only grossly negligent but also fraudulent by
both commission and omission.224
At a vastly oversimplified level, Yung can be summarized as being
pretty much a predictable generic tax shelter litigation. Between June, 2000,
when first approached by its accounting firm, defendant Grant Thornton,
and December 29, 2000, when the first two steps of the shelter transaction
were effectuated, the plaintiff Yung225 was convinced to purchase a tax
shelter from the defendant that would enable Yung to repatriate $30 million
from two of his controlled foreign corporations without incurring any
income tax.226 Yung and his advisors were repeatedly assured the plan was
legally valid and risk-free and that Grant Thornton would give him its
more-likely-than-not opinion to this effect.227 The first two steps of the
transaction were effectuated on December 29, 2000.228 The third and final
step was effectuated on September 28, 2001.229 Timely tax returns for 2000
and 2001 were filed by Yung after they were either prepared and/or
reviewed by Grant Thornton.230 In 2004 the IRS commenced an audit of the
shelter transaction.231 The audit was settled on June 7, 2007 and resulted in
Yung paying additional taxes, interest and substantial penalties.232 Grant
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Thornton was involved in the audit. This action was commenced shortly
thereafter, on August 29, 2007.233
As is suggested by the award of any punitive damages, and certainly by
the magnitude of this award, Yung involved egregious wrongdoing by the
defendant—much more than simply selling a tax shelter that ended up being
disallowed. Mr. Yung was very conservative when it came to tax matters.234
He had previously refused to purchase tax shelters offered to him.235 He was
so meticulous in meeting his tax obligations that he was actually
complimented by the IRS for his consistent approach to paying taxes.236 In
addition, Mr. Yung was involved in the gaming industry.237 The state
regulators of the gaming industry take a very dim view of any applicant
who participated in a tax shelter.238 In fact, Mr. Yung’s participation in the
shelter sold him by the defendant branded him as someone who failed to
report income, which later resulted in the inability of one of his
corporations to obtain a gaming license, and which in turn resulted in
payment of over $20 million in damages for breach of contract.239 Due to its
longstanding close relationship with Mr. Yung and his entities, the
defendant, Grant Thornton, was aware of Mr. Yung’s predilections and
gaming industry interests.240
In Yung, the defendant, Grant Thornton, was eager to enter the tax
shelter business to meet the competition from the larger accounting firms. 241
But, the firm did not seem to have the required expertise in this area. It was
unable to properly analyze the proposed shelter transaction, or to satisfy the
technical requirements adequately to attain a high enough confidence level
in the product to enable it to give the promised more-likely-than-not
opinion that the shelter was valid. During the entire time period from when
the shelter was first offered to the plaintiff until well after the plaintiff had
purchased and effectuated the shelter, the defendant was still in the process
of developing and refining the tax shelter. It was premature of them to sell it
to anyone, much less to a very conservative taxpayer who eschewed risky
tax products. The early version of the shelter that was sold to the plaintiff
233
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was actually technically flawed and could never have generated the
purported tax benefits, even assuming such tax shelter transactions might be
viable.242 Grant Thornton later revamped the product to eliminate these
technical problems, but never informed the plaintiff.243 In addition, the court
found that Grant Thornton had numerous opportunities to inform the
plaintiff of the flaws in the shelter while there was still time to take
corrective actions that would have obviated the plaintiff’s damages. 244 The
court held that if informed of the problems with the shelter, the plaintiff
would have rescinded or reversed the transaction, filed amended returns, or
otherwise ameliorated the situation.245 Instead, the court found that Grant
Thornton never made any of the disclosures it should have because it did
not want to lose the $900,000 fee it received on the sale of the shelter.246
Being desperate to complete a sale of its new shelter product, the court
found Grant Thornton utilized its position of trust with the plaintiff to
convince him and his advisors the product was legal, and not even
questionable. The court held the defendant affirmatively and fraudulently
misrepresented the product and fraudulently failed to disclose material
information in order to effectuate the sale of the shelter.247 There were also
many other instances of unconscionable behavior. Taken together, all of
these resulted in the imposition of the large punitive damages award.
Before focusing on the numerous instances of fraud and egregious
conduct by the defendant, a brief review of the shelter scheme and the
background regulatory environment is helpful to fully appreciate the
situation. The shelter was called a Leveraged 301 Distribution or simply a
Lev 301.248 Section 301 of the I.R.C. governs the taxability of dividends
received by a shareholder from a corporation, hence the 301 reference.
When a dividend is received by a shareholder it is normally included in the
shareholder’s gross income.249 The amount of the dividend is the cash
received or the fair market value of any property received.250 If property
received is subject to a liability, the amount of the dividend is reduced by
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the liability.251 A constructive or deemed dividend occurs whenever a
corporation confers a monetary benefit on a shareholder even if the
corporation did not go through the formalities of declaring and paying a
dividend.252
In the Leveraged 301 transaction, as applied to the plaintiff’s situation,
his controlled foreign corporations would borrow $30 million and use the
funds to purchase U.S. Treasury Notes.253 The Treasury Notes would be
security for the loan.254 The corporations would then declare and pay a
dividend of the Treasury Notes, subject to the loan.255 Since the securities
and the liability to which they were subject were of equal value, the amount
of the dividend would be the net value received, or zero, and not subject to
any tax.256 The plan contemplated that the controlled foreign corporations
would wait six months to a year and then pay off the loan, leaving Mr.
Yung with $30 million of tax-free Treasury Notes.257
Apart from the potential applicability to this plan of several judicially
created anti-tax avoidance doctrines,258 the product description itself seems
to have an internal inconsistency that should have eliminated any prospect
for its viability. In arguing that the repayment of the debt by the controlled
foreign corporations did not create a constructive or deemed dividend to the
shareholders, the description noted that since the controlled foreign
corporations were the primary obligors on the debt, they were simply
repaying their obligation, and any indirect benefit to their shareholders
should not be a constructive dividend.259 Initially, this argument for the
absence of a constructive dividend seems facially incorrect since the
payment of the loan by the foreign corporations conferred a monetary
benefit on the shareholders by eliminating the debt to which the Treasury
Notes were subject. Additionally, the description acknowledged that the
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controlled foreign corporations were the primary obligors on the loan.260
This in turn would make the initial dividend of the Treasury Notes taxable.
As subsequent Treasury Regulations made explicit, if the primary obligor
on the debt was expected to, and later did, pay the debt, the Treasury Notes
when distributed were not really subject to the debt, so the full value of the
Treasury Notes was a taxable dividend.261 To be even facially viable, the
Lev 301 required the original borrowing to be on a nonrecourse basis with
no one having personal responsibility for the debt.262
When initially contacted in June 2000 by Grant Thornton about
investing in the Lev 301 shelter, the climate for investing in such tax
shelters was very dangerous.263 In the early 1990s the government learned
of the shelters and addressed them primarily through the IRS’s audit
function. By 1999 the Treasury and IRS had become more fully aware of
the scope and seriousness of the shelter situation. They decided to address
the situation by exposing the shelters and the promoters—“sunshine is the
best disinfectant.” They attacked the shelter problem systemically and
systematically. In addition to continuing its audit program, new initiatives
and requirements were imposed by regulation and otherwise to curb the
spate of tax shelter activities.264 The active and vigorous crackdown was
ultimately successful in shutting down abusive shelters. The defendant was
aware of these changes.265 In Yung, the judge took particular note of the
following relevant anti-shelter developments:266
December, 1999: The Boss Notice, IRS Notice 99-59.267 In this Notice,
the IRS described a tax shelter product being sold by accounting firms
called The Bond and Option Sales Strategy (“BOSS”).268 After describing
the steps of the strategy, the Notice warned that the tax loss claimed in
BOSS transactions was not valid and the IRS may impose penalties on
participants, promoters and those who report such transactions.269 Notably,
the BOSS transactions also involved a foreign corporation borrowing
money to purchase securities, giving the bank a security interest in the
260
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securities, distributing the encumbered securities to a shareholder and the
corporation later paying the debt from other assets.270
February 28, 2000:
1. Listed Transactions Notice. Notice 2000-15271 introduced the term
“listed transactions” which were transactions identified in written guidance
or regulations by the Treasury as unlawful tax avoidance schemes. This
included transactions the same as, or substantially similar to, BOSS
transactions.272
2. List Maintenance Requirement. Regulations were issued requiring
any promoter or seller of any interest in a potentially abusive tax shelter to
maintain a list of purchasers and to make the list available to the IRS upon
request.273
3. Tax Shelter Registration Requirement. Regulations were issued
imposing an obligation on organizers and promoters of certain corporate tax
shelters to register them with the Treasury.274
4. Reportable Transaction Obligation. Regulations were issued
requiring corporate taxpayers to disclose on their tax returns any
participation in “reportable transactions.”275 These were transactions the
same or substantially similar to listed transactions that were expected to
reduce federal income tax liability by more than $1 million in any year or
by more than $2 million for any combination of taxable years.276
August 11, 2000: Son of BOSS Notice. Notice 2000-44 addressed a
transaction that was a derivative of BOSS and indicated it was not valid.277
It also indicated that such arrangements were listed transactions and subject
to tax shelter registration and list maintenance requirements.278
The court also took note of an article published on April 14, 2000 by
Lee Sheppard, a “well-known and respected commentator of federal income
tax issues.”279 In the article, under the heading of “Bossy,” she described a
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variant of the BOSS shelter marketed by Arthur Andersen, but which was
very similar to, if not identical with, the Lev 301 product.280 She predicted
the government could combat the shelter by retroactively importing into the
section 301 regulations a definition of assumed liability that was added to
I.R.C. § 357.281 This later occurred in January, 2001.282
In Yung, the court found that the defendant’s conduct towards the
plaintiff was rife with fraudulent misrepresentations, fraudulent omissions
of material information and professional conduct that was grossly
negligent.283 Such conduct occurred both in connection with the sale of the
Lev 301 to the plaintiff, the defendant’s failure to recognize that the Lev
301 was not legally supportable and on its failure to so advise the plaintiff
when the transaction still could be undone or when the tax returns still
could be amended.284
In Yung, the court presented the underlying facts in excruciatingly
complete detail. This was likely done for two reasons: first, to support the
court’s finding of the many instances of unprofessional conduct and fraud
which served as the basis for the court’s imposition of the large punitive
damages award; and second, because of the rather detailed evidence trail
available in e-mail records. The following summary of the events is
therefore somewhat extended to relay the facts and to illustrate some of the
egregious conduct that was the basis for the punitive damages award.
Based on its close relationship with the plaintiff since 1996, and
knowing of his careful, conservative approach to complying with the tax
laws, the defendant initially approached the plaintiff about engaging a Lev
301 transaction in June, 2000.285 There were meetings on July 5th and
24th.286 In both of these meetings the defendant presented the product as a
lawful strategy by which to transfer the money from the controlled foreign
corporations to the United States.287 The court found that at the original
presentation at the July 5th meeting, the defendant’s partners did not
disclose that the Lev 301 was similar to the abusive BOSS transaction, that
the recently issued February regulations imposed disclosure requirements
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on corporations utilizing such transactions, and that sellers were required to
maintain a list of participants in such transactions.288 They also did not
inform the plaintiff of the Lee Sheppard article that predicted that a product
equivalent to Lev 301 likely would be retroactively declared unlawful. 289
Finally, the court found that the defendant then believed there was a ninety
percent chance the IRS would disallow the Lev 301 tax benefits on audit.290
The court also found that if the likelihood that Lev 301 would be viewed as
an unlawful shelter was disclosed at the July 5th meeting, the plaintiff’s
officers would have immediately terminated discussions about Lev 301.291
Mr. Yung was present at the July 24th meeting at which the steps of the
transaction were outlined.292 Based on notes of this meeting, the court found
that the defendant never mentioned the requirement that the borrowing of
funds from a bank in the first step of the Lev 301 transaction must be
nonrecourse.293 The court further found that while there was mention by the
defendant of the need for a non-tax related business purpose for the Lev
301, it was never indicated that this purpose must be the primary motivation
for the transaction, and that a clear understanding of this would have had an
impact on Mr. Yung’s decision whether to proceed with the transaction. 294
At this meeting the defendant’s partners also represented that in a worstcase scenario, if the Lev 301 was ineffective, the Grant Thornton opinion
would prevent the IRS from assessing any penalties.295 The court found this
representation was a blatant lie made to close the sale and that if Mr. Yung
had understood there was a risk of incurring penalties he would not have
proceeded with the transaction.296
At the July 24th meeting, one of Mr. Yung’s advisors told the
defendant’s partner that Mr. Yung did not want to be the guinea pig by
being the first one to do a Lev 301 transaction.297 At some point following
this meeting, the defendant’s partner intimated to one of Mr. Yung’s
advisors that two local, large businesses had successfully utilized Lev 301
288
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transactions to transfer foreign wealth to the United States.298 The advisor
surmised that these two businesses were General Electric and Proctor &
Gamble.299 The court found this representation was a lie made to complete
the sale and that if Mr. Yung had realized that he in fact was the guinea pig
for the Lev 301 he would not have engaged in the transaction.300
On August 11, 2000 the IRS issued the Son of BOSS Notice301 and
modified certain of the February 28th regulations.302 These developments
caused some of those at Grant Thornton involved with developing and
selling the Lev 301 concern about whether Lev 301 remained viable.303 On
August 21st the Wall Street Journal published an article about the BOSS
transaction and Price Waterhouse Cooper’s decision to stop selling it.304 In
response to this article the defendant stopped selling Lev 301.305 Also in
response to the article, one of Mr. Yung’s advisors called the defendant
expressing concerns about the legality of Lev 301.306 He was reassured that
there was no cause for concern and that Lev 301 was distinguishable from
BOSS transactions.307 He was not notified, however, that the defendant had
stopped selling Lev 301 or that a list maintenance was required.308
A final engagement letter was sent by the defendant to the plaintiff
around September 15, 2000.309 Before the letter was finalized, J. Michel, the
defendant’s primary relationship contact with the plaintiff and his
companies, was informed that the defendant could not back up the
representation it made that a Grant Thornton opinion would prevent the IRS
from assessing penalties in the event there was an audit of the Lev 301
transaction.310 Instead of dropping the representation, the wording was
changed to “soften” what was promised.311 Mr. Yung was not informed of
this since he would not have proceeded with the transaction without this
298
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representation.312 In addition, although Mr. Michel was advised by his
superiors to inform the plaintiff that Grant Thornton would be required to
maintain a list of customers to whom it sold Lev 301 shelters, he failed to
do so because he knew that this disclosure would kill the sale to Mr.
Yung.313 This failure to disclose was found by the court to be a gross
deviation from the standard of care applicable to tax professionals, and this
was particularly so in light of Mr. Yung’s involvement in the gaming
industry.314 Likewise the engagement letter did not contain any disclosure
that Lev 301 was substantially similar to BOSS and was likely to be
deemed an abusive tax shelter.315
Although Grant Thornton had signed an engagement letter with the
plaintiff in mid-September 2000 and had promised a more-likely-than-not
opinion letter, they were having internal difficulty concluding Lev 301 was
more-likely-than-not valid. Ultimately, they could not attain the morelikely-than-not level of certainty until around the time they issued the final
opinions to the plaintiff in August of 2001—and this occurred only after
they revised some aspects of the transaction.316 As part of this ongoing
process to satisfy themselves of the legality of the Lev 301 shelter, Grant
Thornton engaged the law firm of Baker & McKenzie to review their draft
opinion letter.317 The two Baker & McKenzie tax attorneys who reviewed
the opinion had concerns over whether the transaction complied with the
judicial doctrines of business purpose, economic substance and step
transaction.318 Neither of the reviewing attorneys was willing to opine that
Grant Thornton had reached the more-likely-than-not confidence level it
was seeking.319
Despite receiving the negative feedback from the law firm, Grant
Thornton decided to proceed with the Lev 301 shelter and to attempt to
achieve more-likely-than-not status by trying to inject more business
purpose into the transaction.320 The plaintiffs were not informed of the
outside legal review nor of the adverse feedback.321 Rather shockingly, in
312
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mid-October the defendant’s managing partner of tax services informed
other partners that a reputable law firm reviewed Lev 301 and gave a
“thumbs up.”322 This was an obvious lie to his partners, who passed it on to
clients, and it resulted in fraud upon both the clients’ and defendant’s sales
force.323
The plaintiff was intending to do the Lev 301 transaction before the end
of 2000.324 Financing had been arranged.325 Pursuant to the terms of the
final engagement letter, before entering into the transaction Grant Thornton
had to provide at least its preliminary conclusions that it would be able to
issue its promised more-likely-than-not opinion in support of the
transaction.326 Without these assurances the transaction would not occur.327
The loan was scheduled to close on December 29, 2000.328 In a letter dated
December 28th, Grant Thornton issued a “short-form” or “model” opinion,
in order for the transaction to proceed.329 While not containing all the
elements of a complete opinion, it did assert that it was the firm’s morelikely-than-not opinion that the transaction would be upheld and that the
final opinion letter would contain the same opinion.330 The letter did not
disclose the list maintenance requirement nor the risk stemming from the
transaction’s similarity to BOSS.331 The plaintiff was also never informed
that the transaction might have to be reported on the tax return, or that
Grant Thornton had not yet reached a more-likely-than-not confidence level
for the transaction.332 Relying on this letter, the first two steps of the Lev
301 transaction were completed on December 29th.333 The $30 million loan
was closed, Treasury Notes were purchased with the proceeds, and
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dividends of the Treasury Notes subject to the loan were declared and
paid.334
On January 3, 2001, temporary and proposed regulations were issued
under I.R.C. section 301 that invalidated the Lev 301 transaction
prospectively and were retroactive for any transactions similar to BOSS
shelters described in Notice 99-59.335 These regulations were essentially
what the Lee Sheppard article predicted. The regulations set off internal
discussions in Grant Thornton as to whether the Lev 301 was totally
dead.336 On January 8th, Grant Thornton ended sales of Lev 301 until
further notice.337 There was some indication that Grant Thornton directed its
personnel to notify all clients of the regulations and that their impact was
being evaluated.338 Despite this, Mr. Yung was not notified nor was he
informed that Grant Thornton had ceased marketing Lev 301.339 The court
found that had Mr. Yung been notified he and his advisors would most
likely have unwound the December 29th transaction and avoided any
negative tax consequences.340 This would also have prevented Grant
Thornton from receiving its $900,000 fee for the transaction.341 Quite the
contrary, on January 10th, J. Michel e-mailed an employee of the plaintiff
and indicated the January 3rd regulations did not adversely affect the
plaintiff’s transactions since they predated the effective date of the
regulations.342 He also indicated that the regulations might even favorably
impact the transaction.343 This was a lie because at this point in time Grant
Thornton had not reached a conclusion on either of these issues.344 He also
failed to disclose that in response to the new regulations Grant Thornton
was no longer selling Lev 301.345
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During the ensuing weeks Grant Thornton concluded the new
regulations were retroactive to the plaintiff’s December 29th transaction,
but failed to advise Mr. Yung to unwind the transaction.346 In response to an
inquiry by one of Mr. Yung’s employees as to whether the December 29th
loans should be paid to stop the interest expense or whether Grant Thornton
would pay the interest if the Lev 301 never finalized as planned, on
February 6th Grant Thornton sent an incomplete draft of an opinion letter to
the plaintiff.347 On this day Grant Thornton had still not determined if Lev
301 had any ongoing viability.348 Despite the uncertainty, in April 2001
Grant Thornton decided to start selling the product again.349 However, it
continued to omit crucial details about the products’ risks and the weakness
of Grant Thornton’s legal arguments.350
In late May 2001, an attorney unrelated to Grant Thornton reviewed the
Lev 301 transaction for one of his clients to whom the Lev 301 was
offered.351 The attorney concluded that Lev 301 did not work under the
January 2001 regulations because of the initial loan’s recourse nature. 352
Going forward, Grant Thornton modified the Lev 301 to require only
nonrecourse borrowing and a representation from the client to this effect.353
This, of course, meant that the plaintiff’s Lev 301 was invalid under the
January regulations that applied to it retroactively.
Eventually, on August 8th and 13th, Grant Thornton delivered final
opinion letters to the plaintiff.354 While the ultimate conclusions in the
letters were the same as the earlier draft and opined that the Lev 301 was
more-likely-than-not valid, the analysis within the letters was changed.355
More business purpose was inserted, as was the requirement that the initial
loan to purchase the securities was nonrecourse.356 There was also
discussion of how the transaction survived under the judicial anti-tax
avoidance doctrines.357 Although the defendant knew the loans obtained by
346
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Mr. Yung’s controlled foreign corporations were recourse, they simply
opined that the loans were nonrecourse and treated them as such.358
Similarly, while they characterized the loans as what one would normally
expect when a company finances the distribution of an asset, they knew this
to be untrue since they marketed Lev 301 as a tax-avoidance product.359 The
court held that no reasonably competent tax practitioner would have issued
this more-likely-than-not opinion for the Lev 301.360
Yung’s controlled foreign corporations paid off the loans on September
28, 2001, a few days before filing his federal tax forms for 2000.361 In
connection with his 2000 tax forms, it should be noted that on several
occasions Grant Thornton had advised that no disclosure of any income
from the Lev 301 should appear on the tax returns and insisted on reviewing
the forms before they were filed.362 Despite preparing one of Mr. Yung’s
tax returns and reviewing another, the defendant did not advise Mr. Yung to
report the transactions to minimize or eliminate the risk of penalties.363
Similarly, in September 2002 Grant Thornton prepared the plaintiff’s tax
returns for 2001.364 The returns did not disclose the repayment of the loans
by the plaintiff’s controlled foreign corporation in September of 2001.365
This latter decision was especially egregious since Grant Thornton
previously had received a request from the IRS in February 2002 requesting
it to disclose all of its potentially abusive transactions, and, on June 25,
2002, it was served with a summons requesting all of its list maintenance
transactions.366 The court found that Grant Thornton’s intentional failure to
report or disclose the Lev 301 “was in furtherance of its efforts to conceal
its prior negligent and fraudulent behavior . . . ”367
Without getting into any of the details, there were a number of instances
in 2001 and 2002 when Grant Thornton was either reminded of the
invalidity of the Lev 301 sold to the plaintiff,368 forced to reappraise the
358
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validity of Lev 301 in light of new regulations or new articles in the
press,369 or forced to suspend sales of Lev 301.370 However, it never
informed the plaintiff of any of these—never giving him the opportunity to
either attempt to unwind the transaction or to fairly determine how to
proceed.371 Grant Thornton also did not inform the plaintiff that in
December of 2002 it received a summons from the IRS specifically for
documents relating to Lev 301.372
In November of 2002 the IRS initiated an audit of one of plaintiff’s
corporations, CSC, an S-corporation.373 The audit was not related to Lev
301.374 In connection with the audit CSC received a standard Information
Document Request (“IDR”) inquiring whether CSC had directly or
indirectly participated in any transactions that were the same or similar to a
listed transaction.375 Because CSC was an S-corporation, the inquiry
effectively asked whether Mr. Yung had individually participated in such a
transaction.376 Mr. Yung’s advisors became concerned about whether the
Lev 301 should be disclosed since it was similar to BOSS.377 Mr. Michel of
Grant Thornton advised that the transaction was not similar to BOSS,
despite the fact the Grant Thornton had previously concluded it was
substantially similar.378 Mr. Michel then responded to the IDR question in
the negative.379 The court concluded this was done to conceal Mr. Yung’s
involvement in the Lev 301 and to conceal Grant Thornton’s prior fraud.380
On September 12, 2003 the Department of Justice, on behalf of the IRS,
initiated an action to enforce its Lev 301 summons previously served on
Grant Thornton.381 Grant Thornton turned over various documents that
identified Mr. Yung as a Lev 301 participant.382 The CSC audit was
subsequently expanded to include audits of Mr. Yung’s 2000 and 2001 tax
369
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returns.383 Grant Thornton was involved with the audits, which commenced
in May 2004.384 After an extended process, the audits were settled in 2007,
with Mr. Yung paying additional taxes, interest and penalties but with the
penalties reduced from twenty percent of the tax initially demanded to
thirteen percent.385
Before awarding damages the court needed to deal with two threshold
issues: a limited liability clause386 and the statute of limitations.387 The final
engagement letter signed by the parties contained a provision that the
maximum liability of the defendant to the plaintiff “arising for any reason
relating to the Opinion shall be limited to the amount of fees paid for this
engagement.”388 The fees were $900,000.389 In holding that the provision
did not limit the defendant’s liability, the court relied on Kentucky
precedent that a person cannot contract against fraud.390 The court then held
that the defendant committed fraud, primarily by not informing the plaintiff
of the listing requirement.391 As to contracting against negligence or gross
negligence, the court held that in Kentucky such agreements are “‘generally
disfavored and are strictly construed against the parties relying on
them.’”392 The court then held that the agreement did not specifically
mention negligence or gross negligence and was otherwise not precise
enough to cover the type of errors that occurred here.393 While perhaps
morally satisfying in light of the egregious fraudulent conduct of the
defendant, this might turn out to be the Achilles heel of the opinion on
appeal.
As to statute of limitation concerns, the court held that the statute was
tolled until the settlement with the IRS on June 7, 2007 because the
defendant was continuously representing the plaintiff in connection with
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Lev 301 matters, and because of the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of
their misconduct.394
The compensatory damages awarded the plaintiff consisted of the
additional taxes ($11,837,860), interest ($5,021,494) and penalties
($1,555,873) incurred and a refund of the $900,000 fee paid for the Lev
301.395 The court’s analysis of these damages was relatively
straightforward. The court first noted the law that the measure of damages
in a tax malpractice case against an accountant is the difference between
what the taxpayer paid and what the taxpayer would have owed absent the
negligence.396 The court found that here absent the negligence, the plaintiff
would not have repatriated any money in 2000 and therefore would not
have incurred any taxes, interest or penalties.397 Interestingly, concerning
the interest, the court was concerned with whether the underlying amount
was adequately liquidated so interest could be awarded under Kentucky
law.398 The court apparently was not aware of the current three approaches
to the recovery of interest.399 Similarly, with respect to the fees paid to the
defendant, the court held that but for the defendant’s false representations
about the Lev 301 product, the plaintiff would never have incurred this fee
and was entitled to its return.400
The most interesting aspect of the court’s damage award was its holding
that injury to the plaintiff’s reputation as a shareholder and key person in a
casino corporation could be considered by the court in its assessment of
damages.401 However, unless this statement is understood to mean that such
reputational harm could be considered in awarding punitive damages, the
import of this statement is unclear since the court directed a verdict for the
defendant regarding such damages.
Late in 2004 one of the plaintiff’s corporations acquired a casino for $60
million in a bankruptcy auction.402 To complete the acquisition, as sole
shareholder of the corporation, Mr. Yung had to obtain a key person license
394
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from the Missouri Gaming Commission.403 As part of this process Mr.
Yung disclosed the IRS audit of his Lev 301 transaction.404 In September
2005 he was informed that the Gaming Commission would deny his license
primarily because of his participation in the Lev 301 transaction.405 As a
result, he withdrew his license application, fearing that a license denial
would adversely impact his other existing casino licenses.406 The court held
that his decision to withdraw the application was commercially
reasonable.407 As a result of withdrawing the license application, he could
not complete the purchase of the casino from the bankruptcy auction.408 The
seller of the casino brought a breach of contract suit that was ultimately
settled by the payment of $20.5 million by Mr. Yung’s corporation.409
The damages of $20.5 million could not be recovered by Mr. Yung from
Grant Thornton since the damages were incurred by Mr. Yung’s
corporation, not by him personally.410 However, the court held that Mr.
Yung suffered personal reputational damages from this episode.411
As noted previously, the court also awarded the plaintiff punitive
damages of $80 million because of the many egregious, fraudulent
commissions and omissions by the defendant and because of the many
instances of gross negligence of the defendant.412 The court was very
careful to explain the reasons for its award of the damages and to justify
their magnitude as roughly four times the compensatory damages.413

E. Analysis
In attempting to focus on the potential tax malpractice liability of the
attorney and accountant participants in the generic tax shelters, the
immediate difficulty that arises is that often the tax professionals were not
acting simply in their customary roles as tax advisors but were really the
creators and/or purveyors of the shelters. As the two Senate Reports
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indicate, while in form they rendered opinion letters, the tax advisors often
were part of the group selling the shelters and their opinion letters were a
marketing tool to make the product appear efficacious and to make the
sale.414 As such, the automatic reaction is that they ought to be responsible
under some actual or implied warranty as sellers or under principles of
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or the like. It seems very difficult, if not
impossible, to disentangle their roles as principals from their roles as tax
advisors and focus only on the latter.
To attempt to separate out the tax malpractice issues from the other
issues lurking in the generic tax shelter scenario, let us assume a potential
purchaser of a tax shelter consults with an independent attorney or
accountant concerning the viability of the shelter. The tax advisor
ultimately determines the shelter is viable and renders an opinion letter that
the transaction is more-likely-than-not viable and valid. The client then
purchases the shelter, faithfully effectuates all the steps prescribed by the
shelter, and claims the deductions on the tax return. It later turns out the
shelter is ineffective and the client incurs back taxes, interest, penalties and
corrective costs.
The initial issue would seem to be that the tax advice given that the tax
shelter was efficacious was wrong and that, perhaps, liability should be
imposed on the tax professional for this reason alone. However, under the
error in judgment rule, being wrong does not automatically subject a tax
professional to liability.
[Professionals are not infallible] and the law does not
impose on them an implied guaranty of result. As long as
their opinion is based on adequate research and careful
consideration of the matter, the fact that their judgment on
a doubtful or unsettled area of law turns out to be incorrect
will not give rise to malpractice liability.415
As I stated previously, based upon the leading treatise on attorney
malpractice:
Professionals, especially attorneys, are frequently called on
to exercise judgment to resolve issues that are uncertain
and subject to disagreement. To subject an attorney to
malpractice liability simply because a judge ultimately
414
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 5 (2003); see, e.g., supra text accompanying footnotes 91–103; see
S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 5 (2005).
415
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2014]

BAD TAX SHELTERS

651

disagrees with a judgment call would be unfair and place
too great a burden on the legal profession. Because of those
concerns, under the mere error in judgment rule it is
universally recognized that an attorney is not liable for an
error of judgment on an unsettled proposition of law.416
A caveat is necessary at this point to differentiate between attorney and
accountant tax advisors. While it is clear that the error in judgment rule
applies to attorneys and its application is said to be universal, the
application of this rule to accountants is more problematic.417 The source of
the problem is that I am unable to locate any case law that applies the rule
to accountants. Several leading commentators do equate accountants and
lawyers and indicate the error in judgment rule applies to both
professions.418 The logic underlying the rule would seem to apply equally to
both—at least where the accountant is functioning as a tax advisor—and
there are cases that hold the elements of a tax malpractice action are
substantially identical regardless of whether the defendant is an accountant
or attorney.419 Nevertheless, the absence of case law applying the rule to
accountants is of concern.
Another reason why liability might not be imposed on the tax
professional, though the advice was incorrect, is inherent in the type of
opinion rendered. The opinion posited in our example is the type of opinion
normally encountered in the tax shelter area, the “more-likely-than-not”
opinion. This opinion asserts only that the professional rendering it believes
there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood that the transaction under
review will be held to be valid.420 The more certain opinions that a
416
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transaction “should” or “will” be valid are never encountered.421 Exactly
how much reliance is a layman entitled to place on an opinion that is so
weak? A fair translation of this opinion is that in 100 transactions of this
type, 51 will be held to be valid and 49 will be held to be invalid. This
certainly seems to be very little reassurance of validity and a weak basis for
imposing liability.
Militating the other way, though, is the fact that if the transaction really
has no chance for success, or only a very minimal chance for success, the
opinion has still vastly overstated the likelihood for success and perhaps
“caused” the plaintiff damages that ought to be recoverable. In any event, in
many of the reported generic tax shelter cases there were oral
representations that indicated a much higher probability of validity for the
transaction. The oral representations might serve as an independent basis
for recovery, apart from the written opinion.
While not an issue in the posited hypothetical example, a factor possibly
undercutting the utility of the tax advisor’s opinion as a basis for liability in
most of the reported generic tax shelter cases is the fact that those opinions
were normally given after the transactions had already been effectuated.422
As such, they were opining on something that had already occurred. It
would be a stretch to argue that they “caused” the taxpayer to purchase the
shelter. If anything, it seems that the cause, or, at least, one of the several
causes, of the damages for purchasing the shelter would rather be the
promise that an opinion letter would be forthcoming, (or a short form or
draft of the opinion letter to come). This, of course, makes it more difficult
for a plaintiff to establish the cause of action, since there is no written
documentary evidence to establish what was promised to induce the shelter
purchase. Now, what was said also needs to be proven, and there is a great
likelihood that each side of the conversation would remember it differently.
In addition to the tax malpractice issues relative to the issuance of the
incorrect opinion that the proposed shelter transaction was valid, there are
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also tax malpractice issues concerning the tax return preparer who reported
the tax shelter deductions on the tax return. To avoid underpayment
penalties, there must be a reasonable basis for claiming deductions or losses
on the tax return.423 If the shelter deductions were not reported on the tax
return, there would not have been any subsequent interest, penalty, or
corrective cost damages from underreporting the taxpayer’s tax liability.
Thus, the return preparer may face potential liability for causing some, or
all, of the taxpayer’s damages. Very relevant to the return preparer’s
potential liability in this regard is the existence, and the return preparer’s
knowledge, of any opinions that opined that the shelter was valid. These
opinions, especially one from a source independent of the seller of the
shelter might, itself, be enough to exonerate the return preparer from any
liability.
Although perhaps very obvious, it should be noted that if the particular
tax shelter involved was a listed transaction, or was otherwise designated as
an abusive shelter that must be reported on the tax return, the return
preparer must be aware of the requirement and comply with it. Any failure
may lead to malpractice liability exposure.
Although not directly relevant as a technical matter, a prediction of who
is likely to be successful in a tax malpractice litigation often depends on the
intangible of which side is more sympathy evoking, or stated more
colloquially, who is the good guy and who is the bad guy. By this measure,
both parties seem to have problems, though, ultimately, the plaintiff
taxpayer seems to be somewhat better than the defendant tax advisor. The
plaintiff taxpayer in these situations does not evoke much sympathy.
Ultimately, she or he is a very rich person who received a great deal of
money and who attempted to avoid paying her or his fair share of taxes due
by spending a lot of money on some high-cost, esoteric tax gimmick
promising results too good to be true that an average taxpayer could not
even imagine. In short, she or he is a really rich, selfish, tax avoider, at best,
or tax evader, at worst.
The defendant tax advisor is not much better. Even if we address only
the type of advisor posited herein i.e., one who is honest and
straightforward and who is not engaging in the fraudulent and deceitful
conduct often present in the reported generic tax shelter situations, the
advisor still does not fare too well. After all, the tax advisor is a fancy
professional who studies tax esoteric and who develops, or opines upon, the
type of schemes that enable the very rich, like the plaintiff, to avoid paying
423
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millions of dollars of taxes. At best, she or he charges outrageous fees to
facilitate and enable the opprobrious conduct of people like the plaintiff.
And, to make it worse, the advice given was wrong! A fortiori where the tax
advisor is more like the typical advisor highlighted in the Senate Reports,
who was either the seller of, or one of the group selling, the shelter.
While both sides have likeability problems, I believe the plaintiff shelter
investor comes off a little better than the tax advisor. Here, once the
plaintiff concedes she or he is wealthy and was trying to avoid paying taxes,
the argument presented is that they were trying to avoid paying taxes in a
legally permissible and lawful manner. As such they did everything
appropriately. They consulted with a tax professional who appeared to be
respected and knowledgeable. They did exactly what the tax professional
advised, and they proceeded only because they were advised they could
legally do so. What else is a layman supposed to do when dealing with a
very intricate and labyrinthine statute such as the tax law?

III. OTHER TAX MALPRACTICE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Preliminary
1. Scope of Engagement
The basic relationship between a client and an attorney, accountant or
other professional is defined by the scope of engagement. Why was the
attorney or other professional hired? Accordingly, before issues of
malpractice may be addressed, it is necessary to ascertain the scope of the
engagement. Ideally, the nature of the representation should be specified in
writing and in enough detail so that there is no room for any
misunderstanding between the parties. 180 E. 88th St. Apt. Corp. v. Law
Office of Robert Jay Gumenick, P.C. illustrates the benefit of doing it
right.424 In this case the plaintiff was a housing cooperative corporation and
the defendant was the law firm retained to draft the contract of sale for the
plaintiff’s building.425 This litigation involved the claim by the plaintiff that
the defendant “failed to structure the contract of sale with tax implications
considered, or to have at least advised them to look into the tax issues

424
425

923 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
Id. at 475.
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underlying the sale.”426 Because the underlying retainer agreement provided
that the defendant would not provide tax advice in connection with the
transaction but would be available to discuss such issue with plaintiff’s tax
advisor or accountant, the First Department had no problem affirming the
lower court’s dismissal of the complaint on a motion for summary
judgment.427 The defendant attorney therefore was able to expeditiously end
the litigation.
The danger of not having a written agreement specifying the scope of
engagement is illustrated by Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern.428 Wo Yee
also involves a suit between the seller of a building and the seller’s attorney
concerning a missed tax opportunity upon the sale of the building.429 Here,
the defendant attorney testified that at the inception of the representation
and on a number of subsequent occasions he informed the plaintiff’s officer
that he had no expertise or experience with structuring a section 1031 likekind exchange and that the responsibility for doing so would remain with
the officer.430 The defendant further testified that the officer stated that he
would take care of the section 1031 part of the transaction and that he had
done these in the past.431 This agreement, however, was never reflected in
writing.432 The plaintiff’s officer testified to the contrary—that the
defendant had agreed to take care of the section 1031 exchange
requirements and that the officer was unfamiliar with how a section 1031
exchange worked.433 The stakes were quite high, since $5.1 million of
additional taxes were alleged to have been incurred due to the unavailability
of a section 1031 exchange.434
Here, unlike in 180 E. 88th St.,435 there was no written retainer
agreement or other written evidence to establish who had agreed to be

426
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responsible for meeting the section 1031 exchange requirements.436 Even if
the defendant attorney was correct and the plaintiff’s officer had agreed to
be responsible, a relatively expeditious disposition of the suit by a motion to
dismiss was unavailable.437 The defendant attorney, however, was
successful in obtaining summary judgment dismissing the case, but because
of a substantive defect in the plaintiff’s cause of action—the plaintiff failed
to prove that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s
damages.438
In Wo Yee, at the closing of the sale of the old property, the plaintiff
actually received the sales proceeds, making section 1031 treatment
unavailable.439 The court, however, held the plaintiff never offered any
satisfactory proof that it met all of the other requirements for a section 1031
exchange.440 The type of section 1031 exchange possibly applicable in Wo
Yee required evidence establishing that the plaintiff could have identified
the replacement property within 45 days of the sale of the old property and
would have actually received it within 180 days of the closing of the sale of
the old property.441 Accordingly, the court held that even if, arguendo, the
defendant attorney was negligent in allowing the plaintiff to obtain the sales
proceeds for the old property, there was no proximate causation of damages
to the plaintiff, since the other requirements for section 1031 treatment were
not present.442 The plaintiffs never proved that but for the defendant’s
malpractice, section 1031 treatment would have been available.443
In Ambase Corp. v. Davis Polk & Wardwell, the plaintiff corporation
became an independent entity in 1985 upon the liquidation of its parent
company.444 As part of the liquidation, the plaintiff agreed to assume
primary liability for its parent’s federal income taxes and secondary liability
for certain other liabilities of its parent.445 Shortly thereafter, the IRS
determined that the parent failed to withhold taxes on the payment of
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interest to a related foreign entity from 1979 through 1985.446 Attempts to
settle the matter failed, and in 1992 the defendant law firm was retained to
settle the tax matter.447 In May, 1995 the IRS issued a notice of deficiency
for almost $21 million for the withholding taxes alleged to be due.448
Defendant, Davis Polk, then successfully litigated the matter in tax court
and won a complete victory in 2001.449 Following the victory, the plaintiff
refused to pay the outstanding legal fees of over $1.4 million.450 Plaintiff
then commenced this action against Davis Polk for legal malpractice,
alleging that Davis Polk failed to advise the plaintiff that it was only
secondarily liable for the payment of the withholding taxes.451 The plaintiff
also requested a declaration that it did not owe the legal fees.452 The
damages claimed, apart from the legal fees, are very interesting and
novel.453 Plaintiff claimed that but for Davis Polk’s negligence, it would not
have had to maintain a large loss reserve on its books, which created the
appearance that it had a negative net worth, which in turn caused it to lose
business opportunities.454
The trial court granted Davis Polk’s motion to dismiss the complaint
and awarded it a money judgment for the unpaid legal fees.455 The
Appellate Division affirmed.456 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial
court’s decision primarily because the retainer agreement provided that
Davis Polk was retained to litigate the amount of tax liability.457 It was
never required to address the issue of whether the plaintiff was primarily or
secondarily liable.458 The court also noted some factual problems with the
plaintiff’s cause of action, such as that the plaintiff had privately and
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publicly acknowledged that it was responsible for the subject taxes
approximately seven years before Davis Polk was retained.459 Also, the
plaintiff and its accountants had decided to maintain the loss reserve on its
books despite the fact that Davis Polk advised them, soon after it was
initially retained, that in its attorneys’ opinion the plaintiff had a very strong
case and was probably not liable for the taxes.460
An interesting aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion is that it went out
of its way to reaffirm New York’s judgmental immunity rule.461 Although
not necessary for its holding, the court noted that the retainer agreement
between the parties was never construed by any court or arbitrator as to the
issue of whether the plaintiff undertook primary liability for the
withholding taxes involved in this litigation.462 The court then quoted its
earlier observation that “‘[a] legal malpractice action is unlikely to succeed
when the attorney erred because an issue of law was unsettled or
debatable.’”463
Cohen v. Weitzner is somewhat similar to Ambase, since here too the
defendant attorney was hired for one task but liability for another issue was
sought to be imposed.464 It also illustrates the need to avoid mundane, nonlegal errors.465 In Cohen, the plaintiffs had filed their 1997 through 2002
income tax returns in 2003.466 The IRS accepted the tax liability as reported
on the returns but also assessed penalties for late filing and late payment
and interest.467 The defendant attorney was retained to seek an abatement of
the penalties due to the plaintiff husband’s medical condition.468 The
defendant was successful, reaching an agreement with the IRS to abate all
penalties for 1997 and 1998 and for plaintiffs to have one year to pay the
remaining amounts due.469 The problem asserted by the plaintiff was that
there was a typographical error on one of the spreadsheets prepared by the
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defendant that understated their tax for 2000 and that they were damaged in
this amount.470
The claim asserted seems frivolous since the basic tax liability was
never an issue in the representation, and the plaintiffs failed to allege how
they were damaged.471 The First Department affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint.472
In Offshore Express, Inc. v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP,
the defendant attorneys had represented the owner of the plaintiff in a 1998
reorganization transaction in which an existing corporation was split into
two corporations, one of which was the plaintiff.473 As part of that
transaction a tax-sharing agreement was also signed.474 Subsequently,
disputes arose over the allocation of the old corporation’s income taxes for
1997 and 1998.475 These disputes ended in arbitrations in which the
defendant represented the plaintiff.476 The plaintiff lost the arbitrations and
subsequently brought this action one day short of the three-year limitations
period.477
In this litigation the defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss
the malpractice claims arising from the reorganization transaction as barred
by the statute of limitations.478 While the parties had executed an
engagement letter for the reorganization representation, no agreement was
signed concerning representation at the arbitrations.479 The issue before the
court was whether the reorganization and the arbitrations were one
continuous matter or two distinct matters for statute of limitations
purposes.480 The court held they were two matters and that the statute of
limitations had expired vis-à-vis the reorganization transaction.481 While
ultimately successful, the existence of a separate engagement letter for the
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arbitrations likely would have been helpful in disposing of the claim more
expeditiously.482
In re Mirabilis Ventures, Inc. v. Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway, Gibbons,
Lash & Wilcox, P.A. is really an unusual case to be included in this section
of the article, but its ultimate resolution really comes down to a scope of
engagement analysis.483 In Mirabilis, the person who controlled the
plaintiff, Frank Amodeo, used the plaintiff and “a web of subsidiaries and
related companies as vehicles for an enormous tax fraud and money
laundering scheme.”484 Essentially, companies were established to provide
human resources services to various clients.485 These companies would
calculate the payroll taxes owed by the clients and collect the amounts from
them.486 However, these taxes were never paid to the IRS, but were diverted
to Amodeo’s and his co-conspirators’ personal uses.487 Amodeo eventually
pled guilty to a number of felonies and was sentenced to over twenty-two
years in jail and ordered to pay restitution of over $181 million.488 Plaintiff
was also under criminal indictment and had agreed to plead nolo
contendere.489 This suit was instituted against the defendant attorney and his
law firm seeking damages for various negligence and related claims.490 The
court characterized all of plaintiff’s claims as boiling down to an allegation
that the defendant attorney “either advised the people running Mirabilis that
diverting payroll tax funds to other uses was acceptable, or at least learned
of the plans to do so and failed to warn anyone.”491 The only problem was
that the defendant attorney was employed by an affiliate of Mirabilis in a
capacity not involving legal advice regarding tax matters.492 The defendant
testified that the first time he heard about plans to divert payroll taxes was
when he was sued in this case.493 Not having any evidence connecting the
defendant with the fraud, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary
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judgment.494 Again, establishing the defendant attorney’s scope of
engagement was key to vindicating him—and doing so by summary
judgment.495
A variation of the scope of engagement issue arises in connection with
tax return preparation. As such it will normally pertain to accountants, but
can also affect other professionals. The issue can be placed in focus by the
question, “whose tax return is it?” If the taxpayer gives the return preparer
an amount of charitable contributions, medical expenses, or some other
deduction, then who is responsible for the accuracy of this number? The
simple answer is the taxpayer. Freeman v. Usoroh hit the nail on the head:
By signing her tax return, plaintiff acknowledged the
veracity of its contents and became responsible for
providing proof of the items deducted upon request of the
IRS. Even had defendant tax preparer been negligent in his
advice to plaintiff, he cannot be held responsible for
plaintiff’s inability to provide proof of her entitlement to
the refund . . . .496
In Freeman, the court reversed damages awarded the plaintiff in a small
claims proceeding on the reasoning stated above.497 It is the taxpayer’s
return, and the preparer is not responsible for the taxpayer’s inability to
prove amounts claimed on the return.498
Although not involving allegations of negligence or malpractice, the
underlying situation in Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. is a most informative
counterpoint to the simple principle presented in Freeman that it is the
taxpayer’s tax return.499 In Wooley, the plaintiff taxpayer alleged that the
Jackson Hewitt franchise office that prepared his tax return simply made up
false charitable and other deductions on his tax return that he did not
authorize.500 Relying on defendant’s purported competency and accuracy,
the plaintiff simply signed and filed the return.501 These deductions were
disallowed upon audit and additional taxes, penalties, and interest were
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incurred.502 The dispute between the plaintiff and Jackson Hewitt arose
when Jackson Hewitt refused to honor either its basic guarantee that it
would pay any penalty or interest incurred as a result of any error by
Jackson Hewitt or its Gold Guarantee, for which the plaintiff paid extra,
that Jackson Hewitt would pay additional taxes up to $5,000 if caused by
their error.503 Since the same scenario occurred to two of plaintiff’s postal
co-workers, this suit was brought as a class action.504
Ultimately Wooley became a simple breach of contract case as to
whether Jackson Hewitt was justified in not fulfilling its basic guarantee.505
One of Jackson Hewitt’s arguments was that the plaintiff was not entitled to
reimbursement under its basic warranty because if the plaintiff would have
properly reviewed his income tax return he would have discovered the
unauthorized deductions.506 In response, the court noted that although a
taxpayer is legally responsible for his return and cannot escape liability by
blaming the return preparer, this does not prevent the taxpayer from
asserting a breach of contract claim against the preparer for an erroneous or
inaccurate return.507
In Daunno v. Crincoli, the plaintiff’s husband failed to file federal and
New Jersey income tax returns for the couple from 1991 through 1996.508
After receiving summonses from the IRS and New Jersey in 1997, the
defendant CPA was retained by the plaintiff’s husband to file the delinquent
returns.509 Consistent with their practice that plaintiff’s husband handled all
of the couple’s tax and financial matters, only he met and spoke with the
defendant.510 The husband gave the defendant all necessary financial
information to complete the tax returns.511 Also, the husband informed the
defendant that the marital house was jointly owned, though it was actually
owned solely by the plaintiff.512 Based on the data supplied, the defendant
determined that the husband would save about $55,000 if he and the
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plaintiff filed jointly rather than separately.513 The plaintiff had little or no
income during this time period, and, if filing separately, would have had to
file only for 1995 with income of less than $10,000.514
When asked by the defendant about how he would pay the delinquent
taxes of approximately $270,000, the plaintiff’s husband responded that he
was to obtain a large inheritance soon, that he expected to imminently settle
several large cases in his law practice, and that the marital home could be
refinanced.515 Pursuant to instructions from the plaintiff’s husband, the
defendant prepared joint returns, which were duly signed by the plaintiff
and her husband and filed.516 Despite the receipt of the inheritance and the
sale of plaintiff’s husband’s successful law practice, the taxes were never
paid.517
In 2001 when the plaintiff’s husband became ill, the plaintiff first
learned of her tax problems when she tried to sell the marital home and
learned that there was about $900,000 in tax liens on the house.518 The
plaintiff subsequently filed in bankruptcy and retained only a small portion
of the home’s equity.519 She also incurred about $57,000 in legal fees.520
The plaintiff then instituted this malpractice action against the defendant
accountant and his accounting firm, asserting that he had a duty to inform
her of the personal liability she was undertaking for all taxes, interest, and
penalties by filing jointly instead of separately.521 The plaintiff apparently
also alleged that the defendant should have ascertained that the marital
home was owned solely by her.522
After trial, the court held that, as a tax return preparer, the defendant had
no duty to speak with both spouses to independently verify information
provided him, or to inform the plaintiff about the additional liability she
was exposing herself to by filing jointly rather than separately.523 In short,
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the court held that these matters were beyond the scope of engagement to
prepare tax returns.524
The court also held that even if the defendant did have a duty to inform
plaintiff of the risks of filing jointly, his breach still was not actionable
since there was no evidence of proximate causation.525 The plaintiff never
introduced any evidence to indicate that if she had received the warning not
to file jointly she would have changed her longstanding practice of filing
joint returns and following her husband’s instructions on financial
matters.526 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and granted
judgment to the defendant on his counterclaim for his fees.527 The New
Jersey Appellate Division affirmed.528
In Miller v. Volk, at trial the plaintiff recovered from the defendant
accountant an amount equal to additional taxes and interest assessed by the
IRS against his personal service corporation (“PSC”) for 1996.529 The
defendant was a CPA who was engaged to prepare the plaintiff’s personal
income tax return for 1995 and the PSC’s 1996 income tax return.530 The
error at issue was that the accountant deducted the full amount of salary the
PSC paid the plaintiff in 1996, notwithstanding a limit contained in the
Internal Revenue Code on such deductions when a PSC has a fiscal tax year
obtained under I.R.C. section 444.531 On appeal the trial court’s decision in
favor of the plaintiff was reversed.532 The primary reason for the reversal
was that the alleged negligence was never proven, since the plaintiff never
established that the PSC was subject to the salary deduction limitation.533
Also, the defendant had never given the plaintiff any tax planning advice,
nor did he ever assume any responsibility for the PSC’s payroll.534 He had
only agreed to prepare the tax return based on the facts as they existed for
1996.535 In addition, the court held that there were no actionable damages
since penalties were not imposed by the IRS, there was no proof that the
524
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interest paid the IRS on the deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiff of
having use of the money, and the tax assessed by the IRS was simply what
the taxpayer owed and nothing in excess of that amount.536
With respect to the court’s analysis of damages, it is noteworthy that the
court seems to have followed the more modern, intermediate view
concerning the recovery of interest, but without expressly focusing on the
current three-way split on this issue.537
One aspect of the lower court’s decision concerning damages is also
noteworthy. While the lower court permitted the recovery of the additional
tax assessed by the IRS, and presumably paid, it denied any recovery for a
corresponding state tax deficiency that had not yet been asserted by the
state.538
In Parsons & Whittemore Corp. v. Schwartz, one of the many issues in
contention between the parties was whether the defendant, who originally
was the plaintiff corporation’s tax counsel and subsequently became its
president and chief operating officer, had agreed to file personal tax returns
for certain members of the family controlling the plaintiff.539 The court
denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on this issue, since further
evidence was necessary.540

2. Conflict of Interest
In Price v. Ragland, the transactions facially at issue were a redemption
of stock and representation in an estate/gift tax dispute.541 However, the
underlying legal issues really concerned the conflicts of interest by the
defendant attorney.542 TBC was a corporation that had 5,000 shares of stock
outstanding at the beginning of the relevant time period.543 The shares were
owned by Tully Turner (3,300), his son Buddy (612), and a trust for Tully’s
other three children (1,088).544 Tully was the trustee of the Children’s

536

Id. at 581–82.
See Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 4 (This view permits the recovery of interest
only when the interest paid the government on a tax underpayment exceeds the value to the
plaintiff of having had the use of the money in the meantime.).
538
Miller, 825 N.E.2d at 580.
539
See 387 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
540
Id. at 373.
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966 So. 2d 246, 248 (Ala. 2007).
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Trust.545 The attorney for TBC was the defendant, Price, a friend of the
Turner family.546
In 1983 Tully suffered a brain aneurism.547 Immediately before surgery
he signed a power of attorney giving his son, Buddy, authority to handle his
business and personal affairs.548 Following surgery, Tully suffered two
massive strokes and became severely incapacitated and unable to work or
handle any of his personal affairs.549 In 1986, Buddy, who had become the
president of TBC, consulted defendant Price and TBC’s accountant about a
tax efficient way to generate the income needed to pay for Tully’s medical
care.550 Based on the advice, it was decided that TBC would redeem a large
percentage of its outstanding stock.551 TBC ended up purchasing the shares
owned by Tully and the Children’s Trust, leaving Buddy as the sole
shareholder.552 Since TBC was not publicly traded, a large accounting firm
was retained to value the shares for the redemption.553 Based on a draft
report valuing each share at $496, the redemption occurred in 1986 using a
value of $500 per share.554 In the redemption transactions Buddy, as
president of TBC, acted on behalf of TBC, and he also acted on behalf of
Tully as his attorney-in-fact.555 Although never appointed as a successor
trustee for the Children’s Trust, he effected the transaction on behalf of the
Children’s Trust in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for Tully, who was the
named trustee of the trust.556 In these transactions Price was the only
attorney involved and he represented TBC and Tully.557 There was disputed
evidence at trial as to whether he also represented the trust.558
Tully died testate in 1991.559 The beneficiaries of his will were a marital
trust for his wife and a trust for Tully’s four children (Buddy and his three
545
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siblings).560 Defendant Price represented the estate in connection with
probate of the estate.561
In 1994, in connection with the estate’s tax return, the IRS contested the
$500 per share value used for the 1986 stock redemptions.562 The IRS
preliminarily decided the shares were then worth $1,422.563 As a result,
when Tully sold his shares for an understated price, the IRS asserted he was
making a gift of approximately $3 million, thereby resulting in additional
gift tax liability of over $1 million.564 Price represented the estate in its
dispute with the IRS from its inception until the spring of 1996, which was
shortly before the dispute was settled in September 1996.565 Although Price
did associate with another attorney experienced in handling similar disputes
with the IRS, he often communicated with the entire Turner family
concerning the IRS dispute.566 He advised the executors of Tully’s estate,
Buddy as president of TBC, and Buddy as trustee of the Children’s Trust
about the dispute, about their fiduciary obligations and about possible
courses of action if the IRS’s valuation should ultimately prevail.567 He
advised the executors whether there might be a cause of action by the estate
and the beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust against Buddy in connection
with the redemption.568 He also advised Buddy and TBC about the
consequences to them if the IRS’s valuation prevailed.569 During the entire
time that Price was communicating with and representing multiple parties
with conflicting interests, he never disclosed the conflict nor attempted to
obtain waivers from any of the parties.570
The dispute with the IRS was settled in September 1996 on the basis
that the shares were worth $665 per share.571 In November 1996, the
executors and beneficiaries of Tully’s estate and the trustee and
beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust sued Buddy, TBC, the accountant, and
defendant Price in connection with the redemption, asserting a number of
560
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causes of action, ultimately seeking rescission and reimbursement for all
distributions made with respect to the shares between 1986 and 1996.572
They also asserted claims against Price for fraud and negligence in
connection with the conflict of interests from 1986 to 1996 in the
redemption and the subsequent representations through settlement of the
IRS dispute.573 Subsequently, the plaintiffs settled with Buddy and TBC but
retained the right to proceed against Price.574 At trial against only Price, the
plaintiffs received a judgment of $400,000 in compensatory damages and
$700,000 in punitive damages.575 The punitive damages later were remitted
as excessive due to Price’s dire financial condition.576
On appeal, the compensatory damages awarded were reversed.577
Initially, though the court held the statute of limitations did not bar this
action, it held that damages relating to the 1986 stock redemption were not
recoverable since that wrong occurred outside the open statute of limitations
period.578 The damages allegedly resulting from defendant Price’s conflict
of interest on the IRS dispute representation consisted of an assertion that,
instead of contesting the IRS’s value of the shares in 1986, the parties could
have sought rescission of the redemption transactions, thereby resolving the
matter differently, and presumably, more favorably.579 The court found,
however, that the plaintiffs had not proven they would have pursued the
alternative strategy.580 To rescind would have required paying back all
amounts received from the redemption, and there was no evidence the
parties had the wherewithal to do this.581 Also, the amount of estate tax and
other savings if the alternative courses were pursued were not established
by the plaintiffs.582 Accordingly, the court held these asserted damages were
speculative and not recoverable.583
Although not involving a scope of engagement issue, Graham v. Welch,
Roberts and Amburn, LLP illustrates a miscommunication between a
572
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taxpayer and his accountant that could have easily have been avoided.584 In
Graham, the plaintiff received a notice that he owed $4,296.49 of taxes to
New York State.585 He issued a check for this amount and sent it to the
defendant accountant, intending for the accountant to pay the tax bill.586
There was evidence that the defendant accountant in the past had paid
certain expenses for the plaintiff.587 The accountant applied the check
toward his fees.588 Subsequently, the plaintiff’s bank account was levied
upon by New York State for the unpaid taxes.589 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant
accountant on statute of limitations grounds.590 The court agreed that the
plaintiff should have realized the error when he received a bill from his
accountant with a credit in the precise amount of his payment.591

B. Tax Filing and Tax Preparation
1. Late Filing and Non-Filing
To file a client’s tax return late, or not to file it at all, seems to be one of
the most obvious types of professional negligence one could imagine in the
tax area. A prominent commentator noted that “[t]he vast majority of
malpractice cases arising in the return preparation context involve the
practitioner’s failure to file the client’s tax return on a timely basis.”592 It is
therefore a bit puzzling that in 2007 a lower court in New York needed to
look to cases in other states as authority for this type of cause of action.593
In Blumberg v. Altman, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant accountant
filed his federal, New York State, and New York City income tax returns
late for 2004 and 2005 and that the defendant failed to obtain an extension
for filing in 2005.594 As a result, the plaintiff incurred penalties, interest and
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late fees, which he was seeking to recover in this action.595 Although
upholding the cause of action, the court stated:
Although New York courts are familiar with accounting
malpractice based on late filings, it appears that they have
not had occasion to reach the issue of whether an
accountant’s failure to file returns on time and file the
appropriate extensions states a valid cause of action for
accounting malpractice. However, courts in other
jurisdictions have expressly recognized these allegations as
a valid cause of action.596
In upholding the pro se plaintiff’s malpractice cause of action from the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court did note that in New York interest
paid the IRS is not recoverable as damages because it is viewed simply as
an appropriate charge for the use of money the plaintiff had during a period
of time he was not entitled to it.597 The court, rather perceptively, added that
penalties incurred by a plaintiff are different and are recoverable.598
Bryant v. Golden also involved a suit by a taxpayer against his
accountant for the interest and penalties incurred when the accountant failed
to file his 2000 federal income tax return.599 The case, however, dealt solely
with statute of limitations issues and affirmed the lower court’s holding that
the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.600
Pair v. Queen revolved around the late filing of federal and District of
Columbia estate tax returns.601 Penalties and interest of more than $1
million were incurred as a result and were sought to be recovered by the
plaintiffs from the defendants.602 The primary defendant, Queen, was an
attorney who was both a co-representative of the estate and the estate’s
attorney with respect to preparing and filing its tax returns.603 The other
595
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Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
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Biased supra note 42, at 149.
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defendants were an attorney and accountant who allegedly assisted Queen
in preparing the estate’s tax returns.604 The plaintiffs were beneficiaries
under the decedent’s will and also co-representatives of the estate.605 This
case, however, did not address the substance of the malpractice issue.606 It
focused solely on reversing the lower court’s incorrect dismissal of the
malpractice claims on non-substantive grounds.607 The lower court had also
ignored the fact that the plaintiffs were also heirs under the will, not merely
co-personal representatives with defendant Queen.608 In addition, the lower
court also misconstrued United States v. Boyle as preventing this
malpractice action.609
Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP involves the alleged failure
to file a refund claim for overpaid federal estate taxes.610 Hillbroom
involves the sizeable estate of one of the co-founders of DHL, the
international express delivery business.611 As part of the settlement of
litigation involving the heirs and beneficiaries of the estate, the defendant
accounting firm and one of its tax attorney employees, Gregory Jenner,
were retained to represent the estate to pursue estate tax refund claims. 612
Allegedly, when the previous tax counsel met with Jenner they informed
him of the need to pursue a refund claim because additional administrative
expenses and other deductible amounts were incurred after the tax return
was filed.613 Jenner apparently acknowledged the need to file the refund
claim for these amounts but did not want to do so until a previous refund
claim that was then pending was received.614 Ultimately, the second refund
claim was not timely filed and this suit for over $6 million was brought.615
The lower court dismissed the suit on statute of limitations grounds, and the
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court of appeals reversed and remanded for further fact finding concerning
several statute of limitations issues.616
Goodman v. Hanson involves interesting procedural issues arising from
several tax malpractice disputes.617 In Goodman, the defendant was the
attorney for an estate of which the plaintiff was the executor and the
principal beneficiary, as well as the trustee of a related trust.618 In 2005, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for the damages resulting from the failure to
timely file an Illinois estate and generation skipping tax return.619 This suit
was settled in December 2005 with the defendant paying the plaintiff
$35,000 and releasing any claims for unpaid legal fees.620 The parties
signed a general release that was approved by the probate court.621 In
January 2007, the plaintiff filed a second suit against the defendant arising
out of the same facts, but this time alleging malpractice based on the
defendant’s failure to take certain deductions on the federal estate tax
return.622 It seems that most of the deductions were taken on the trust’s
income tax return rather than on the estate tax return even though the
estate’s marginal tax rate was higher than the trust’s.623 The issue before the
Illinois intermediate appellate court was whether the second suit was barred
by either the general release or res judicata.624 The court held the general
release barred the second suit.625
Several other cases arising from late filing or non-filing should be noted.
Ballreich Bros. v. Criblez involved errors on a payroll tax return and the
untimely filing of an amended payroll tax return.626 In Ballreich, the
taxpayer sued the accountant and his firm, seeking damages for
malpractice.627 The case revolved around the accountant’s third-party
complaint against the attorney who had provided the incorrect advice that
caused the problem.628 The court held that the trial court should not have
616
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dismissed the third party complaint with prejudice because it was
inadequately pled, since the cause of action could have been revised to cure
the pleading defect.629 The problem with the pleading was that it simply
claimed the advice given by the attorney was incorrect.630 There was no
allegation that the advice was negligent, that it fell below applicable
standards or that the attorney breached any duty owed the client.631
In Murphey v. Grass, the plaintiff had retained the defendant accounting
firm to manage all bookkeeping and accounting services for his two
businesses and to prepare all payroll and other tax returns.632 The
defendant’s accountant was negligent in performing the work.633 It turned
out the IRS had filed liens and that the plaintiff owed approximately
$100,000 in employment taxes and interest.634 Subsequently, the State of
Washington determined that over $185,000 was owed for additional
retailing, sales and use taxes plus interest and penalties.635 Only the
additional state amounts were the subject of this litigation.636 The
Washington Court of Appeals held that for statute of limitations purposes
the liability for these amounts accrued under Washington law only after all
administrative appeals were finally concluded and that this action was
timely.637
At the heart of the dispute in A. Morrison Trucking, Inc. v. Bonfiglio
was the fact that the plaintiff incurred almost $79,000 in penalties and
interest for approximately three years, beginning March 31, 1999, because
his accountant failed to make payroll tax deposits, file tax returns or
respond to IRS tax due notices in a timely fashion.638 The defendant,
Bonfiglio, owned the tax service that was to provide these various
accounting services to the plaintiff.639 The person who actually performed
the services was Allan Keizer.640 Keizer initially was an employee of
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defendant’s accounting service.641 At some point during the relevant time
period Keizer formed his own company and continued to perform the
accounting services for the plaintiff.642 It is unclear when the transition
occurred and, therefore, who was responsible for what damages.643 These
causes of action were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.644
Morgan v. Fennimore involved a suit for damages by a taxpayer against
his CPA tax return preparer for failing to file a state income tax return.645
The defendant accountant annually prepared the plaintiff’s federal and
Indiana income tax returns from 1990 until 2007.646 Prior to 1990, the
plaintiff had won $25 million from the Ohio State Lottery.647 From 1990
until 2003, the plaintiff was receiving annual payments from the lottery. 648
Although each year Ohio sent a Form W-2G for the lottery payments, the
defendant CPA never prepared or filed an Ohio income tax return for the
plaintiff.649 In 2008, a notice was received from Ohio demanding almost
$1.8 million in tax liabilities, fees and interest.650 This suit ensued.651 The
court never reached the substance, since it granted summary judgment to
the defendant on statute of limitation grounds.652
641
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Although not addressed in the case, another lapse by the defendant
occurred which, perhaps, could be the basis for a malpractice suit.653 In
early 2003, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he had moved to
Washington state.654 Nevertheless, the defendant prepared a full-year
Indiana tax return for the plaintiff.655
Several cases involve an error by an accountant as to which state was
the taxpayer’s state of residence.656 However, neither of the cases focused
on the substance of the allegation.657 In Choina v. Albanese, the plaintiff
was a New York resident who lived in New Jersey.658 For 2005 and 2006,
the defendant accountant prepared New York state tax returns for her.659
The plaintiff later learned she should have filed in New Jersey and owed
approximately $225,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties.660 The statute of
limitations had run on amending the New Jersey returns for amounts paid in
New York.661 The claim was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.662
In Rakoff v. St. Clair, CPAs, P.C., the plaintiff allegedly advised the
defendant CPA that during 2007 he owned residential properties in four
states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio.663 Instead of
discussing the indicia of residency in each state, the defendant advised the
plaintiff to file as a resident of Pennsylvania and a nonresident of New
York, allegedly because that would result in the smallest tax liability. 664
New York subsequently instituted an audit.665 This suit was instituted for
the initial advice, for errors made in connection with the New York audit,
for failing to file amended Pennsylvania returns and for failing to advise the
plaintiff of the statute of limitations for filing amended returns in
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Pennsylvania.666 The case revolved primarily around statute of limitations
issues.667 The court held the statute was open and denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.668

2. Negligent Preparation
This section focuses on errors involved in the return preparation
process. Several cases simply assert that defective or erroneous returns were
prepared without specifying the underlying facts in enough detail to enable
any useful analysis.669 These cases, by and large, are ignored. Cases that
result from the misapplication of a specific tax code provision, deduction or
tax concept will be discussed subsequently.670 It is interesting to note that
most of the cases in this section involve motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment and often involve claims that the statute of limitations has run. It
is likely that a reasonably thorough review of the current state of the law
concerning when the statute of limitations commences to run and when it is
tolled can be gleaned just from these cases. As a preliminary matter,
Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop held that a taxpayer who was criminally
convicted of filing a false tax return and tax evasion was precluded from
seeking damages from the accountant who prepared the return.671 Collateral
estoppel bars the subsequent malpractice suit since the criminal conviction
necessarily determines that the taxpayer acted intentionally or willfully.672
The court also held that Texas public policy prohibits the taxpayer from
recovering damages from his own illegal acts.673
Weiss v. Deloitte & Touch, LLP, one of the cases that does not specify
the underlying negligence with enough detail to enable analysis, is
noteworthy because it also involves a cause of action against the accountant
defendants for negligently reviewing tax returns prepared by the plaintiffs’
666
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prior accountants.674 The substance of this cause of action was not
addressed since New York’s Appellate Division for the Second Department
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this cause of action on statute of
limitations grounds.675
In Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, the plaintiff sought to
recover fees he paid to accountants in connection with audits of his 19941996 tax returns on the theory that the audits of these years were caused by
the defendant accountants “taking improper losses and deductions in his
1994 tax return.”676 New York’s First Department had little trouble
affirming the lower court’s dismissal of this cause of action because the
court did not believe the asserted facts.677 Instead, the court found that the
plaintiff likely was targeted for IRS tax scrutiny because of errors in, and
the audit of, the 1994 tax return of an “S” corporation in which the plaintiff
was a shareholder, which return was prepared by different accountants.678
The court in Penner nevertheless proceeded to address the substance of
the asserted cause of action.679 The court stated that the plaintiff’s
expenditures in defending the audits were not recoverable, even if the
alleged malpractice did cause the audits, where there was no evidence that
the error caused a tax liability that otherwise would not have existed.680
“Plaintiff is not entitled to the cost of trying to convince the tax authorities
that he should not have to pay taxes he legitimately owed but would have
avoided had the 1994 return been prepared in a way that did not red-flag the
potential for abuse.”681
The court here is answering in the negative the often-asked question
whether any damages may be recovered when some tax malpractice triggers
an audit that uncovers other, non-related, taxes to be due.682 The court
emphatically answers that neither the other taxes nor the costs of defending
the audit are recoverable.683
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In Penner, the First Department also held the plaintiff may not recover
the fees he paid the defendants for preparation of the returns that were
audited.684 The court found that the plaintiff received something of value in
return for the fees—tax returns, whether or not correct, that were accepted
by the IRS, though subject to adjustment.685
Shaiman v. Carpet One of the Hamptons, Inc. stands in partial contrast
to Penner.686 In Shaiman, the plaintiff was the defendant’s accountant for
more than ten years until 2007.687 During this time, the plaintiff prepared
the defendant’s income tax returns and New York State sales tax returns.688
With respect to the sales tax returns, the plaintiff simply reported the
amounts given him by the defendant’s bookkeeper without any independent
verification.689 For the year 2000, the sales reported on the sales tax returns
differed from the sales reported on the income tax returns by $1.3
million.690 As a result, the defendant was subjected to a sales tax audit for
March 1, 2000 to November 30, 2002.691 This initial audit was later
followed by a compliance audit for December 1, 2002 through February 28,
2006.692 As a result of the audits, the defendant ended up paying
approximately $500,000 in additional sales taxes and $134,000 in
interest.693 The plaintiff spent a total of over 150 hours working on both
audits and brought this action to collect his fees of $15,000.694 The
defendant counterclaimed for damages flowing from the plaintiff’s
negligence in preparing the 2000 tax returns in failing to discover the $1.3
million discrepancy between the sales figures reported on the federal
income tax return and the sales tax return.695
The damages sought by the defendant are very interesting.696 During
closing argument, defendant’s counsel withdrew the defendant’s claim for
684

Id. at 231.
Id.
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See No. BRC 208–08, 2010 WL 2305549, at *5, *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Co. June 9, 2010).
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Id. at *1.
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Id. at *1, *3.
689
Id. at *1.
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Id. at *3.
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caused the sales tax audit.
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the additional taxes since the defendant actually owed the taxes.697 This is
consistent with Penner and with New York law that taxes owed are not
recoverable from a negligent tax advisor.698 As to the interest on the
underpayment of the sales taxes, the court followed established New York
law that refuses to award interest in tax underpayment situations.699
Although the defendant fired the plaintiff in the midst of the second
compliance audit and hired a replacement accountant, the plaintiff never
introduced any evidence concerning the cost of the replacement accountant,
so the court dismissed this counterclaim.700 Therefore, the only damages
asserted were the very same fees the plaintiff was seeking to recover in this
suit.701 The court in Shaiman awarded the plaintiff his audit fees of $15,000
and awarded this same amount as damages to the defendant for the
plaintiff’s negligence in preparing and not detecting the conflicting sales
numbers on the income and sales tax returns and then offset the amounts.702
Awarding the defendant damages for the negligent return preparation is
inconsistent with Penner, in which the court held the taxpayer was not
entitled to recover either the cost of the negligent return preparation or the
audit defense costs.703 Initially, Shaiman is consistent with Penner in
awarding the plaintiff CPA compensation for his work on the two audits his
negligence caused.704 But when Shaiman awarded the defendant client the
same amount as damages flowing from the plaintiff’s negligence in
submitting tax returns with inconsistent sales numbers, Shaiman seems
inconsistent with Penner.705 In Shaiman, contrary to Penner, the audit fees
were still unpaid.706 It may be that the judge in Shaiman ultimately did not
want the plaintiff CPA, who was quite blameworthy, to obtain any net
recovery from the litigation: “Plaintiff should not be compensated for work
that it in essence created due to its negligence or could have been altogether
avoided had Plaintiff discovered and communicated the discrepancy to
697
698

Id.
See 844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007); NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at

149.
699

Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *8; See also NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at

149.
700

Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *4, *8.
Id. at *9.
702
Id. at *5, *9.
703
844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007).
704
Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *5, *9.
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Id. at *9.
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See id. at *2.
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Defendant.”707 It should be emphasized that Penner was decided by the
First Department, one of New York’s four intermediate appellate courts,
while Shaiman was decided in Suffolk County District Court, a lower court
of very limited jurisdiction.708
Several cases revolving about statute of limitations issues illustrate
potential negligent return preparation scenarios. In SK Partners I, LP v.
Metro Consultants, Inc., the plaintiffs’ cause of action asserted that the
defendant accountants, who had prepared income tax returns for a group of
related entities, caused the plaintiffs to overpay their taxes by claiming
depreciation deductions that were too low.709 The accountants’ depreciation
was calculated on an understated cost basis for the assets to be
depreciated.710 At least part of the overpaid taxes were recovered when new
accountants filed amended returns.711 The damages asserted by the plaintiffs
included being required to file amended returns and suffering “‘a loss of the
depreciation deductions, excess attorney’s fees and accountant fees,’ as well
as ‘a loss of the interest and economic value of the money’ overpaid to the
IRS.”712
In Iacurci v. Sax, the defendant CPA and his firm had prepared the
plaintiff’s tax returns from 1989 to 2006.713 For tax years 1999 through
2002, the returns prepared by the defendants portrayed the plaintiff as a real
estate investor.714 For tax years 2003 through 2005, without informing the
plaintiff, the defendant changed this and portrayed the defendant as being
“engaged in the business of real estate.”715 According to the plaintiff’s
expert, this change caused the plaintiff to overpay his taxes by $177,000.716
The precise makeup of the additional taxes and the amount recovered upon

707

Id. at *9.
See Penner 844 N.Y.S.2d at 229; Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *1. It was suggested that
the plaintiff reduced the amount of fees he sought to recover so as to fall within the $15,000 limit
of the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *2
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944 N.E.2d 414, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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Id. at 415 n.1.
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No. CV095028505S, 2011 WL 1470005, at *1, *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011), aff’d,
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the filing of an amended return is not specified in the opinion.717 However,
in both Iacurci and in SK Partners I, the causes of action were held to be
barred by the statute of limitations, and the substance of the asserted claims
was never reached.718
In Sahadi v. Schaeffer, the case centered on when the California twoyear statute of limitations commenced to run for a case of negligent
preparation of tax returns that were later audited by the IRS. 719 Here, the
taxpayer was more fortunate than the two previous taxpayers, as the
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held the plaintiff’s
suit was timely.720 The tax returns primarily at issue in Sahadi were their
1991 California and federal income tax returns.721 The returns were
prepared by the defendant accountant and filed on April 15, 1992.722
Within one year, two amended returns were prepared by the defendants and
filed by the plaintiffs.723 Eventually, the California tax authorities and the
IRS audited the returns.724 Large tax deficiencies of over $35 million were
asserted initially by both tax authorities.725 After more than five years of
negotiation, the deficiencies were reversed by both the IRS and the
California authorities.726 The primary negligence of the defendant involved
failing to properly document positions taken on the 1991 tax returns.727 In
January of 1991, the taxpayers transferred ownership in a real estate
complex consisting of a high rise office building, shopping center and
hotels to their lender by deed in lieu of foreclosure.728 The taxability of the
transfer turned on the insolvency of taxpayers at that time, which was
717

The filing of amended returns for tax years 2003–2005 is mentioned. Id. at *1. As to the
nature of the damages, they presumably result from the difference in being able to utilize long
term capital gains tax rates on investment income (typically reported on Schedule D to the federal
income tax return) versus having to pay tax at regular tax rates on ordinary business income
(typically reported on Schedule C to the federal income tax return). The plaintiff’s expert stated
the errors discovered were caused by filing a Schedule C rather than a Schedule D. Id. at *3.
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Id. at *7; SK Partners I, 944 N.E.2d at 415.
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66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 520–21 (Ct. App. 2007).
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Id. at 542–43.
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Id. at 521.
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Id.
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Id. at 521–22.
725
Id. at 522.
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largely dependent on the value of this and their other property, as well as on
the precise amount of their indebtedness.729 Apparently, the defendants did
not have any of the necessary supporting documentation prepared.730
Similarly, there was no documentation for a net operating loss deduction
claimed on the tax return.731
Sahadi also involved allegations that the defendant accountant was
negligent in representing the plaintiffs on the audit.732 IRS audit reports
issued in 1997 criticized the defendant “for failing to (1) provide
information the IRS had requested, and (2) offer support for tax positions he
had asserted during the audit process.”733
The damages asserted by the plaintiffs included almost $2.3 million in
out-of-pocket costs, which seem quite appropriate, but also included
emotional distress and economic loss caused by the tax liens needlessly
filed against them.734 The plaintiffs claimed that they lost $2 million when
tax liens filed by the California tax authorities against their thoroughbred
horse breeding farm caused them to lose it from a “fire-sale” through
foreclosure.735 Whether this type of loss is recoverable as proximately
caused by the negligent tax return preparation is most interesting. Alas,
there is no published report of the subsequent disposition of this case, and
this issue must await determination by another court.
In SG Industries, Inc. v. RSM McGladrey, Inc., the plaintiff retained the
defendant accounting firm for tax consulting services and to prepare its tax
returns for 2007 and 2008.736 In September 2009, a different accounting
firm reviewed these tax returns and identified a number of errors that were
made both on the federal and state returns which caused the plaintiff to

729

Id. Normally, when a taxpayer’s debt is discharged without full payment, the amount of
the unpaid discharged debt is taxable gross income. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012). An exception
exists if the taxpayer is insolvent when the discharge occurs. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2012).
However, the exception is strictly limited and may not exceed the amount of the insolvency.
I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (2012). It is thus a certainty that establishing and proving the amount of a
taxpayer’s insolvency will always be necessary whenever this exception to including discharged
debt in income is claimed.
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See Sahadi, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 522.
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Id. at n.4.
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Id. at 523–24.
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Id. at 522.
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Id. at 524.
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Id.
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No. 10–cv–11119, 2011 WL 6090247, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2011).
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overpay its taxes.737 The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action for
malpractice, seeking to recover its losses.738 While a resolution of certain of
the potential substantive issues raised would have been quite informative, it
was not to be. The plaintiff’s suit was dismissed because the plaintiff never
offered any expert testimony, nor even identified expert witnesses, to
establish the standard of care, breach of the standard and causation, all of
which were necessary elements to establish the cause of action.739 The
plaintiff had hoped to establish its cause of action through defendant’s
experts.740 After missing many deadlines to file an expert report, the
plaintiff’s counsel unsuccessfully sought leave from the court to remedy
this defect by filing a rebuttal expert report.741 When this proved
unsuccessful, the plaintiff changed counsel and new counsel attempted to
obtain leave to name an expert and provide an expert report.742 The court,
however, would not grant leave.743 There was evidence that the parties
“were engaged in a lengthy and extensive settlement dialogue” and the
court viewed the plaintiff’s failure to comply as being deliberate, and an
attempt to save expert fees.744
Goodman v. Hanson, discussed previously,745 involved a claim that the
defendant accountant negligently prepared an estate tax return when he
failed to claim certain deductions on the estate tax return, and instead
claimed the deductions on a related trust’s income tax return despite the fact
that marginal tax rate for the estate tax return was higher.746 Taking the
deductions on the estate tax return would have saved more taxes than
claiming the deductions on the trust’s returns.747 This issue was not
addressed by the court since it held the issue was precluded by a general
release signed by the litigants in a related case.748
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Id. at *2.
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Somewhat similar to Goodman is Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust.749 Here,
the underlying tax negligence involved failing to amend a federal estate tax
return to claim relatively nominal deductions that had been overlooked and
also failing to keep the statute of limitations open to enable the filing of an
amended return for additional administrative expenses being incurred in
litigation related to which of decedent’s wills was governing.750 The case,
however, deals solely with statute of limitations and certain other
procedural issues.751
In Allmen v. Fox Rothschild LLP, one of the allegations was that the
defendant attorneys were negligent in preparing the decedent’s estate tax
returns by treating certain bank and brokerage accounts of the decedent as
being joint accounts rather than including the accounts as part of the
estate.752 Excluding these funds from the estate, together with the operation
of the tax allocation clauses of the will, which were also alleged to be
negligently drafted, forced the estate to pay certain debts and expenses with
funds that otherwise would have gone to a charitable lead trust, thereby
reducing the estate’s charitable contribution deduction and increasing the
estate’s tax liability.753 The court, however, did not focus on the substance
of the claims but on statute of limitations issues.754
In Hall v. Crittendon and Assocs. LTD, the plaintiff taxpayers seem to
have retained a tax preparer that was shady and unscrupulous.755 Before
2004, the plaintiffs’ tax returns were prepared by a CPA.756 To save on fees,
the plaintiffs decided to have their 2003 tax return prepared at an office
doing business as EZ E-File.757 When they met with the return preparer he
told them their prior returns were not prepared correctly and that many
deductions to which they were entitled were not claimed. 758 They not only

749

See Nos. A093450, A094395, 2006 WL 952578, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2006).
Id. at *1–3. The gross estate was over $1.8 million. The omitted deductions totaled over
$1,000. Id. at *2.
751
Id. at *1, *3.
752
101964/11, 2012 WL 470451, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2012). The case is discussed
in somewhat more detail infra at text accompanying notes 1089–1094.
753
Id. at *2.
754
Id. The case arose on the defendant attorney’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations
grounds.
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See A133235, 2013 WL 1810593, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013).
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Id. at *1.
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had the 2003 return prepared, but also amended returns back to 1998.759 The
amended returns reduced the earlier reported adjusted gross income very
dramatically.760 The changes were obviously fabricated since the return
preparer did not even request to see any business records for the prior tax
years.761 In June of 2004, the IRS denied the plaintiffs’ refund claims for
1998–2000 on statute of limitations grounds and opted to audit the amended
2001 to 2003 tax returns.762 While the defendant was retained to represent
the plaintiffs on the audit, the representation was unsatisfactory.763 They
later learned the audit had not gone well.764 Their refund claims were
denied, the IRS asserted they owed over $23,000 in additional taxes,
interest and penalties for 2002 and 2003 and they could have been
prosecuted for fraud.765 They subsequently retained a tax attorney who
favorably resolved their tax situation.766 This suit against the defendants
ensued.767
This suit went to trial and the plaintiffs received a judgment for over
$39,000.768 On this appeal the judgment was reversed on statute of
limitations grounds.769 In its opinion, the court adhered to established
California precedent that damages for emotional distress are not available
where, such as here, the loss is purely economic.770
The following three cases are worthy of brief mention. Although each
case, at some level, involves inaccurate tax returns, in each this issue is
essentially engulfed and overshadowed by other concerns or issues.
Estate of Erich Heinz involves a contested proceeding in New York’s
Surrogate’s Court brought by the preparer of an estate tax return in order to
collect his fees.771 The estate tax return involved was negligently prepared
and overstated the amount of tax due.772 The case, however, really revolves
759
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about the astonishingly shocking activities of the preparer and will be
discussed subsequently.773 Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.,774 previously
discussed,775 alleged the return preparer made up deductions and thus
created an inaccurate return.776
Nathel v. Siegal involved motions to dismiss a securities law action
brought against the sellers of an allegedly fraudulent oil and gas investment
scheme.777 The defendants allegedly misrepresented the investments to be
valid interests in oil and gas drilling partnerships that were expected to
produce revenue from operations as well as certain tax deductions.778 In
fact, most of the wells were already dug and were dry, so the promised tax
deductions were impossible to obtain.779 Among the defendants were the
taxpayers’ accountant who vouched for the investments and other
accountants who prepared certain of the partnership’s tax forms which
included deductions that were obviously unavailable and that were in the
process of being disallowed.780 The court refused to dismiss plaintiffs’
declaratory judgment claims against one set of defendants solely on the
ground that the damages claimed were not yet final and therefore
hypothetical.781 The court did dismiss the cause of action against the second
set of accountants who only prepared one of the partnerships’ tax returns
since they were not otherwise involved in selling the fraudulent investment
and any action for only tax malpractice belonged in state court, not in
federal court.782
In RTR Technologies, Inc. v. Helming, an accountant was sued—albeit
unsuccessfully—for giving correct and ethical advice.783 The underlying
flavor of the case is evident from the first paragraph of the district court’s
opinion:
The background of this case is unusual and, to some extent,
disturbing. Plaintiffs managed for many years to enjoy over
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$1,000,000, tax-free, by claiming on their tax returns that
this money was a “loan” from a Subchapter S corporation
they controlled, rather than income. When Defendants, an
accounting firm, advised them to amend the return to
recognize these funds as income, Plaintiffs followed the
advice and incurred a tax liability. Now Defendants find
themselves sued for this allegedly negligent advice.784
RTR Technologies was a subchapter S corporation.785 Its president and
sole shareholder was Ms. Berger.786 Evidently, from 1994 until 2003, Ms.
Berger withdrew varying sums of money from RTR which were recorded as
loans to officer on RTR’s books.787 These loans totaled over $1 million.788
These loans drew criticism in 2002 and 2003 when RTR attempted to
obtain loans from the Small Business Administration.789 In 2003, the
defendant and his firm were hired as a turnaround manager for RTR.790 In
2005, the defendant was also retained to provide tax preparation services for
RTR.791 The defendant was convinced that these loans were not really loans
but “surreptitious advances.”792 The loans had no documentation, nor
“attributes of loans,” which presumably means no interest was ever paid on
the loans.793 In addition, Ms. Berger did not have the means to repay these
loans.794 In light of this, the defendant advised Ms. Berger to amend her
personal and RTR’s tax returns for 2002 to reclassify the loans as income to
Ms. Berger.795 After consulting with counsel, who also expressed concern
about the loans, Ms. Berger reluctantly agreed to file amended returns for
2002 through 2005 for herself and RTR.796 While the additional income
resulted in Ms. Berger owing additional federal income tax of over
784

Id. at 414.
Id. at 415. An S-corporation is a special type of corporation that generally is not subject to
the income tax imposed on corporations. See IRC § 1363(a) (2012).
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$525,000, the corresponding effect on RTR (additional compensation paid
of over $1 million plus other additional deductions) caused RTR to go from
a small profit for these years to cumulative loss of over $1.475 million.797
In 2008, the defendants ceased all business dealings with RTR and Ms.
Berger.798 Pursuant to advice from an in-house accountant for RTR, Ms.
Berger then re-amended her 2002 income tax return to reverse the change
made by the defendants’ amended return by eliminating the $1 million of
income and resurrecting the loan to officers account.799 This suit against the
defendant and his accounting firm ensued asserting damages of over $4.5
million for various purported additional costs and lost profits.800
While the court rather easily granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds801 and could have
ended its analysis with that ruling, it went on to address the plaintiffs’
substantive claims and to laud the defendants and lambast Ms. Berger.802
Apparently, the court was annoyed not only with Ms. Berger’s original tax
evasion of treating money taken from RTR as loans, but also because the
court caught the plaintiff red-handed in further tax cheating.803 The court
rather astutely observed that while Ms. Berger in 2008 re-amended her
personal 2002 income tax return to eliminate the $1 million in income and
to re-characterize it as a loan, she never re-amended RTR’s income tax
returns for 2003 through 2007 to reflect the corresponding elimination of
the extra $1 million of compensation deduction created by the original
amendment of the 2002 income tax returns.804
As a result, amending only the [personal] 2002 tax returns
eliminated the estimated $500,000 tax liability caused by
Defendants’ actions and allowed Plaintiffs to reap the
benefits of the million-dollar loss carried forward by RTR
in the years that followed. Defying logic and IRS

797

Id.
Id. at 418–19
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Id. at 419.
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Id.
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Id. at 424.
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Id.at 424, 434. The court also lambasted the plaintiffs’ attorney/CPA expert witness. The
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regulations, Plaintiffs are at the present time, in essence,
having their cake and eating it too—and trying to get an
extra dollop of whipped cream by reaping damages from
Defendants.805
The district court’s annoyance with Ms. Berger, and its sympathy for the
defendants, is aptly illustrated by the court’s concluding paragraphs of the
opinion:
It is surprising that Plaintiffs had the temerity to bring this
lawsuit. The complaint was clearly filed too late. The
record, mainly as a result of Plaintiffs’ failure to file longoverdue tax returns, is utterly insufficient to demonstrate
damages. Most importantly, it is clear that Plaintiffs for
many years enjoyed over $1,000,000 in income without
paying any taxes on it, and they accomplished this by filing
a tax return that improperly characterized the monies they
received as a loan. It is close to ludicrous to claim that, by
advising Plaintiffs to amend the 2002 tax return to conform
with what the law and good accounting practice required,
Defendants were being negligent. On the contrary, they
were serving their clients ethically and well.
As a result of behaving professionally, Defendants have
found themselves slapped with this expensive lawsuit. That
undeserved headache, at least, is now over. The court can
only hope that the IRS and the state authorities will make
sure that Plaintiffs now proceed to do what everyone who
enjoys the privilege of living in our beloved country is
required to do: pay their fair share of taxes.806
The moral, perhaps, is that a plaintiff bringing this type of tax
malpractice case should have clean hands as concerns tax compliance. If
not, the judge may very well notice.

C. Taxpayer Representation Before IRS and Courts
In contemplating possible malpractice scenarios involving tax, one of
the most basic to come to mind would undoubtedly be negligent
representation before the IRS or some other taxing authority or before a
805
806

Id. at 425.
Id. at 434.
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court. Two recent cases demonstrate these situations. A third case
demonstrates an extremely unusual situation that could have come from a
Hollywood script writer—probably one who specializes in horror films.
In Sahadi v. Scheaffer, which was previously discussed,807 one of the
allegations against the defendant accountant/return preparer was that he
negligently represented the plaintiffs before the IRS. 808 In fact, the reports
of the IRS agents which proposed tax deficiencies of approximately $35
million explicitly criticized the defendant.809 The reports asserted that he
failed “to (1) provide information the IRS had requested, and (2) offer
support for tax positions he had asserted during the audit process.”810 While
Sahadi held the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations, there is no
reported case indicating the outcome of the litigation.811
Guerrero v. McDonald involved a claim for negligent representation in
a Tax Court litigation.812 During the 1990s the IRS conducted multiple
audits of tax returns of corporations owned by the plaintiff and asserted
additional taxes due.813 The plaintiff then hired the defendant to represent
him at the IRS appeals process and subsequently to file suit in Tax Court to
contest the proposed adjustments.814 The defendant was a CPA who had a
law degree, but was not licensed to practice law in Georgia.815 After losing
in Tax Court, the plaintiff hired a law firm to appeal the decision.816 The
judgment of the Tax Court was ultimately upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.817
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming that he was
negligent in how he handled the trial in Tax Court.818 Alternatively, the
plaintiff argued that if the defendant’s initial advice that the plaintiff’s tax
claims were meritorious was incorrect, then he sought to recover all fees
paid to plaintiff and the other attorneys who represented him in post-trial
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proceedings.819 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.820
As to the initial claim, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facia cause of action because he never established proximate
causation.821 The plaintiff never established that but for the defendant’s
negligence a different result would have been obtained.822 He was simply
second guessing what the defendant did.823 As to the alternative cause of
action, the court went back to very basic doctrine affirming the error in
judgment rule.824 So long as an attorney honestly exercises his judgment in
the conduct of litigation, he cannot be held liable for malpractice.825
Professionals are not insurers who guarantee outcomes.826
Interestingly, the lower court applied the legal malpractice standard here
even though the defendant was not a licensed attorney.827 The court did this
because both parties cited legal malpractice precedent and neither objected
to the use of such precedent.828 Also, the asserted malpractice concerned
actions taken in connection with a trial.829 The appellate court approved the
holding of the lower court and also applied the legal malpractice
standard.830
Estate of Erich Heinz involves a situation in which the representation—
or actually, misrepresentation—of the executor of an estate is so extremely
diabolical, that it almost could be imagined to be the fictional creation of
some horror novelist.831 In Heinz, the decedent had property in the United
States and Germany.832 The estate was divided equally between his three
children, one of whom, Bettina, resided in California, while the other two
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resided overseas.833 Bettina was named executor of the will and in June
1999, was duly qualified in New York.834 She also received ancillary letters
in Germany.835 She hired Ervin Sommer to prepare the estate’s federal
estate tax return.836 Sommer was an enrolled agent who could practice
before the IRS, but was neither an attorney nor an accountant.837 In
connection with the retainer, Bettina executed a power of attorney and a
declaration of representation in favor of Sommer.838 These enabled Sommer
to receive confidential financial information and to execute documents on
behalf of the estate.839 Sommer filed the estate’s tax return in October of
1999.840
Bettina became dissatisfied with Sommer’s work and revoked his power
of attorney on August 24, 2000, before an IRS estate tax advisor.841
Sommer was notified of the termination by phone and in writing.842 Without
Bettina’s knowledge, Sommer contacted the IRS claiming that he still
represented the estate and that his power of attorney was revoked by
mistake.843 He then urged the IRS to audit the estate’s tax return, which it
did.844 He never notified Bettina of the audit.845 He represented the estate on
the audit and the IRS determined that additional taxes of over $70,000 were
due.846 Without any authority, he then filed an amended return on behalf of
the estate.847 All of this occurred despite the fact that Bettina again informed
the IRS that Sommer’s original power of attorney was revoked and that she
again informed him, by phone and in writing, that he should refrain from
any contact with the IRS on behalf of the estate.848 Sommer ignored
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Id.
Id.
835
Id.
836
See id. at *1, *3.
837
Id. at *1–2.
838
Id. at *3.
839
Id.
840
Id.
841
Id.
842
Id.
843
Id. at *3–4.
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Id. at *4, *5.
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Id. at *4.
846
Id. at *5.
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Id.
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Id. at *5–6.
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Bettina’s instructions and filed an amended return for the estate.849 While
the details of this case are not specific, some of these events occurred up to
three years after the power of attorney was revoked.850
While this was transpiring, Sommer flooded the German court and
Bettina’s siblings with letters and documents accusing her of criminal
activity and of committing numerous breaches of her fiduciary duties.851
This resulted in a revocation of Bettina’s ancillary letters in Germany. 852
She had to retain German counsel to seek reinstatement of her letters.853
In October 2003, Bettina commenced an action in California for
damages and an injunction against Sommer.854 The CPA she hired to review
the estate’s records testified that Sommer made numerous errors on the
estate tax return, including failing to claim a tax credit for foreign estate
taxes, failing to deduct administration expenses, and overstating the value
of the German property of the estate.855 A corrected tax return was filed,
and a tax abatement of $94,000 was obtained.856
While the California litigation was pending, Sommer claimed to be a
creditor of the estate and filed this petition in New York Surrogate’s Court
seeking an accounting from Bettina.857 When she failed to timely account,
he brought a petition to hold her in contempt.858 Upon a hearing of what
essentially became a suit for fees, Sommer admitted he had no authority to
act on behalf of the estate or Bettina.859 He was ordered to refrain from
contacting the IRS on behalf of the estate.860 Without getting into similar
details about his claimed fees, the court held Sommer was not entitled to
recover any fees.861
At the end of the opinion, the court indicated that Sommer had recently
filed complaints with the IRS against Bettina and her California attorney
849

Id. at *6. It is not clear from the opinion whether he filed one or two amended returns. See
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Id. at *4–5.
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Id. at *5.
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Id.
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *6–7.
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *7.
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Id. at *8.
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See id. at *8–9.
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Id. at *13.
851

694

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

and accountant.862 The little bit of light at the end of the tunnel was that a
possibility of obtaining sanctions against Sommer did remain open.863

D. Personal Tax Planning
1. Income Tax
a. Litigation Settlement Advice
In Kerbein v. Hutchison, the defendant attorney represented the plaintiff
in a worker’s compensation discrimination claim against her former
employer.864 The plaintiff agreed to settle her claim for $37,500 based on
her belief that this amount was not taxable.865 At the settlement hearing, the
plaintiff accepted the $37,500 with the express condition that she had ten
days to investigate the tax consequences of the settlement.866 Five days
later, the defendant advised the plaintiff that the $37,500 would not be
subject to tax, so she allowed the settlement to become final.867 It was later
determined that the $37,500 was taxable.868 The issue before the court was
whether the statute of limitations had expired before this suit was
instituted.869 The Third Department held the statute of limitations began to
run when the settlement became final and that the suit was timely.870
Delahaye v. Plaisance also involved an allegation that the defendant
attorney incorrectly advised the plaintiff that an amount received in the
settlement of litigation would not be subject to federal or state income
tax.871 The case, however, focuses on the statute of limitations and affirms
the trial court’s dismissal of the action as untimely.872
862

Id.
Id. at *14.
864
816 N.Y.S.2d 591, 591 (App. Div. 2006).
865
Id.
866
Id.
867
Id.
868
Id.
869
See id. at 592.
870
Id. at 592–93.
871
No. 2007 CA 1697, 2008 WL 2065927, at *1 (La. Ct. App. May 2, 2008).
872
See id. at *3. A noteworthy aspect of this case is that the plaintiff initially brought a similar
action that seemed timely. See id. at *1. That action was dismissed by the plaintiff because he had
not yet filed his tax return and could not quantify his damages. Id. But inability to precisely
quantify damages was held not to delay the accrual of the cause of action for statute of limitations
purposes. See id. at *3.
863
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In Ortiz v. Allyn, Hausner & Montanile, LLP, the defendant attorney
represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action that was
settled in June 2000.873 The settlement agreement failed to specify whether
any of the proceeds were attributable to personal physical injuries or
physical sickness.874 From August 2002 until January 20, 2003, the
defendant represented the plaintiff before the IRS and/or the Tax Court
concerning the taxability of the proceeds.875 The Tax Court ultimately ruled
adversely to the plaintiff.876 The plaintiff instituted this suit in December
2003, which was within three years of the defendant’s representation on the
tax issue, but was later than three years from the settlement of the
underlying discrimination action in June 2000.877 The majority of the First
Department held the continuous representation doctrine applied, the suit
was timely, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
to dismiss.878

b. Long Term Capital Gains
In Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., the ultimate error asserted
involved incorrect advice by an attorney stating that if a taxpayer sold a
series of anticipated annual lottery payments for a discounted lump sum
payment, the lump sum would be subject to the lower tax rates imposed on
long term capital gains.879 The case, however, involves a much more
nefarious scheme surrounding the advice.880 In Flannery, the defendant was
in the business of purchasing the installment payments of lottery winners
for a lump sum amount.881 The plaintiff had won an Iowa state lottery in
1988.882 The defendant, on a number of occasions, had unsuccessfully
attempted to purchase the plaintiff’s lottery payments for a lump sum

873

852 N.Y.S.2d 555, 555–56 (App. Term 2007).
Id. at 555.
875
Id. at 556. The exact nature of the representation is unclear. The majority opinion indicates
the representation was before the IRS, but the dissent indicates the representation was before the
Tax Court. Id.
876
Id.
877
See id.
878
Id. The dissent believed the continuous representation doctrine did not apply and would
have dismissed the complaint as time-barred. Id. at 557.
879
17 A.3d 509, 511 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
880
See id.
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Id.
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Id.
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price.883 The defendant, it was alleged, entered into a business relationship
with an attorney, whose role was to offer lottery winners purportedly
“independent” advice stating that by selling their lottery payments they
would gain significant tax advantages—presumably the long term capital
gains tax rates.884 This advice was false.885 The plaintiff ended up retaining
the attorney’s law firm, thereby receiving the intentionally false advice.886
This suit was then instituted against the attorney, his law firm, and the
defendant.887 After the cause of action was dismissed against the attorney
and the law firm, the lower court granted summary judgment to the
defendant on statute of limitations grounds, which was affirmed by the
Connecticut Appellate Court.888
In Camico Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rogozinski, an accounting firm had
incorrectly reported long term capital gains income as ordinary royalty
income for tax years from 1989 to 2006.889 The ensuing extra taxes were
incurred by three brothers who were partners in patents they licensed to
others.890 The parties in this case were the taxpayers and the accounting
firm’s professional liability insurance carrier.891 The issue was whether
under the policy there was one claim, with a $1 million policy limit, or
several claims, with a $2 million policy limit.892 The court held there was
only one claim involved.893

c. Divorce Related
In Fielding v. Kupferman, the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against
the attorney who represented him in a divorce action.894 In the divorce
action, the defendant attorney advised the plaintiff to enter into a
883

Id.
See id.
885
Id.
886
Id.
887
Id. at 510 n.2, 512.
888
Id. at 510 n.2, 515. The court does not disclose the reason for the dismissal of the claims
against the attorney and his firm. In a footnote, the court states that they received partial summary
judgment in the trial court and that the plaintiff thereafter withdrew the remaining claims against
them. See id. at 510 n.2.
889
No. 3:10–cv–762–J–32MCR, 2012 WL 4052090, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 13, 2012).
890
Id. at *3.
891
Id. at *5.
892
Id. at *1.
893
Id. at *11.
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885 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (App. Div. 2009).
884
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stipulation, subsequently incorporated into the judgment of divorce, that he
would pay his wife $1.2 million in immediately available funds.895 The
plaintiff’s total liquid assets at that time were around $1.26 million, almost
$895,000 of which was in a Keogh account.896 As assets in a Keogh
retirement account, these funds were available before retirement only upon
the incurrence of a substantial tax cost.897 Notwithstanding the defendant’s
knowledge of the facts, she advised him to agree to the stipulation and
never informed him of the tax costs involved in withdrawing money from
the Keogh account.898 After entering into the stipulation and being unable to
mortgage his apartment that he still co-owned with his soon-to-be ex-wife,
the plaintiff was forced to withdraw the money from the Keogh account to
meet his payment obligation to his wife.899 Although the lower court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state
a cause of action, the First Department unanimously reversed and reinstated
the cause of action.900

d. Offshore Trusts
There are several cases involving the creation and utilization of offshore
trusts as a tax savings device. In DeMay v. Moore & Bruce, LLP, the
defendant attorneys and the plaintiff established an ongoing relationship in
1995.901 Defendant, Bruce, became a board member of the plaintiff’s
corporation, DeMay, and a legal advisor to Mr. DeMay.902 Defendant
Moore became chief counsel for the corporation.903 In 1996, the defendants
advised DeMay to create four foreign trusts in order to reduce the taxes that
he might incur in the event of the sale of his company. 904 The four trusts
were established and shares of DeMay’s company were transferred to the
trusts.905 Over the ensuing years, the defendant attorneys were extensively
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Id.
Id. at 27.
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Id.
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Id. at 25–26.
899
Id. at 25.
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Id.
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See 584 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Id.
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Id.
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involved with the trusts.906 Bruce was a fiduciary of all the trusts.907 Moore
and their law firm did legal work for the trusts.908 Over the years, in
addition to assisting in the operation of the trusts, they also amended the
trust agreements, appointed a trustee for a trust, moved the location of one
of the trusts, were involved in trust litigation, and reviewed tax returns of
the trusts.909
In 1999, the IRS began an audit of DeMay’s taxes for 1996 through
1998.910 While other counsel was hired as primary counsel in connection
with the audits and ensuing Tax Court litigation, the defendants also
participated and assisted.911 The IRS ultimately asserted deficiencies of over
$12 million for unpaid income taxes and penalties, as well as nearly $3
million for gift taxes.912 All of the deficiencies arose out of various
transactions the defendants advised DeMay to undertake.913 In 2005,
DeMay settled the income tax deficiency for $6 million.914 The following
year, DeMay settled his gift tax liability.915 While he acknowledged gift tax
liability, no immediate tax was payable since the lifetime exclusion was
greater than the gift tax and offset the liability.916
This suit ensued, alleging malpractice for all of the incorrect tax advice
given over the years.917 Other claims were also asserted, primarily for
damages due to various breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the
defendants’ administration of the trusts.918 The primary focus of the case
was whether the statute of limitations was suspended by the continuous
representation doctrine.919 The court held the statute of limitations was

906

See id. at 175.
Id.
908
Id.
909
Id. at 174–75.
910
Id. at 173.
911
See id. at 176.
912
Id. at 177.
913
See id. at 177–78.
914
Id. at 178. While the court stated that DeMay agreed to pay $6 million for past due income
taxes, it went on to note the current balance at trial had grown to $7.5 million including interest.
Id.
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Id.
916
Id.
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See id.
918
Id. at 178–79.
919
Id. at 173.
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suspended, and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
these causes of action.920
With respect to the damages to be addressed at the jury trial, the court
endorsed the general proposition that the plaintiff could recover the
difference between the taxes paid (i.e., the settlement amount with the IRS)
and what he would have paid with correct tax advice.921 Unfortunately, the
court did not address the most intriguing aspect of the damages sought by
the plaintiff—whether the settlement of the asserted gift tax deficiency
resulted in recoverable damages—since it did reduce the plaintiff’s lifetime
estate and gift tax exemption, but required no immediate payment.922
Grace v. Allen also involved tax planning through the creation and
utilization of three levels of trusts in Belize.923 In 1997, the defendant
attorney advised the plaintiff to establish the trusts to minimize her tax
liability.924 Securities were transferred to, and sold by, the middle-level
trust.925 While a non-resident tax return was filed for the middle trust for
1997, no tax was due since the proceeds from the sale were purportedly
distributed to the third level trust—a foreign entity.926 The plaintiff never
reported the sale of the securities nor paid taxes on the sale, saving
approximately $556,000.927 While the IRS investigated the plaintiff
between 2001 and 2003 and the Department of Justice subsequently
determined the Belize trust structure to be illegal, no taxing authority ever
assessed any taxes, interest or penalties in connection with this
transaction.928 Nevertheless, the plaintiff instituted this action against the
defendant attorney seeking rescission and various damages.929 The lower
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that the
damages sought were speculative.930 The appellate court affirmed, giving
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Id. at 173, 181, 186.
Id. at 186.
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No. 1 CA–CV 11–0695, 2012 WL 5893493, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2012).
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short shrift to the plaintiff’s argument that she would always be at risk for
paying the back taxes since there was no statute of limitations.931

e. Miscellaneous
In Solin v. Domino, the plaintiff sued his insurance agent/financial
advisor for professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation.932 The
crux of the complaint was that the defendant understated the tax that would
be incurred if the plaintiff were to cash in his annuity policy.933 The plaintiff
had an annuity worth approximately $3.2 million.934 The plaintiff was
contemplating one of two courses of action: (1) to surrender the annuity,
pay the taxes and invest the balance in a taxable account; or (2) to roll over
the annuity tax-free into another annuity.935 If the second option was
selected, no taxes would be currently incurred, but would be deferred until
the new annuity was surrendered.936 Based on the defendant’s advice that
approximately $200,000 of taxes would be incurred currently if option one
were chosen and the annuity cashed, the plaintiff chose option one.937 It was
later determined that the actual tax liability was over $600,000 rather than
the advised $200,000.938 When confronted about the discrepancy, the
defendant admitted that he had made a mistake.939 The suit was commenced
because the plaintiff asserted he would have selected the second option if he
had been given accurate advice.940
931

See id. at *5. Other damages sought such as for the loss in value of the securities (some
appreciated after the sale) were likewise speculative and not recoverable. Id.
932
08 Civ. 2837 (SCR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009).
Portions of the discussion of Solin are taken from NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 173–
76. There were actually two plaintiffs in Solin; Daniel Solin, individually and as trustee of the
Daniel R. Solin Trust. Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *1. For ease of presentation they
are treated as one plaintiff since the issues for both were identical and the court also treated them
as one. See id. In the final footnote of the opinion, the court noted that since the plaintiff’s cause
of action was defective because it failed to assert any recoverable damages, the court did not need
to address the defendant’s alternative argument that New York law does not recognize a
professional malpractice cause of action against financial advisors. Id. at *11–12 n.7. The
discussion herein also does not address this contention.
933
See id. at *1.
934
Id.
935
Id. at *2. See I.R.C. § 1035 (2012).
936
Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *4.
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See id. at *2.
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Id. at *4.
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In New York, the elements of a cause of action for attorney malpractice
are negligence, proximate causation, and damages.941 In Solin, the court
dismissed the cause of action because it found the plaintiff did not establish
the existence of any recoverable damages.942 The taxes incurred by the
plaintiff as a result of the negligent advice were held not to be recoverable
for two reasons.943 First, the tax liability was caused by the plaintiff’s
having recognized taxable gain, not because of any misrepresentation by the
defendant.944 And second, any recovery of taxes would put the plaintiff in a
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation, and hence were
not recoverable under New York law.945
Solin also gave short shrift to the plaintiff’s alternative argument that he
ought to be able to recover as damages the difference between the taxes
incurred on cashing the annuity and what he would have incurred by
utilizing the other option of deferring the tax by exchanging the annuity for
another annuity.946 According to the court, such damages were speculative
and not recoverable.947 They were speculative because the amount of taxes
ultimately incurred is not knowable, they will depend upon such factors as
when the future tax liability will be incurred, what the plaintiff’s tax rate
will be at that time, and whether there will have been any changes in—
perhaps even elimination of—the tax law.948 The court also rejected the
plaintiff’s attempt to shift the speculative problem to the defendant by
stating that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full $600,000 of taxes
currently paid, and if the defendant wanted to reduce this amount by any
taxes that would be saved in the future as a result of the present tax
payment, the defendant had the burden of proof on this offset.949 Since the
defendant certainly could not prove the amount of any offset due to its
inherent speculativeness, the plaintiff argued that he should be able to
recover all the taxes paid currently.950
941

Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *11.
943
See id. at *7–8.
944
Id. For this proposition, the court relied on Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668
N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (N.Y. 1996).
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Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *8. For this, the court relied on Alpert v. Shea
Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314–15 (App. Div. 1990).
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See Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *9.
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Id. at *10.
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While, arguably, Solin may have correctly followed current New York
legal principles, I have argued elsewhere that the principles are misguided
and that they are really fraud-damage principles that have been
inappropriately transplanted into the negligence area.951 In any event, if
Solin is followed, damages in this very basic and simple scenario (let’s get
tax advice before doing anything) may never be recoverable, nor may
damages arising from timing differences ever be recoverable in a
negligence cause of action.952

2. Estate, Gift and GST Tax Planning
a. Introductory—Privity
Generally, in situations involving claims of tax malpractice, the defense
of the expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations is frequently
encountered and often successfully prevents consideration of the
substantive claim.953 In the estate, gift, and generation skipping tax context,
another defense that is also frequently encountered is lack of privity
between the plaintiff and the attorney or accountant who prepared the estate
plan. The professional tax advisor normally is retained by a taxpayer to
prepare an estate plan which can include the preparation of wills, trusts,
perhaps other documents, and may involve transfers of property. Often, any
error is discovered only after the death of the taxpayer by either the
fiduciary of the estate or by an heir. If strict rules of privity are followed,
neither of these parties have standing to sue since they are not in privity
with the attorney or accountant who rendered the advice, drafted the
documents, or effectuated the property transfers.954 This means the tax
advisors are impervious to any responsibility for any malpractice.955
In Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Texas noted that in 2006 this strict privity rule was a minority
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See NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 160.
See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 758.
953
See, e.g., DeMay v. Moore & Bruce, LLP, 584 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D.D.C. 2008);
Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., 17 A.3d 509, 511 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Ortiz v. Allyn,
Hausner & Montanile, LLP, 852 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Term 2007).
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See, e.g., Lutz v. Balch, Nos. 06AP-247, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31,
2006); Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, No. 05 CA 10, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
26, 2006); Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, No. 05 CA 11, 2006 WL 3783544, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 2006).
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See Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4; Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783544, at *3.
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view followed in Texas and only eight other states.956 The court then
reviewed and changed the position of Texas.957 Upon a careful analysis of
Texas precedent, and, perhaps, a bit of fancy footwork, the court held that a
malpractice claim in the estate planning context survives the decedent’s
death and passes to the estate.958 The estate’s fiduciary may pursue such
claims free from any lack of privity objection.959 Others, such as heirs or
beneficiaries, still may not assert such claims since they are not in privity
with the tax practitioner.960
In Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, the New York Court of Appeals
followed in Belt’s footsteps and changed the New York law.961 The court
held that the personal representative of the estate has privity, or a
relationship sufficiently approaching privity, with the estate planning
attorney of the decedent to maintain a malpractice claim on behalf of the
estate.962 The court emphasized however, that, absent fraud, strict privity
still bars any beneficiary and other third parties from asserting a claim for
estate planning malpractice.963
In Ohio, in Lutz v. Balch, decided by the Ohio intermediate Court of
Appeals for the Tenth District in August 2006, the court simply applied
Ohio’s strict privity rule and affirmed the dismissal of a claim asserted by
the child of the decedents against the attorney who drafted the decedents’
wills and trusts.964 However, in Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, two related cases
with the same name, the Ohio intermediate Court of Appeals for the Fifth
District, in December 2006, also applied Ohio’s strict privity rule, but the
court ended both opinions with a plea to the Ohio Supreme Court to revisit
this issue.965 The court was very troubled by the fact that under strict
privity, negligence in the estate planning area has no remedy. 966 On appeal,
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192 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. 2006). The other states are Alabama, Arkansas, Maine,
Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. Id. at 783 n.1.
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See id. at 785.
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Id.
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Id. at 787, 789.
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See id. at 788–89.
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15 N.Y.3d 306, 309 (2010).
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Id.
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Id. at 310.
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Nos. 06AP-247, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2006).
965
No. 05 CA 10, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006); No. 05 CA 11,
2006 WL 3783544, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006).
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the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the strict privity rule.967
However, the majority opinion, by four members of the seven-member
court, did leave open the possibility that, in an appropriate case, they might
be receptive to relaxing the strict privity rule to allow the personal
representative of the estate, but not the beneficiaries, to sue for
malpractice.968
The concurring opinion in Gindlesberger, joined by three members of
the Ohio Supreme Court, is quite significant.969 In it, the judges indicate
they would be willing to change the strict privity rule to even allow
beneficiaries to sue for malpractice in the preparation of a will.970 However,
the facts of this case were not appropriate for making the change.971 In
Gindlesberger, the defendant attorney had prepared the decedent’s will in
1986 and later prepared two codicils.972 In 1990, the decedent desired to
transfer a farm she owned to one of her three children, while maintaining a
life estate in the farm.973 The attorney drafted a deed that retained a life
estate for the decedent and gave a joint life estate to the decedent’s son and
his wife, with the remainder going to the survivor.974 It was this later
transfer that the other heirs claimed was incorrect, since it took the property
out of the estate while leaving the estate with insufficient assets to pay the
estate taxes resulting from the transfer.975 This case, therefore, according to
the concurrence, did not involve any negligence in the preparation of a will
but, instead, simply involved negligence “in a financial transaction
independent of the will.”976 It was therefore not an appropriate vehicle in
which to change the strict privity rule for negligence in preparing wills.977 It
appears that even the Ohio Supreme Court might be receptive to changing
the strict privity rule if an appropriate opportunity presented itself to the
court.978
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b. Planning Errors
The most general observation about the cases that have arisen in this
area is that many, but not all, focus on some procedural matter and do not
specify the underlying malpractice claim in any meaningful detail. In Lutz
v. Balch, there was simply an assertion that the attorney who drafted the
decedents’ wills and trust was negligent by failing to minimize estate
taxes.979 Similarly, in Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc.,
the allegation was simply that the defendant attorneys “were negligent in
drafting their father’s will and in advising him on asset management[,]”
causing $1.5 million in tax liability that could have been avoided.980 Both of
these cases focused on privity issues.981 Steffen v. Gray, Harris & Robinson,
P.A. contains a very brief, passing reference that the plaintiffs employed the
defendant attorneys for estate planning purposes.982 However, the case is
exclusively focused on the ineffective asset protection planning done by the
defendants for the plaintiff, the wife of Paul Bilzerian, a man convicted of
securities fraud in 1989, and who then attempted to hide assets from the
authorities.983 Similarly, in Gelof v. Prickert, Jones & Ellio, P.A., there is a
conclusory allegation that the defendant attorneys failed to minimize
generation skipping transfer taxes.984 The entire opinion’s focus, however,
was on the jurisdictional problem of the case, having been brought in
Delaware Chancery Court rather than in Delaware Superior Court.985
In the following cases focusing on privity, the underlying negligence is
somewhat more determinable, but again, without nearly enough detail to
justify any discussion. In Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, the negligence
asserted against the defendant attorney was that he failed to advise the
decedent of the tax consequences of making an inter vivos transfer of a
property while retaining a life estate.986 This seems to suggest a violation of
I.R.C. § 2036, which addresses inter vivos transfers with the retention of a
life estate.987 In Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, the asserted negligence
was in advising the plaintiff, or failing to advise the plaintiff, on how to
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own a $1 million life insurance policy.988 Over a period of several years
prior to his death, the decedent purchased the life insurance policy,
transferred it to an entity of which he was the principal owner, then
transferred it to another entity of which he was the principal owner, and
then, in 2005, transferred it back to himself.989 The policy was included in
the gross estate when the decedent died in October 2006.990 This would
obviously implicate I.R.C. § 2042, which addresses whether life insurance
is included in the gross estate.991
Jones v. Wilt involved a suit by the decedent’s husband, who was also
the executor of the decedent’s estate, against the attorney who prepared the
decedent’s will and a trust agreement.992 Among the allegations were that
the attorney failed to advise the decedent to minimize estate taxes by
utilizing a qualified terminable interest property (“QTIP”) trust and that the
tax allocation provision in the will was defective because all of the taxes
were to be paid by the residuary portion of the trust (which otherwise would
have gone to the plaintiff’s husband), even those pertaining to property that
was devised to others.993 While these issues are very interesting, the case
never addressed them.994 There was evidence introduced by the defendant’s
attorney that the decedent was not concerned with whether her husband
received any property.995 Her primary concern was that property she
received from her father went to her surviving sister.996 The opinion focused
solely on whether the trial court’s exclusion of certain evidence offered by
an expert was correct.997 The court upheld the trial court’s evidentiary
ruling and its grant of summary judgment to the defendant.998
Coln v. Larson involved an expert’s testimony that was not accepted by
the trial court.999 In Coln, the defendant accountant had represented the
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decedent for a number of years.1000 The representation included estate
planning in addition to accounting services.1001 The decedent’s estate plan
was reasonably intricate, involving several living trusts and a
conservatorship for the decedent.1002 The plaintiff, who was one of the
decedent’s two children and an heir of the decedent, in the spring of 2001,
became convinced that utilization of a family limited partnership (“FLP”)
would minimize estate taxes upon his father’s death.1003 Although the
father’s conservator, who was the plaintiff’s brother, initially did not agree
with this, he subsequently changed his mind.1004 On September 9, 2001,
before the living trust could be amended to permit the creation of an FLP,
the decedent died.1005 The plaintiff then instituted a civil suit against the
defendant accountant for negligence and breach of fiduciary duties for
failing to advise the decedent to create an FLP.1006 The plaintiff also
instituted a similar action in the probate court.1007 The defendant prevailed
in both litigations.1008 In the civil action, a jury found he did not act
negligently, and the probate court held he did not breach any fiduciary
duties.1009 On this appeal, the only issue before the court was whether the
plaintiff’s expert witness, who was an attorney with substantial experience
in estate planning, was qualified to testify as to the standards of the
accounting profession that applied to the defendant accountant.1010 The
court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony.1011
In Jeanes v. Bank of America, N.A., the decedent was rather wealthy,
having a gross estate of almost $39.5 million at her death in 2003.1012 Her
estate paid estate and inheritance taxes equal to approximately half of the
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estate.1013 The primary negligence asserted was that the defendants failed to
minimize the decedent’s taxes.1014 The plaintiff alleged that creating a
family limited partnership would have saved the estate over $6 million in
taxes.1015 The defendants were the bank, the bank’s officer assigned to the
decedent’s account, and the attorney who had prepared the decedent’s will,
living trust, unitrust, and amendments thereto.1016 The bank was the trustee
of several small unitrusts of the decedent, the successor trustee of the
decedent’s living trust, and acted as the decedent’s agent for much of her
financial dealings.1017 The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence, breach of
contract and fiduciary duty against all defendants and also breach of trust
against the bank.1018 Interestingly, the plaintiff, who was the decedent’s
niece and inherited the majority of the decedent’s assets, did not sue in her
own capacity, but solely as the estate’s representative.1019
The trial court below granted summary judgment on all claims to all
defendants.1020 With respect to the attorney defendant, the Kansas appellate
court initially held that the plaintiff’s claim sounded only in tort, and not as
a separate breach of contract claim, since there was no specific term of any
contract the attorney was alleged to have violated.1021 Instead, the alleged
failing by the attorney was grounded in the law’s general imposition of a
duty upon attorneys to use reasonable and ordinary care, diligence, and skill
ordinarily possessed by attorneys in the community.1022 It therefore affirmed
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorney on
the breach of contract claim.1023
As to the tort claim of negligence against the attorney, the court also
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant
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attorney.1024 Under Kansas law, for a tort cause of action to survive the
death of a decedent, it is necessary that the cause of action accrue while the
decedent was still alive.1025 For a legal malpractice cause of action to
accrue, the plaintiff must have suffered actual loss or damage. 1026 Here, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court and held the damages claimed—the
additional taxes incurred—arose only after the death of the decedent and
therefore the claim did not survive the death of the decedent.1027 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court did not accept the plaintiff’s argument that the
decedent could have sued the attorney during her lifetime and recovered the
fees paid to the defendant and the costs incurred to restructure her estate
plan.1028 The direct result of the Court’s holding would seem to be that
damages for tax malpractice in connection with wills or estate planning may
never be recoverable by a decedent’s estate in Kansas. However, the Court
did note that in Kansas beneficiaries can sue attorneys, so attorneys might
still be held responsible for such malpractice.1029 This raises the question of
why the plaintiff did not bring this action also on her own behalf, as the
primary heir of the decedent, rather than solely as the representative of the
estate. As to the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant
bank’s officer, the Kansas appellate court reversed in part, holding there
were several factual issues concerning the scope of the fiduciary duties that
needed to be developed at trial.1030
In Hodge v. Cichon, five years before his death, the decedent consulted
with a tax and estate planning specialist, Frank Yong, for estate planning
advice.1031 Mr. Yong advised creating a family limited partnership and
prepared documents to implement his suggestion.1032 The decedent was later
declared partially incompetent, and three individuals were appointed as his
guardians.1033 At the request of the guardians, the probate court entered an
order directing the implementation of Mr. Yong’s estate plan to reduce the

1024
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estate’s tax liability.1034 This plan was still not fully implemented when the
decedent died two and one-half years later.1035 The plaintiffs, alleging they
were intended beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate, brought this action
against the guardians’ attorneys seeking to recover the loss caused by the
higher estate taxes.1036 The trial court below granted summary judgment to
the defendant attorneys on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs were not
intended beneficiaries and therefore lacked standing to assert this cause of
action; and (2) that the family limited partnership was not viable in the
current situation.1037 The Florida appellate court reversed on both grounds,
holding that there were factual issues that needed to be determined at trial
and that summary judgment was not appropriate.1038
In Driftmeyer v. Carlton, the deceased was one of four partners in a
successful business.1039 The business had a pension plan that was funded
with annuities and insurance policies.1040 The plan was arranged so that
insurance proceeds payable upon the death of a partner could avoid being
included in the partner’s gross estate, but only if the partner had created an
intervivos trust to receive the insurance proceeds.1041 The decedent had not
created the intervivos trust, so the insurance proceeds paid upon his death
($2 million) were paid to his estate, and therefore subject to estate taxes.1042
The plaintiff, the decedent’s sister and heir, as personal representative of the
estate, sued everyone in sight, claiming they breached their fiduciary duty
to explain to the decedent the importance of creating the intervivos trust to
receive the insurance proceeds at death.1043 The defendants included the
accountant who originally suggested the business establish a pension plan,
the insurance agent who designed and sold the plan to the business, the
insurance company who sold the insurance policies, the attorney for the
business who had reviewed the pension plan before it was adopted, and a
number of others.1044 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the evidence
established that the decedent had been informed of the need to create the
1034
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intervivos trust by several of the defendants.1045 The evidence also
established that the decedent did not really care for the life insurance feature
of the plan and that he was “somewhat flippant” about the need to establish
the intervivos trust.1046 The Ohio appellate court therefore affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the
complaint.1047

c. Drafting Errors
Under I.R.C. section 2041(a)(2), if a person has a general power of
appointment at death, the property subject to the power is included in that
person’s gross estate for estate tax purposes.1048 A general power of
appointment includes a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, but does
not include any power limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the
health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent.1049 The pertinent
regulations provide that a power to use property for the welfare of the
holder is not limited by an ascertainable standard.1050
In Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos,
the elder Carlsons, in 1988, retained the defendant attorneys to prepare their
wills.1051 One of their goals was to avoid any additional federal and state
estate taxes when the property was transferred from their children to their
grandchildren.1052 The wills were identical and provided that upon the death
of Mr. or Mrs. Carlson, their property would go into a trust, with a bank
acting as trustee.1053 The income from the trust initially was payable to the
surviving spouse.1054 Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the income
was payable to their son and daughter-in-law or the survivor.1055 Upon the
death of the survivor, the property would pass to their grandchildren. 1056
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The trustee had the power to invade principal for the son and daughter-inlaw “as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable . . . for either of their
medical care, comfortable maintenance and welfare . . . .”1057 The trust also
contained a provision giving a majority of the current income beneficiaries
the power to remove the trustee for any reason and to appoint “any person”
as the successor trustee.1058 Upon the death of testators’ son or daughter-inlaw, the survivor would be the sole remaining income beneficiary, and
hence, would constitute a majority of the current income beneficiaries.1059
As such, the survivor would have the power to remove the current trustee
and appoint him or herself as trustee.1060 In turn, as trustee, the survivor
would have the power to invade the trust’s principal for the survivor’s own
“welfare,” a discretionary, not ascertainable, standard.1061 This power would
require the entire corpus to be included in the survivor’s gross estate since
the survivor possessed a general power of appointment.1062
In Carlson, both Mr. and Mrs. Carlson died in 1992.1063 In 1994, an
attorney retained to assist with the management of the elder Carlsons’ trust
brought this problem to the attention of the Carlsons’ son.1064 At the request
of the beneficiaries under the elder Carlsons’ wills, the defendants brought
an action to reform the trust to eliminate the problematic language.1065 The
trial court granted the petition to reform the trust.1066 The original language
was reformed to eliminate the ability of the trustee to invade principal for
the “welfare” of the beneficiaries.1067 The new language provided that the
principal could be invaded if the trustee deems it necessary “for either of
1057
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their health and maintenance.”1068 This suit was thereafter brought by the
beneficiaries of the elder Carlsons against the defendants, alleging
malpractice in the drafting of the wills.1069
In the trial court, the defendant attorneys were granted summary
judgment on the ground that the reformation of the trust eliminated the
malpractice.1070 The intermediate court reversed, holding the reformation of
the trust was contrary to Indiana law.1071 The intermediate court also noted
that for federal tax purposes, the decision of a state’s trial court is in any
event not binding, so the possibility of a second estate tax upon the passage
of the property to the elder Carlsons’ grandchildren was not eliminated.1072
The Supreme Court of Indiana held the reformation of the trust was valid
since they held avoiding adverse tax consequences was one of the main
purposes of the testators.1073 The Court seems to have broken new ground in
holding that reformation of testamentary trusts was also available to correct
for a mistake of law, not just a mistake of fact.1074 Although upholding the
validity of the reformation, the Supreme Court reversed the summary
judgment awarded the defendant attorneys for two reasons.1075 First, if the
defendants were negligent, the costs incurred by the plaintiffs in addressing
the original drafting error may be recoverable damages regardless of
whether additional estate taxes are incurred.1076 Also, although the Court
was certain that its decision upholding the reformation of the trust was
binding on the IRS since it was the highest court in Indiana, it was still
uncertain whether the IRS might nevertheless attempt to avoid the effect of
the reformation, and the Court refused to speculate on this point.1077
In Pace v. Raisman & Assocs., Esqs., the defendant attorney amended a
trust in 2001.1078 He assured the plaintiff’s decedent that any property in the
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trust at the decedent’s death would not be included in his gross estate.1079 It
was later determined that the amendment provided the decedent with too
much authority to borrow trust corpus or income without adequate
consideration, and all property conveyed to the trust after the amendment
was includible in the decedent’s gross estate.1080 The Appellate Court held
the suit was not timely filed and reversed the lower court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.1081
Although deciding only the procedural issue to remand a litigation back
to Pennsylvania state courts, the asserted negligence in Booth v. Baldwin
also concerned the defective drafting of a trust.1082 In Booth, the defendant
attorney drafted an irrevocable trust as part of the estate planning for the
plaintiff.1083 After the death of the attorney, the plaintiff retained a new
attorney and accountants.1084 After reviewing the trust, they informed the
plaintiff that the trust was a revocable trust and the property that had been
gifted to the trust would be included in his gross estate.1085 The plaintiff
then obtained a local court order changing the trust language.1086 The IRS
refused to issue a private letter ruling accepting the change.1087 The plaintiff
then instituted this action seeking damages for the anticipated additional
taxes to be incurred and the cost of correcting the defendant’s negligent
drafting.1088
In Allmen v. Fox Rothschild LLP, the plaintiffs alleged the defendant
attorneys were negligent both in drafting the tax allocation clauses in the
decedent’s will and subsequently in preparing the estate’s federal and state
estate tax returns.1089 Allegedly, certain bank and brokerage accounts owned
by the decedent were reported by the defendants as joint accounts on the
estate tax returns, rather than as part of the estate.1090 As a result, the funds
in these accounts could not be used to pay debts and expenses of the
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estate.1091 Instead, funds that otherwise would have gone to a charitable lead
trust were utilized to pay the debts and expenses, thereby reducing the
estate’s charitable tax deduction.1092 The case, however, addressed only the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, not the substance of the claim.1093 The court
held that the statute of limitations had expired regarding work done by the
defendant attorneys on drafting the decedent’s will, but was still open on
work done in connection with filing the estate’s tax returns.1094

E. Business Related Tax Planning
1. Benefit Plans
In the employee benefit area, the tax benefit that is normally obtained by
utilizing a qualified plan is for the employer to be able to obtain a current
deduction for amounts spent to provide some type of future benefits to
employees. The employees are taxed in the future as the benefits are
received. To achieve this tax magic of an immediate deduction coupled with
future income recognition, the I.R.C. normally requires a trust be utilized as
an intermediary. The employer pays the cost currently to the trust, thus
putting the money beyond its control. The trust then has the obligation to
invest, maintain and manage the funds to enable it to provide the benefits
promised the employees.1095 As an overlay in this area, there are a number
of requirements imposed by ERISA1096 designed to assure the safety of the
funds and the fairness of the benefits and procedures. As a result, in this
area many professionals are involved in addition to the attorney (or benefit
consultant) who drafts (and updates) the original plan and the accountant
who prepares the annual tax return. A plan administrator, actuary, custodian
of assets, insurance company, and various other consultants are often
encountered. It should be noted that some of these individuals, as well as
the promoters, financial planners and other consultants may not be
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“professionals” under the tort or other laws of a particular state.1097 One of
the tax policy concerns in the benefit area is to assure that the benefit plan
or arrangement actually benefits a broad range of employees, not just the
owners.1098
Although all the cases examined in this section involve some type of
benefit plan connection, in several of the cases the underlying facts are
rather sparse or not clearly presented. For instance, Gertler, M.D., P.C. v.
Sol Masch & Co. discloses only that the malpractice alleged against an
accounting firm involved trading securities on margin within a pension plan
trust.1099 No additional details are offered.1100 The case affirms the trial
court’s dismissal of the action upon the defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict due to insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiff.1101 The court
did note summarily that under New York law, taxes and interest on
underpaid taxes are not recoverable as damages.1102 Similarly, at the heart
of the cause of action in Trico Bancshares & Subsidiaries v. Rothgerber
Johnson & Lyons LLP is the claim the plaintiffs incurred $440,000 in
additional federal and California income taxes because the defendant law
firm drafted a defective stock option plan for the plaintiffs.1103 However, the
case never mentions or cites any relevant income tax provision.1104 Instead,
the focus is on the fact the defendant law firm was retained “to handle all
phases of SEC compliance” for plaintiffs.1105 The case mostly addresses,
and denies, defendant’s motion to change venue.1106
In Schafer v. Johanson, the malpractice asserted occurred in connection
with the creation and operation of an employee stock ownership plan
(“ESOP”).1107 However, there are so many different allegations of fault
against the attorneys and law firm that drafted the plan, and against a
number of others involved with the establishment and/or operation of the
plan over several years, that the precise nature of the malpractice and,
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perhaps, fraud is difficult to fathom.1108 Boiled down to its essence, it seems
the defendant attorneys convinced the plaintiffs to establish the ESOP.1109
The individual plaintiffs also attempted to utilize I.R.C. section 1042 which
permits the sale of shares of stock in the employer corporation sponsoring
the ESOP to the ESOP without immediate recognition of gain by the sellers
if a number of conditions are met.1110 One of these conditions is the
requirement to purchase qualified replacement property with the proceeds
of the sale of the employer stock to the ESOP.1111 The attorneys were
apparently orchestrating all of the required activities.1112 They also
instructed plaintiffs to deal with various parties the attorneys selected.1113
The attorneys apparently also represented the plaintiffs in connection with
IRS filings, IRS challenges to the efficacy of the ESOP, and compliance
with I.R.C. section 1042.1114 There were also allegations of money being
wasted or stolen and attorney conflicts of interest.1115 In addition, there is
some issue of whether the attorney defendants were representing only the
corporate plaintiffs or the individual plaintiffs also.1116 The bulk of the
court’s opinion focused on whether the dispute was subject to
arbitration.1117 The court denied motions by the plaintiffs and the defendants
concerning arbitration and sent the case back for additional discovery to
clarify the facts.1118 The court also seems to have been unable to unravel the
precise nature of the dispute from the confused pleadings.1119
Both Vig v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co. and Finderne Management.
Co. v. Barrett involved invalid welfare benefit plans under I.R.C. section
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419 (e)(1).1120 Although Vig does not explore the underlying facts in nearly
as much detail as Finderne, it seems very likely that in both the basic flaws
with the plans were quite similar. In both cases the plaintiffs were
convinced to adopt and participate in section 419(e)(1) welfare benefit
plans.1121 The major benefit was that these plans provided an immediate tax
deduction for the annual contributions, while benefits would be taxed later,
when received.1122 In Finderne the plan covered only the two brothers who
operated the trucking businesses involved and their sister.1123 While the
sister received some group term insurance under the plan, only the brothers
would be able to convert their insurance to receive retirement benefits at
age sixty-five.1124 In addition, the court indicated that the annual premiums
paid were inflated so as to have a larger benefit at retirement.1125 In effect,
there was no real welfare plan for employees, just a scheme to enable the
primary business owners to purchase retirement benefits and currently
deduct the premiums.1126
In Vig the plaintiffs invested $150,000 in the benefit plan, known as the
Xelan 419 Welfare Benefit Trust, on the understanding that the plan was a
legitimate tax shelter, rather than an improper tax avoidance scheme. 1127
When new IRS regulations were promulgated and it became obvious the
plan was invalid, the plan was terminated.1128 The plaintiffs lost virtually
their entire investment in the plan ($143,000) and they expected to owe
additional taxes, interest and penalties to the IRS.1129 They brought this
action to recover these amounts.1130 Since the Xelan Plan was in
bankruptcy, they did not sue the Plan.1131 They sued the person who was the
plan’s chairman, founder and trustee, the insurance company that marketed
the plan and provided the plan’s insurance policy, the insurance company’s
agent and the attorneys who, on behalf of the other defendants, provided a
1120
Vig, 336 B.R. 279, 280 (S.D. Miss. 2005); Finderne, 955 A.2d 940, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2008); I.R.C. § 419(e)(1) (2012).
1121
Vig, 336 B.R. at 280–81; Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946.
1122
Vig, 336 B.R. at 282; Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946.
1123
Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946 n.2.
1124
Id.
1125
Id. at 946.
1126
See id.
1127
Vig, 336 B.R. at 280–81.
1128
Id. at 281.
1129
Id.
1130
Id.
1131
Id.
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legal opinion that the plan was a valid section 419 welfare benefit plan.1132
Unfortunately, Vig did not address the merits of the claim, but only decided
the case would be remanded to state court.1133
Although differing in a number of details,1134 the basic claim in
Finderne is the same as in Vig. The plaintiffs were convinced they were
obtaining a legitimate tax shelter in the form of a valid section 419 welfare
plan, here known as an “EPIC” plan, when, in reality, the plan was
invalid.1135 The plaintiffs adopted the plan in 1991 and participated in it for
six years, contributing over $336,000 to the plan.1136 The plan was later
challenged by the IRS, and the plaintiffs were audited for 1994 and
1995.1137 As a result of the audit, the plaintiffs paid additional taxes and
interest of approximately $50,000 for these two years.1138 The IRS waived
penalties and did not seek additional taxes for the prior four years.1139 The
plaintiffs also had to terminate their participation in the plan.1140 They lost
most of their investment in the plan because the plan’s insurance policies
lapsed.1141 The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit against all the parties
involved with the plan and against the two financial planners who
convinced them to adopt the plan.1142 After a jury trial, the plaintiffs were
awarded damages of almost $37,000 from each of the financial planners.1143

1132

Id.
Id. at 286.
1134
The Finderne court very meticulously presents the relevant tax provisions. Finderne
Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 948–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). The primary
difference from the plan in Vig is that the EPIC plan was promoted as being a valid multiple
employer plan pursuant to I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6). Id. at 948. As such, some of the funding
restrictions on single employer plans were not applicable. Id. However, the plan did not qualify as
a valid multiple employer plan. Id. at 949.
1135
Id. at 948–49.
1136
Id. at 946.
1137
Id. at 947.
1138
Id.
1139
Id.
1140
Id.
1141
Id.
1142
One of the financial planners, Barrett, was the plaintiffs’ financial advisor and insurance
salesman since 1977. Id. at 945. The other advisor, Papetti, was also a CPA. Id. at 953. However,
the court indicated that he was being sued only in his role of financial planner and not as a CPA.
Id.
1143
Id. at 947.
1133
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Finderne is the appeal by both plaintiffs and defendants from the trial
judgment.1144
In addition to holding the rendition of the complex tax avoidance advice
by the financial planner defendants was not subject to New Jersey’s
Consumer Fraud Act,1145 Finderne addressed two important aspects of
damages recoverable in such situations: (1) the basic theory underlying
recoverable damages; and (2) whether income tax benefits recognized by a
plaintiff reduce recoverable damages.1146
With regard to the basic theory of damages, in connection with the trial
below, a motion judge decided the plaintiffs could only collect out-ofpocket damages and not expectancy, benefit-of-the-bargain, damages.1147
The judge held that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were not appropriate
because they would result in an inappropriate windfall to the plaintiffs.1148
In effect, such damages would result in the plaintiffs receiving the tax
benefits promised by the promoters of the EPIC plan even though those
benefits were clearly not available under the I.R.C. 1149 On appeal, the court
agreed with this reasoning.1150 Finderne acknowledged that the appropriate
measure of damages in fraud cases was a “perplexing problem.”1151 While
New Jersey does recognize benefit-of-the-bargain damages in fraud
situations, the court ultimately agreed with the motion judge that the effect
of awarding such damages would be to enforce the EPIC contract and give
the plaintiffs unwarranted tax benefits.1152 The court seemed to view the
promised EPIC benefits as an illegal contract, which the court refused to
enforce.1153 To buttress its conclusion, Finderne also noted that to obtain a
benefits-of-the-bargain recovery would require the damages claimed to be
established with “sufficient certainty.”1154 Here, the court held, the
plaintiffs’ damages did not meet this threshold because: “[t]he projected
retirement benefits analysis given to plaintiffs were estimates, contingent on
issues including the amount of the conversion credits as allowed by the
1144

Id. at 947–48.
Id. at 956.
1146
Id.
1147
Id.
1148
Id.
1149
Id.
1150
Id. at 957.
1151
Id.
1152
Id.
1153
See id. at 958.
1154
Id. at 957.
1145
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insurance company, . . . [plaintiffs’] experience rating, or possible future
changes in the tax laws.”1155 Interestingly, the court also noted the
plaintiffs’ dirty hands in that they knew their EPIC participation involved
taking advantage of a very narrow tax exclusion and that they were
significantly overpaying for the insurance and claiming a tax deduction for
the inflated amount.1156 One may wonder whether this influenced the
court’s holding.
Concerning whether any income tax benefits obtained by the plaintiff as
a result of the losses caused by the defendants may reduce the recoverable
damages, the trial judge below dealt with this issue in a very Solomonic
fashion. At trial the plaintiffs argued for a jury instruction telling the jury to
ignore any tax savings.1157 The defendants maintained that any damages
should be reduced by the tax deductions taken by the plaintiffs for the four
years the IRS did not challenge.1158 Not wishing to resolve this issue, the
trial judge included both positions in his charge to the jury and left this
issue entirely to the jury.1159
With such a wise disposition, on appeal Finderne affirmed the trial
judge, finding no legal error present.1160 In analyzing the issue, Finderne did
hold that Randall v. Loftsgaarden, in which the United States Supreme
Court held a tax benefit flowing from an investment did not reduce
damages recoverable under federal securities laws based on fraud in a
prospectus, did not apply to situations such as the present one.1161 The court
also noted that in Burdett v. Miller, the Seventh Circuit held that tax
benefits received must be considered in determining damages. 1162 Finally,
Finderne strongly suggested that New Jersey’s strong public policy against
permitting double recoveries might apply and thereby require the reduction
of damages for tax benefits received.1163
Unlike Vig and Finderne, which involved bad I.R.C. § 419 welfare
benefit plans, Kelter v. Hartstein involved a bad pension plan under IRC

1155

Id. at 957.
Id.
1157
Id. at 959.
1158
Id.
1159
Id.
1160
Id. at 961.
1161
Id. at 960 (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 659–60 (8th Cir. 1986)).
1162
Id. (citing Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1383 (7th Cir. 1992)).
1163
Id. at 960–61.
1156
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section 412(i).1164 Although Vig and Finderne each used the term tax shelter
to describe the arrangements involved in those cases, in Kelter the tax
shelter aspect seems more pronounced. It reminds one of the abusive
generic shelters, and perhaps, may belong in the same category.1165
Under I.R.C. section 412(i) plans, an employer holds in a trust an
insurance policy on the life of each plan participant.1166 Each year the
employer funds the trust to pay the insurance premiums and receives a tax
deduction for the amount paid.1167 When a plan participant retires, the
insurance policy on the participant’s life is sold and the proceeds used to
purchase an annuity to pay the participant her or his retirement benefits.1168
Because all the premiums paid under the plan are deductible, taxpayers
have attempted to shelter large amounts of income in such plans.1169 The
IRS responded by identifying certain plans as abusive tax shelters not
entitled to any tax benefits.1170 The abusive plans are ones funded solely
with life insurance policies that (a) provide death benefits above the level
permitted by section 412(i); (b) pay extremely high compensation to the
salespeople; and (c) carry exorbitant surrender charges that essentially
prevent an employer from terminating the insurance early.1171
An insurance company, the defendant ECI GROUP, a pension planner,
and defendant attorney Bryan Cave developed the Pendulum Plan involved
in Kelter, which contained each of these characteristics, in the late
1990s.1172 In 1999, defendant ECI was warned about the possibility its plan
was abusive.1173 In June, 2003, ECI announced it would stop marketing the
plan in December, 2003.1174 Nevertheless, ECI sold this plan to plaintiffs in
December, 2003.1175 The plaintiffs were reassured by those involved with

1164

No. G042753, 2011 WL 2556033, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2011); I.R.C. § 412(i)

(2006).
1165

Part II supra.
I.R.C. § 412(i) (2006).
1167
Id.
1168
Id.
1169
Kelter, 2011 WL 2556033, at *1.
1170
Id.
1171
Id.
1172
Id. at *2.
1173
Id.
1174
Id.
1175
Id.
1166
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selling the plan that the plan was valid for income tax purposes.1176 They
were never warned about the tax risks associated with the plan.1177
In February, 2004, the IRS issued two revenue rulings and proposed
regulations further defining abusive section 412(i) plans.1178 Although ECI
informed plaintiffs of the proposed regulations, both ECI and Bryan Cave
assured the plaintiffs the plan was valid and urged them to continue paying
the insurance premiums.1179 In April, 2004, plaintiffs retained defendant
attorney Bryan Cave to obtain an IRS determination letter that plaintiffs’
plan seemed valid.1180 The favorable letter was obtained in March, 2005.1181
In early 2006, the IRS notified the plaintiffs that the plan would be audited
to determine whether it was qualified.1182 The audit resulted in a final
determination by the IRS in June, 2007, that the plan was abusive and not
qualified under section 412(i).1183 Bryan Cave represented plaintiffs on this
audit.1184 This suit was commenced in September, 2008.1185 At that time the
plaintiffs and the IRS were still negotiating how much back taxes, interest
and penalties plaintiffs would be required to pay.1186
This suit was brought against the insurance companies, pension
planners, financial advisors, accountants, attorneys, and other professionals
who developed and sold plaintiffs the plan.1187 The damages sought were to
recover all contributions to the plan, all back taxes, interest and penalties to
be assessed by the IRS, and the cost incurred during the IRS audit.1188
Unfortunately, Kelter does not address the substance of the asserted
claims. The trial court dismissed the complaint against ECI and Bryan Cave
on statute of limitations grounds and, alternatively, also dismissed one
cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty) against ECI and all causes of
action against attorney Bryan Cave on other grounds.1189 On appeal, the
1176

Id.
Id.
1178
Id.
1179
Id.
1180
Id.
1181
Id.
1182
Id. at *3.
1183
Id.
1184
Id.
1185
Id.
1186
Id.
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Id.
1188
Id. at *1.
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Id.
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court reversed the dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.1190 The lower
court held the statute of limitations began to run in December, 2003, when
plaintiffs adopted the plan and paid the first premium. 1191 However, the
appellate court held the statute of limitations did not begin to run until June,
2007, when the IRS issued its final determination that the plan was abusive
and disallowed plaintiffs’ tax deductions.1192 The court did affirm the lower
court’s alternative holding, dismissing one count against defendant ECI
because the plaintiffs never established the existence of any fiduciary
relationship between them and ECI,1193 and all counts against defendant
Bryan Cave because of various pleading defects.1194
Denenberg v. Rosen also involved a Pendulum Plan and certain of the
same defendants as in Kelter,1195 such as Hartstein, ECI, and, for the tax
malpractice focus, the law firm of Bryan Cave.1196 The crux of the
complaint was that the defendants induced the plaintiff to establish a
pension plan funded with life insurance policies that guaranteed tax benefits
that were later disallowed by the IRS, resulting in the loss of deductions and
the imposition of excise taxes.1197 The plaintiff adopted the plan in
December, 2002, but it was effective as of October 1, 2001.1198
The claim of malpractice against Bryan Cave and the individual attorney
who did the work was based primarily on the fact that the marketing
materials contained a September, 1999, opinion from Bryan Cave that the
plan was legal.1199 The opinion, however, contained a caveat that it was
issued only to the promoter and advised that each employer considering
participation in the plan should obtain their own advice relating to tax
matters.1200 The plaintiff also signed an acknowledgment in connection with
his adoption of the plan, that it was his responsibility to obtain legal and tax
advice concerning the plan and that he disclaimed relying on any tax
information provided by the promoters.1201 The plaintiff also retained Bryan
1190

Id.
Id.
1192
Id. at *4.
1193
Id. at *1.
1194
Id.
1195
Id.
1196
897 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392–93 (App. Div. 2010).
1197
Id. at 392.
1198
Id. at 394.
1199
Id. at 393.
1200
Id.
1201
Id. at 394.
1191
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Cave to submit the form of the plan for IRS approval, which was obtained
in April, 2002,1202 and for representation at the IRS audit of the plan in
2004–2005.1203
The First Department reversed the lower court’s order denying Bryan
Cave’s motion to dismiss, because there was no attorney-client relationship
between the plaintiff and Bryan Cave in 2002 when the plan was
adopted.1204 Also, there was no proof of any malpractice by Bryan Cave. 1205
The form of the Pendulum Plan was valid.1206 It was the plaintiff’s
operation of the plan that was not acceptable, since the plan used life
insurance as a tax shelter “in amounts that greatly exceeded both IRS
imposed limits and the terms of the plan document prepared by Bryan Cave
and approved by the IRS.”1207 The other work performed by Bryan Cave—
submitting the plan form for IRS approval and representation before the
IRS—was performed competently.1208
Bhatia v. Dischino is similar to Kelter. In Bhatia, the plaintiffs were a
married couple who were advised by their accountant in October, 2004, to
establish a § 412(i) retirement plan for the wife’s private psychology
practice.1209 After consulting with their accountant’s boss (defendant
Dischino), a financial advisor, an executive benefit planning company
(defendant ECI), a company that administers and manages retirement plans,
and an insurance company (defendant Indianapolis Life), they decided to
proceed and established their plan on March 30, 2005.1210 According to the
complaint, none of the advisors or defendants ever mentioned the
possibility that the § 412(i) plan might be considered an abusive tax shelter
or that certain forms were required by the IRS to be filed for such plans,
despite the fact the IRS had issued two rulings addressing such plans in
February, 2004, and had apparently been cautioning against the potential
illegal use of such plans since 1989.1211 The plaintiffs’ plan received a
1202

Id.
Id. at 397.
1204
Id. at 396.
1205
See id. at 397.
1206
See id. at 396.
1207
Id.
1208
See id. at 397.
1209
No. 3:09-CV-1086-B, 2011 WL 3820825, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2011).
1210
Id. at *1–2.
1211
Id. The plaintiffs apparently received a disclosure form from the insurance company when
they purchased their policy disclosing the IRS guidance and the risks with using a life insurance
policy to fund a section 412(i) plan. Id. at *2 n.3.
1203
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favorable IRS determination in October, 2005.1212 However in June, 2006, a
Notice of Summons was served upon ECI regarding the plan and the IRS
subsequently audited the plan.1213
As a result of the IRS audit, the following problems with the plan were
uncovered: first, the plan was operating as an abusive and impermissible tax
shelter, allegedly caused by misfeasance of the actuary;1214 second, the
accountant had failed to file the required tax shelter Disclosure Form 8886
for the prior two years;1215 finally, the accountant had regularly misfiled
forms and had been forced to re-file, incurring penalties for the plaintiffs
without their knowledge.1216 Upon receiving the audit letter from the IRS,
the plaintiffs dissolved the plan.1217
The damages suffered by the plaintiffs included over $50,000 in underreporting penalties and $900,000 in penalties for failing to file Form 8886,
as well as other back taxes and interest.1218 When the plaintiffs cashed out
their plan’s insurance policy they lost almost $267,000, the difference
between their contributions to the plan ($496,500) and the cash value
($229,500).1219 Finally, in order to cash out the original insurance policy,
the plaintiffs were forced to accept another policy in exchange.1220 The
terms of the new policy allegedly were misrepresented to the plaintiffs,
ultimately causing an additional $270,000 in further losses.1221
As in Kelter, the court in Bhatia also never reached the substantive
issues. In Bhatia, defendants Indianapolis Life and ECI each moved for
judgment on the pleadings.1222 The court granted Indianapolis Life’s motion
since the plaintiffs’ pleadings were deficient in setting forth the asserted
causes of action.1223 With respect to ECI, the court granted the defendant’s
motion with respect to plaintiffs’ fraud, ERISA and rescission claims.1224
However, the court denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim
1212

Id. at *2.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence/malpractice and
negligence.1225
MCNC v. Aon Consulting, Inc. did not involve any tax shelters, but
simply incorrect tax advice given by defendant, a benefit consulting
firm.1226 The plaintiff was a tax exempt nonprofit organization.1227 It had
maintained a pension plan for its employees since 1983.1228 In 1995, it
sought to enhance its plan and retained the defendant for advice.1229 Based
on defendant’s advice, the plaintiff amended its plan as of April 1, 1996, to
provide for mandatory contributions from its employees, which, based on
defendant’s advice, would not be subject to federal income or social
security taxes.1230
In addition to the advice in 1995–96 concerning the plan amendment,
the defendant provided various plan related services until January, 2002.1231
These services included preparing the plan’s annual report (IRS Form 5500)
filed with the Department of Labor, and summary annual reports given to
plan participants, as well as other services.1232 In 2002, the plaintiff
terminated its relationship with the defendant and retained outside counsel
to prepare its annual reports.1233
In 2003, the plaintiff was informed by its outside counsel that the
defendant’s advice concerning the mandatory contributions was wrong and
that taxes might be owed on past contributions.1234 In addition to changing
its plan to eliminate the mandatory contributions, it voluntarily notified the
IRS and Social Security Administration of its error.1235 The plaintiff worked
out a settlement with the IRS that required no payment of back taxes.1236 It
did pay social security taxes for 2002–2004, the open tax years.1237 Neither
agency ever issued a formal assessment against the plaintiff.1238 Plaintiff
1225

Id. at *15, *17–18.
No. 1:05CV00194, 2006 WL 3733267, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 2006).
1227
Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id.
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also incurred attorneys’ fees and a $5,000 fee to IRS in connection with
these settlements.1239 It then instituted this action against the defendant for
negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice.1240 This case
resulted in a denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1241
As an initial matter, the court in MCNC decided that the defendant was
acting as a “professional” in giving tax advice to the plaintiff and treated
this as a professional malpractice claim under North Carolina law.1242 The
main focus of the case was on the statute of limitations. The defendant
argued both that the statute of limitations never commenced running and
that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.1243
The more interesting issue concerned the defendant’s argument that the
statute of limitations never commenced because the plaintiff voluntarily
worked out settlements with the IRS and the Social Security Administration
and neither ever issued an assessment against the plaintiff. This argument
was based on a North Carolina case that held the statute of limitations
against an attorney and accountant for wrong tax advice commenced to run
when the IRS assessed additional tax.1244 Limiting Snipes to its facts, the
MCNC court held that as a matter of public policy, taxpayers need to be
encouraged to voluntarily come forth and settle tax mistakes.1245 To lose
one’s malpractice claim because one voluntarily reports and settles tax
problems prior to an IRS assessment makes no sense. According to the
court, any contrary holding would force taxpayers to choose between
(1) losing their malpractice claim by voluntarily addressing it prior to an
IRS assessment, or (2) keeping silent and hoping the error is never
discovered, but if it is, to salvage their malpractice claim. 1246 The court also
indicated other public policy reasons to hold that a plaintiff’s claim accrues
when it voluntarily notifies the IRS.1247 First, by voluntarily notifying the
IRS, plaintiff may avoid greater damages, thus mitigating damages for itself

1239

Id.
Id.
1241
Id. at *1. The court adopted the Recommendation and Order of the Magistrate Judge to
whom the case was referred. Id.
1242
Id. at *3.
1243
Id. at *1.
1244
Id. at *4. The North Carolina case is Snipes v. Jackson, 316 S.E.2d 657, 659 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984).
1245
MCNC, 2006 WL 3733267, at *4.
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Id.
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Id. at *4, n.2.
1240

2014]

BAD TAX SHELTERS

729

and the defendant.1248 And second, as a fiduciary, plaintiff had a duty to the
plan and its participants to protect them from the consequences of any
mistakes that had been made.1249
As to the defendant’s argument that the statute of limitations had
already expired on the theory that it commenced to run in 1995 or 1996,
when the plan was amended to include the mandatory contributions, the
court held the statute commenced running in 2002 when the defendant
prepared its last plan report.1250 Until then, the statute was suspended due to
the ongoing relationship between the parties and the defendant’s obligation
to prepare an accurate annual report.1251
Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. also involved incorrect
tax advice concerning a benefit plan.1252 In March 2000, with the assistance
of the defendants, the plaintiff established an employee death benefit plan
that was to be funded with life insurance policies.1253 In May 2003, the
managers of the plan notified the plaintiff that the plan did not comply with
IRS regulations and that the plaintiff would need to terminate participation
in the plan by the end of 2003.1254 The plaintiff consulted with the
defendants concerning its options.1255 In October 2003, the plaintiff was
advised by defendant Chase’s vice president of its insurance brokerage and
advisory services to terminate its participation in the plan and to transfer the
insurance policies to a welfare benefit trust.1256 The plaintiff was advised
the transfer should be nontaxable and that further premiums would be
deductible.1257 After the plaintiff’s accountant, defendant Grant Thornton,
concurred with Chase’s advice, the plaintiff followed the advice.1258 On its
tax return for 2003, the amount of the policies transferred to the new plan
was not included in gross income.1259 In March 2007, the IRS notified the
plaintiff that terminating their participation in the original plan was a
1248
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No. 603012/09, 2010 WL 5782547, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2010), aff’d, 939
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taxable event, for which they incurred back-taxes and penalties of over
$900,000.1260 This suit was commenced in September 2009 by the plaintiff
to recover its damages.1261
The court dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s causes of action on
statute of limitations grounds1262 and because there were no allegations the
defendants knowingly made false statements.1263 The only claim that
survived was a claim for unjust enrichment against the accountant
defendant, since there was a possibility the plaintiff might be able to
recover the fees paid the accountant.1264 The plaintiff was given leave to
replead this cause of action with greater specificity.1265
Although the plaintiff’s fraud cause of action was dismissed essentially
because there was no allegation that either defendant knowingly made false
statements, it is noteworthy that the trial court and the First Department also
proceeded to indicate that under New York’s out-of-pocket measure of
damages for fraud, taxes paid are not recoverable and the plaintiff therefore
failed to allege recoverable damages:1266
Plaintiffs’ tax liability did not flow naturally from the
alleged misrepresentations by defendants, but rather from
the taxable event created when plaintiffs switched from one
employee benefit plan to another . . . The fact that plaintiffs
may have performed the transfer pursuant to advice from
defendants does not convert plaintiffs’ tax liability into
consequential damages . . . .1267
It seems almost incomprehensible that if a professional were to give
fraudulent advice to another who follows the advice and thereby incurs

1260

Id.
Id. The amount of damages sought is not clear. After presenting the basic facts the
opinion states the plaintiff sought to recover as damages “the additional taxes assessed against
them by the IRS.” Id. It is unclear whether all taxes paid or only some lesser amount was sought.
Similarly, the court never separates the penalties from the taxes. From a jurisprudential
perspective these issues are significant. The court probably never focused on these issues since it
dismissed virtually all causes of action. Id. at *7.
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Id. at *4.
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Id. at *7.
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Id.
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Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 939 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (App. Div.
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additional taxes, no remedy would be available under New York fraud law.
In addition, it seems to me, that regardless of the logic of the basic rule, any
penalties incurred are recoverable damages.1268
Although pertaining to a pension plan, a rather complex area of tax law,
In-Line Suspension, Inc. v. Weinberg & Weinberg, P.C. illustrates the need
to adhere to basics to document important decisions. In In-Line, the plaintiff
was a corporation that had a pension and profit sharing plan and the
defendant was the attorney who did work for the plan.1269 The plaintiff had
both salaried and commissioned employees.1270 The plan was to cover only
the salaried employees.1271 In 1997, the plan was amended, and under the
amendment the plan was extended to all employees.1272 The plaintiff and
defendant disagreed as to whether this change was authorized by the
plaintiff.1273 In early 2000, the plaintiff first learned of the extension of the
plan to the commissioned employees.1274 In addition to revising the plan,
the plaintiff then needed to make contributions for 1997 and 1998 for the
commissioned employees, pay interest on the late contributions and pay
IRS imposed fees.1275 The plaintiff also elected not to make contributions
for any employees for 1999 in order to avoid making contributions for the
commissioned employees for that year.1276
The plaintiff then instituted this malpractice action to recover the
additional contributions paid for the commissioned employees, the
additional interest, fees and costs, and also for over $10,000 for the “loss of
value” to the plaintiff and the owner for the omitted 1999 contributions.1277
Presumably, this latter item was the additional income taxes the plaintiff
incurred for 1999 because there was no pension contribution made for that
year.1278
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See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 731.
687 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).
1270
Id.
1271
Id.
1272
Id. at 422.
1273
Id. at 422–23.
1274
Id. at 422.
1275
Id.
1276
Id.
1277
Id. at 422–23.
1278
A jury instruction was requested for the jury to be instructed to include the extra taxes as
an element of damages. See id. at 426.
1269

732

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

At trial, the plaintiffs received a jury verdict of over $46,000.1279 The
appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because testimony by
the defendant’s expert was erroneously excluded at the trial.1280
Although not addressed by the court due to the remand, one of the errors
asserted by the defendant was that the damages awarded by the jury did not
reflect tax consequences and were therefore excessive.1281 Alas, another
opportunity to visit this issue was lost.

2. S-Corporations
An S-corporation is a special type of corporation that generally is not
subject to the income tax imposed on corporations.1282 Instead, it is treated
as a conduit.1283 It files a tax return and reports its financial results,1284 but
its income and deductions flow through and are taxed to the shareholders on
their tax returns.1285 To qualify for S-corporation treatment, a corporation
must meet certain conditions and must elect such treatment.1286 All four
recent cases involving S-corporations focus on procedural issues and not on
the merits of the asserted claims.
In Boerger v. Heiman, the plaintiff had owned two apartment complexes
since the 1980s.1287 In 1997, the plaintiff needed to refinance the mortgages
on the complexes and instructed his attorney to work out the details.1288 The
complexes were transferred to a limited liability company, and eventually
the plaintiff, Boerger, became the sole owner of two corporations, which
owned, respectively, 99 percent and 1 percent of the limited liability
company.1289 Boerger was aware that if he owned property through a
corporation double taxation would result.1290 When he asked his attorney
whether this restructuring had any adverse tax consequences, the attorney

1279

Id.
Id. at 429.
1281
Id. at 426–27.
1282
I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2012); See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 252 at 6-6, -25.
1283
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 252 at 6-26 to -27.
1284
See I.R.C. § 1363(b) (2012).
1285
I.R.C. § 1366(a)-(b) (2012).
1286
See I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (2012).
1287
965 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 2009).
1288
Id.
1289
Id.
1290
Id.
1280
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assured him there would be no adverse tax consequences.1291 The court
indicated the attorney’s reassurance might have been accurate if Scorporation status had been timely elected for the two corporations.1292
However, neither Boerger’s attorney nor his accountant at that time made
the election.1293
In 1999, Boerger hired a new accountant to prepare his and his
corporations’ tax returns.1294 The accountant told Boerger that because the
corporations were not S-corporations he would be subject to double tax if
the corporations were ever profitable, but since the corporations had losses,
Boerger could wait until the corporations became profitable before electing
S-corporation status.1295 In 2004, Boerger received an offer to buy one of
the apartment complexes.1296 When inquiring about the tax implications of
selling, he was advised by his accountant that there would be double
taxation because the corporations were not S-corporations.1297 As a
consequence, Boerger did not sell the complex.1298 He then instituted this
action against his attorney, his former accountant, and his present
accountant, each for not electing S-corporation status either initially or in
1999.1299 The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on statute of limitations grounds.1300 In Boerger, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action for trial.1301
Under certain circumstances, an S-corporation that previously was a
regular C Corporation will incur tax when its passive investment income
exceeds twenty-five percent of its gross receipts.1302 If this situation persists
for three consecutive taxable years, the corporation’s S election is
terminated.1303 In Federated Industries, Inc. v. Reisin, the plaintiffs were an

1291

Id.
Id.
1293
Id.
1294
Id.
1295
Id. at 673–74. There was conflicting testimony whether the accountant explained the
current tax ramifications to Boerger or whether she simply told him that he could elect Scorporation status in the future when the corporations became profitable. Id. at 675.
1296
Id. at 674.
1297
Id.
1298
Id.
1299
Id.
1300
Id. at 673.
1301
Id. at 676.
1302
I.R.C. § 1375(a) (2012).
1303
I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (2012).
1292
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S-corporation and its owners who found themselves in this situation.1304 The
defendants were the S-corporation’s accountant and his firm who were
hired to prepare the corporation’s tax returns and to advise when passive
income was likely to exceed the twenty-five percent threshold.1305 If
advised properly, the corporation could have shifted its investments to yield
non-passive income.1306 The defendants under-calculated the plaintiff’s
passive investment income for 2002, 2003 and 2004.1307 As a result, the
plaintiffs incurred additional taxes and penalties and its S-corporation status
was jeopardized.1308 This suit was then commenced. The court affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds,1309 and
never addressed any substantive issues.
In Berg v. Hirschy, the plaintiffs were the shareholders of an Scorporation who had converted their S-corporation to a limited liability
company on the advice of the defendant attorney.1310 The plaintiffs alleged
the defendant negligently failed to advise them that there could be
additional adverse tax consequences if a tax authority were to ascribe some
goodwill or going concern value to the corporation.1311 The tax returns were
filed without reference to any such value, and no tax authority had yet
asserted any claim for additional taxes when this suit was commenced. 1312
This suit was commenced seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant
would be liable for any taxes that might be incurred in the future, or,
alternatively, that for statute of limitations purposes, no malpractice claim
had yet occurred.1313 Berg affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action
at the pleading stage because there was no justiciable controversy.1314 In the
absence of any claim for additional taxes from any taxing authority, the

1304

927 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
Id.
1306
Id.
1307
Id. at 1255. There was also a finding by the IRS that plaintiff also had excessive passive
investment income in 2000 and 2001. Id. at 1256.
1308
Id. at 1254–55.
1309
Id. at 1255.
1310
136 P.3d 1182, 1183 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
1311
Id. at 1184. It is interesting to note that the court refused to explain the nature of the
alleged tax consequences. Id. at 1184 n.1.
1312
Id. at 1184.
1313
Id.
1314
Id. at 1183.
1305
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court held the claim was entirely speculative since there might never be any
claim.1315
In the tax malpractice area, a plaintiff often must traverse a very fine
line. If suit is commenced too soon—before there are any cognizable
damages—the suit is dismissed for being premature, since damages are
normally an element of the cause of action. If a plaintiff waits until there
definitely have been damages, the suit may be dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds if the judge decides the cause of action accrued much
earlier.1316 In Berg, the plaintiffs attempted to resolve this dilemma by
seeking alternative declaratory judgments. The Oregon Court of Appeals,
however, refused to assist the plaintiffs because of considerations of
justiciability. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are thus left to their own devices to make
a correct determination.
In Berkowitz, Dick, Pollack & Bryant v. Smith, the court affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the defendant accountant’s motion to compel
arbitration.1317 The plaintiff owned an S-corporation and a foreign
corporation.1318 The accountant was retained to prepare the plaintiff’s
personal tax returns and to give the plaintiff tax advice.1319 The alleged
malpractice was defendant’s failure to warn plaintiff of the adverse tax
consequences that would result from an intercompany loan from the
plaintiff’s foreign corporation to his S-corporation.1320 Berkowitz does not
explain the underlying tax issue. However, it seems to be a general foreign
tax issue not dependent on the S-corporation status of the borrower.1321

3. Tax Benefits and Elections
In Skyline Duplication and Document Management. Corp. v. David
Gronsbell & Co., a taxpayer sued its long-time accountants for failing to
inform it that it qualified for federal Work Opportunity Tax Credits for
hiring certain targeted classes of employees.1322 While the defendants
asserted a statute of limitations claim in this motion for summary judgment,
1315

Id. at 1184.
See Malpractice II, supra note 1 at 1067–70.
1317
49 So. 3d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
1318
Id.
1319
Id.
1320
Id.
1321
See I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (2012).
1322
See I.R.C. § 51(a)–(d) (2012); No. 604201/2005, 2010 WL 5621157, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 23, 2010).
1316
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the court sidestepped it.1323 Instead, the court granted the defendants’
summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that it
had met all of the requirements needed to obtain the credit.1324 Without
evidence of damages, a cause of action was not stated.1325 The plaintiff
claimed it did not obtain or retain the required information because it was
never informed by the defendant that it needed the information.1326
In reaching its decision, the court noted there was no clear evidence that
the plaintiff either asked the defendant whether it qualified for the credit or
directly inquired about this particular credit.1327 This begs the question of
whether the accountant had a duty to know of such tax provisions and to
raise them with the client, especially where, as here, the accountant had a
longstanding relationship with the client.1328
In Bachand Estates LLP v. Hanft Fride, P.A., the plaintiffs purchased a
senior retirement complex in Wisconsin in 2006.1329 They desired to
redevelop the property and qualify for federal tax credits for developing
affordable multifamily rental housing.1330 Relying in part on an opinion by
the defendant attorney that the property qualified for four-percent credit on
its acquisition cost, the plaintiffs decided to apply for a program under
which four-percent credits were available for both the acquisition and
rehabilitation costs.1331 These credits were available to all applicants.1332
Alternatively, a 9 percent credit could be obtained on only rehabilitation
costs, but this program was competitive and not all applicants obtained the
credit.1333 On December 11, 2006, the plaintiffs learned that the defendant’s
opinion was incorrect and the property did not qualify for the four-percent
credit on acquisition costs.1334 The deadline for filing for the nine-percent

1323

Skyline, 2010 WL 5621157, at *4.
Id. at *5.
1325
Id. at *2.
1326
Id. at *4.
1327
Id.
1328
The defendant accountants prepared the plaintiff’s tax returns from 1994 until 2004. Id. at
*2. The dispute apparently concerns employees hired from 1997 to 2006. Id.
1329
No. 07-cv-334-JCS, 2008 WL 220285, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2008).
1330
Id.
1331
Id.
1332
Id.
1333
Id.
1334
Id.
1324
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credit was February 2, 2007.1335 The plaintiff did not apply for the ninepercent credit.1336 This action for damages ensued.1337
In this action the defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that
the incorrect opinion did not cause any damages because the plaintiff’s
failure to seek the nine-percent credit was based on other business
reasons.1338 Since there were many disputed factual issues, the court denied
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.1339
Under I.R.C. § 754, an election is available to a partnership to adjust the
basis of its assets with respect to a partner that acquires an interest in a
partnership by purchase or by inheritance.1340 This election is very desirable
when the present value of the partnership’s assets exceeds its basis for tax
purposes. In Ames & Fischer Co., II v. McDonald, events occurred in 2000
and 2001 that would have allowed the plaintiff partnerships to make
favorable § 754 elections.1341 However, the accountants who prepared the
tax returns did not make the elections, and the attorneys who rendered
business and estate planning advice to plaintiffs did not advise that the
elections should be made.1342 As a result, the plaintiffs lost a number of
immediate and future tax benefits.1343 This action against the accountants
and attorneys ensued.1344 This case, on a certified question from the trial
court, only addressed the issue regarding when the statute of limitations
commenced to run.1345
Mention should be made of Nagle v. Cohen, which simply contains a
conclusory allegation that the defendant attorneys improperly advised the
plaintiff not to elect “trader” status under the I.R.C. 1346 None of the facts

1335

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
1337
Id.
1338
Id.
1339
Id. at *3.
1340
I.R.C. § 754 (2012).
1341
798 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The death of a partner in 2000 and the sale
of partnership interests in 2001 would have qualified plaintiffs for section 754 elections. Id.
1342
Id.
1343
Id. at 559–60.
1344
Id. at 560.
1345
Id. at 564.
1346
No.2009-098902-NM, 2010 WL 5129813, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010). There
is also an equally cryptic and unexplained allegation that defendants provided incorrect tax advice.
Id. at *2. The reference to not electing trader status presumably applies to IRC § 475(f) pursuant
1336
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relevant to this claim are presented. The case affirms, on statute of
limitations grounds, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendant attorneys.1347
Similarly, in Berg v. Eisner LLP, there is a conclusory allegation the
defendant accounting firm committed malpractice by failing to inform the
plaintiff of a possible tax election that would have allowed the plaintiff to
write off a portion of his securities trading losses.1348 Presumably, this was
the same election as was involved in Nagle.1349 Here, the First Department
reversed the trial court, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint.1350
It should also be recalled that in Goodman v. Hanson, a case discussed
previously, one of the asserted causes of action was that the defendant
attorney deducted certain estate administration fees on a trust’s income tax
return rather than on the estate tax return, which was in a higher marginal
tax bracket.1351 The court did not address the substance of the complaint, but
held that an earlier release signed by the parties prevented this claim from
proceeding.1352

4. Tax-Free Exchanges
Under I.R.C. § 1031, gain or loss is not recognized when certain
property is exchanged for like-kind property.1353 Instead, the tax
consequences from the disposition of the initial property are deferred until
the disposal of the replacement property.1354 Where a direct exchange of
properties is not possible, § 1031 is still available if a qualified intermediary

to which a person in the trade or business of being a trader in securities may elect the mark-tomarket method of accounting for this business. I.R.C. § 475(f) (2012).
1347
Nagle, 2010 WL 5129813, at *4–5.
1348
941 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (App. Div. 2012).
1349
See Nagle, 2010 WL 5129813, at *1–2.
1350
Berg, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
1351
945 N.E.2d 1255, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); See supra text accompanying notes 617–631,
and notes 745–748.
1352
Goodman, 945 N.E.2d at 1270.
1353
I.R.C. § 1031 (2012). To be eligible for section 1031 treatment both the initial and the
replacement properties must be held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2012). Inventory, certain intangibles and interest in partnerships are not eligible
for section 1031 treatment. Id.
1354
Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern, No. 115517/07, 2011 WL 892757, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d, 99 A.D.3d 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). This deferral is obtained by the
basis provisions in I.R.C. section 1031(d).
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is utilized to receive the sales proceeds from the sale of the initial property,
the taxpayer never receives the sales proceeds (or any other non-like kind
property), the taxpayer identifies the replacement property within 45 days
of the disposition of the old property, and the taxpayer actually receives the
replacement property within 180 days of the disposition of the old
property.1355
As discussed previously, in Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern, a § 1031
exchange would have saved the taxpayer a substantial amount of immediate
taxes—allegedly $5.1 million.1356 There was neither a written retainer
agreement nor any other written evidence to establish who—the defendant
attorney or the seller—had agreed to be responsible for complying with the
§ 1031 exchange requirements.1357 Each party testified the other had
undertaken this responsibility.1358 While the parties focused on the fact that
§ 1031 treatment was unavailable because the plaintiff actually received the
sales proceeds at the time of sale,1359 the court granted summary judgment
to the defendant attorney because the plaintiff failed to establish that all the
other requirements for § 1031 treatment were met.1360 Without such
evidence, even if the defendant, arguendo, were negligent, there was still no
proximate causation of any harm to the plaintiff since § 1031 would
nevertheless have been unavailable.1361
In Rashti v. Gadoshian, the defendant CPA advised the plaintiffs, in
connection with their sale of property in 2008, that substantial tax savings
could be realized if they engaged in a § 1031 exchange.1362 The defendant
then recommended an intermediary to receive the proceeds of the sale and
to facilitate the § 1031 exchange.1363 Unfortunately, the intermediary stole
most of the proceeds.1364 Even after issues concerning the intermediary
arose, the defendant allegedly continued to reassure the plaintiffs that their
funds were safe, that the § 1031 requirements were being met, and not to
take any legal action.1365 This suit ensued, alleging professional negligence
1355

I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b) (2014).
Wo Yee, 2011 WL 892757, at *3; See supra text accompanying notes 428–443.
1357
See Wo Yee, 2011 WL 892757, at *1–2.
1358
Id.
1359
Id. at *2.
1360
Id. at *5.
1361
Id.
1362
No. B221198, 2010 WL 4679594, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010).
1363
Id.
1364
See id. at *2.
1365
See id. at *1–2.
1356
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and breach of fiduciary duties.1366 The lower court held there was no duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs and sustained the defendant’s
demurer, dismissing the complaint.1367
On appeal, the California intermediate appellate court reversed the
lower court and held the defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiffs.1368 The
tax advice rendered by the defendant CPA concerning the § 1031exchange
clearly was within the scope of the defendant’s professional services to the
plaintiffs.1369 Also, the court held the recommendation of an intermediary
qualified to effectuate the § 1031 exchange was within the scope of the tax
advice rendered.1370
It should be noted that the court explicitly distinguished this situation
from a “simple referral.”1371 In this case, the referral was part and parcel of
the tax advice.1372 Also, while perhaps not directly relevant, it should be
noted that there was an allegation that the defendant CPA was “a knowing
participant in the criminal act” of the intermediary.1373
While the result in Rashti seems correct, a line may need to be drawn
between “simple referrals” and situations such as this one in which the
referral is central to the professional services rendered. Exactly where the
line should be drawn may not be easy to articulate.
Similar to Rashiti, in Winters v. Dowdall, the defendant attorney
represented the plaintiff in connection with an exchange of properties under
I.R.C. § 1031 in which a qualified intermediary was involved and this
intermediary stole money deposited with it.1374 The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and on this appeal the First Department
unanimously affirmed.1375 The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was
retained to advise him in connection with the § 1031 transaction and with
the selection of a qualified intermediary.1376 The complaint also asserted the
defendant failed to: (1) properly investigate the intermediary before
selecting it; (2) ensure the intermediary was adequately bonded; (3) ensure
1366

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
1368
Id.
1369
Id. at *3–4.
1370
Id.
1371
Id. at *4.
1372
Id.
1373
Id. at *5.
1374
882 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (App. Div. 2009).
1375
Id.
1376
Id.
1367
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the funds received by the intermediary were deposited into an account for
the plaintiff’s sole benefit; and (4) that these failures caused damages of
over $600,000.1377 The First Department held the plaintiff’s pleadings stated
a valid malpractice cause of action.1378
In Frank v. Lockwood, the crux of the dispute between the parties was
the allegedly incorrect advice given by the defendant accountant to the
plaintiffs concerning the taxes to be incurred by the plaintiffs in connection
with a § 1031 transaction.1379 The opinion, however, focused solely on the
recoverability of interest and penalties awarded by the jury to the plaintiffs
as a result of the late payment of their taxes and the late filing of their tax
returns for 2001.1380 Especially noteworthy is the fact that the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that interest incurred upon the late payment of taxes
due to a tax advisor’s negligence is recoverable in a tax malpractice action,
though the burden of proving such damages is upon the plaintiff.1381
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that Sanders v.
Bressler, Amery & Ross, P.C., a case noted briefly at the end of this article,
involved a failed § 1031 exchange.1382

5. Disposition/Acquisition of Property
In Leggiadro, Ltd. v. Winston & Strawn, LLP, the plaintiffs were an Scorporation and its two shareholders.1383 The corporation had a lease for its
flagship store that had approximately seven years remaining.1384 In 2010,
the landlord of the premises notified the plaintiffs that it wished to negotiate
an early termination and buy-out of the lease.1385 The defendant law firm
was retained to negotiate a buy-out so that the after-tax proceeds to the
plaintiff would cover the costs of moving the store to a new location.1386
The defendant was specifically requested to advise the plaintiffs “of any
1377

Id.
Id.
1379
749 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Neb. 2008). The defendant accountant allegedly told the plaintiff
that any taxes on the sale of their property not avoided by means of a section 1031 exchange could
be offset by tax credits available to the plaintiffs. Id.
1380
See id. at 451–53.
1381
Id. at 453; See Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 11–12.
1382
No. 03CV5283DRHWDW, 2006 WL 319303, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006); See infra
text accompanying notes 1482–1486.
1383
No. 154749/2012, 2013 WL 856559, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2013).
1384
Id.
1385
Id.
1386
Id.
1378
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and all tax liabilities arising from the buy-out.”1387 The plaintiffs incurred
unexpected New York State and New York City tax liabilities due to
differences in how the state, the city, and the federal government tax Scorporations.1388 The defendant allegedly failed to inform the plaintiffs of
these tax liabilities and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking to recover
the shortfall caused by the defendant’s error in not negotiating a higher buyout price that would take these costs into account.1389
The defendant’s motion to dismiss the cause of action by the
shareholders of the S-Corporation was granted because the retainer clearly
provided that the sole client represented was the corporation.1390 The fact
that it was an S-Corporation and its income and expenses flowed through to
its shareholders did not matter.1391 The defendant’s motion to dismiss the
corporation’s cause of action was denied.1392 The court held it was a viable
cause of action and the damages sought were not speculative.1393
Delanno, Inc. v. Peace involved a suit by the purchaser of a business
against the attorney who represented him in the purchase transaction.1394
Under the purchase agreement, the purchaser was not to be responsible for
any taxes owed by the acquired business for any time before the date of
purchase.1395 To effectuate this result, the defendant attorney was
responsible for obtaining a tax clearance letter from the state, thereby
absolving the purchaser of any such tax liability that otherwise would have
resulted from the purchase.1396 The defendant advised the plaintiff that he
had obtained the tax clearance letter.1397 It later came to light that an
incorrect tax identification number was used in connection with the tax
clearance letter and the purchaser was responsible for pre-sale taxes of the
business.1398 Despite the error, the defendant attorney avoided liability on
statute of limitations grounds.1399
1387

Id.
Id.
1389
Id.
1390
Id. at *4.
1391
Id. at *3.
1392
Id.
1393
Id.
1394
237 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Ark. 2006).
1395
Id.
1396
Id.
1397
Id.
1398
Id.
1399
Id. at 87.
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6. Method of Accounting
O’Bryan v. Ashland involved an accounting error made by the defendant
accountant in preparing the plaintiff’s tax return for 1995.1400 The defendant
had provided services to the plaintiff since 1987–1988.1401 In 1995, the
plaintiff incorporated his business, following the advice of the defendant,
who had recommended this on several occasions over the years.1402 The
business was incorporated on April 1, 1995.1403 Prior to incorporation, the
business utilized the cash method of accounting for tax purposes.1404 Upon
incorporation, the business changed to the accrual method of accounting.1405
In preparing the business’s tax return for 1995, the defendant erroneously
used the accrual method of accounting for the first quarter of 1995.1406 This
resulted in a substantial understatement of the business’s tax liability. 1407
When the error was discovered several years later, an amended return was
filed.1408 In addition to the extra taxes, approximately $50,000 of interest
was paid.1409 The plaintiff brought this suit to recover the interest and other
expenses incurred to rectify the error.1410 The defendant conceded his
negligence, and the amount of damages was left to the jury.1411 The jury
awarded the plaintiff approximately $39,000 for interest.1412 This award of
interest was appealed by the defendant.1413
On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the issue of
whether such interest is recoverable was a matter of first impression in
South Dakota.1414 The Court ultimately held such interest was recoverable
in appropriate circumstances and upheld the jury award.1415

1400

717 N.W.2d 632, 633 (S.D. 2006).
Id. at 634.
1402
Id.
1403
Id.
1404
Id.
1405
Id.
1406
Id.
1407
Id.
1408
Id.
1409
Id.
1410
Id.
1411
Id.
1412
Id. at 636.
1413
Id.
1414
Id. at 633.
1415
Id. at 634.
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In the United States, there are three views concerning the recovery of
such interest. There are two extreme, opposite views and an intermediate,
more nuanced view. The majority view is the traditional view that simply
permits the recovery of interest as a normal incident of the tort measure of
damages.1416 But for the negligence, the interest would not have been
incurred, so it was caused by the negligence and is recoverable.1417 The
opposite view, the minority view, absolutely refuses to permit the recovery
of such interest.1418 According to this view, a plaintiff who incurs this
interest had, for some period of time, use of the government’s tax money to
which he was not entitled.1419 The interest charge is simply an appropriate
charge for this use.1420 Any recovery of the interest would be a windfall,
giving the plaintiff free use of the government’s tax money.1421 The
intermediate, and most modern view, permits the recovery of interest when
appropriate, which would normally occur when the interest paid the
government exceeds the earnings realized by the plaintiff on the tax
underpayment.1422 In O’Bryan, the Court emphatically refused to join the
minority no-interest-recovery view and instead joined the modern,
intermediate view.1423

7. Stock Redemption
Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP ultimately is
simply a situation in which the New York intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the trial court and held the statute of limitations barred the asserted
cause of action.1424 Unlike the trial court, the reviewing court held the
continuous representation doctrine did not apply to toll the statute of
limitations.1425 The case is worthy of brief focus, however, because the
asserted tax error is unusual, involving the interplay of the federal tax
provisions governing a bank’s bad debt deduction and the stock redemption

1416

Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 3.
Id. at 17.
1418
Id. at 4.
1419
Id. at 23.
1420
Id.
1421
Id. at 4, 23.
1422
Id. at 7–8.
1423
O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 639–40 (S.D. 2006).
1424
895 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (App. Div. 2010).
1425
Id.; See No. 603492/06, 2009 WL 1363026, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d,
895 N.Y.S.2d 361 (App. Div. 2010).
1417
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rules, and because of certain perceptive analysis in the lower court’s
unreported, but available, opinion.
In late 1999 or early 2000, the plaintiff, Apple Bank, consulted with the
defendant accounting firm as to whether there would be any negative tax
consequences under I.R.C. § 593, the provision governing the bank’s bad
debt deduction, if it entered into a stock redemption agreement with the
estate of the bank’s deceased sole shareholder.1426 Apparently, based on the
assumption that § 302 of the I.R.C. applied and would treat the redemption
as a dividend, the bank was advised there would be no negative tax
consequences.1427 The bank then redeemed additional shares in 2001, 2002,
2003, and 2004.1428 In 2005, it was discovered that the redemption was not
treated as a dividend under I.R.C. § 302, but was treated as a sale by the
estate under I.R.C. § 303.1429 As a consequence, the advice was incorrect,
and the redemptions caused the bank to lose a portion of its bad debt
deductions for each of the years in which a redemption occurred.1430 This
required filing amended returns, paying over $12 million in back taxes and
interest, and also resulted in the defendant’s withdrawing its audit reports
for the bank’s 2003 and 2004 financial statements.1431 This suit for damages
ensued.
As argued by the defendant in Apple Bank, New York law is frequently
characterized as not permitting the recovery of back taxes or interest in tax
malpractice situations based upon Alpert v. Shea Gould Clemenko & Casey
and its progeny.1432 I have argued that Alpert is wrong in part, and should be
overturned in part.1433 In the lower court, the judge, rather perceptively in
my view, attempted to limit Alpert and its progeny so that back taxes and
interest may be recoverable where the underlying tax liability could have

1426

Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1.
See id. I.R.C. § 302 is the provision governing the tax treatment of corporate redemptions
of its outstanding stock. See I.R.C. § 302 (2012). Under this provision, assuming the redeeming
corporation has adequate earnings and profits, the redemption of stock from a sole shareholder
would always be treated as a dividend. Id.
1428
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1.
1429
Id.; I.R.C. § 303 is an exception to I.R.C. § 302. See I.R.C. § 303 (2012); I.R.C. § 302
(2012). It permits non-dividend, sale or exchange treatment under certain circumstances when
stock of a decedent is redeemed. I.R.C. § 303 (2012).
1430
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1.
1431
Id. at *2.
1432
Id. at *5. See Alpert v. Shea Gould Clemenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314–15 (App.
Div. 1990). See generally NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42.
1433
See NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 181–82.
1427
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been avoided but for the negligently erroneous advice.1434 The court also
cited, with seeming approval, an earlier case, which did allow the recovery
of interest on an erroneously caused tax underpayment,1435 even though that
other case seems to have been otherwise invisible, as far as being followed
by subsequent cases.1436

8. Tax Exempt Bonds
In Coilplus-Alabama, Inc. v. Vann, the defendant attorney and his law
firm were retained in 1998 to advise the plaintiff about the issuance of $8
million in tax exempt bonds to expand the plaintiff’s steel-manufacturing
plant.1437 The bonds were issued in 1999 upon defendant’s advice that the
bonds qualified for tax exempt status as a small issue under I.R.C. § 144.1438
Under I.R.C. § 144, the maximum amount of tax exempt bonds that could
be issued was $10 million.1439 In determining the $10 million cap, other
similar tax exempt bonds that were previously issued and still outstanding
had to be included in the cap.1440 Since the plaintiff had $5 million of
similar previously issued bonds outstanding, the current issue did not
qualify for tax exempt status.1441 When the IRS learned of this in 2001, the
plaintiff refunded and retired these bonds as of their date of issue.1442 On
appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
the defendant on statute of limitations grounds.1443

9. REMICs
A real estate mortgage investment conduit, or “REMIC,” is a type of
special purpose tax vehicle utilized for the pooling of mortgage loans and
the issuance of securities backed by these loans, (i.e., mortgage-backed

1434

Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *7.
Id. (citing Jamie Towers Hous. Co. v. Lucas, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2002)). Jamie
Towers involved the underpayment of real estate tax rather than income tax. Id. at 533.
1436
NY: Balanced on Biased, supra note 42, at 151.
1437
53 So. 3d 898, 899 (Ala. 2010).
1438
Id.
1439
I.R.C. § 144(a)(4) (2012).
1440
Id.
1441
Coilplus, 53 So. 3d at 899.
1442
Id. at 901.
1443
Id. at 909.
1435
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securities).1444 The REMIC itself is not subject to federal income tax.1445
The type of assets permitted to be owned by a REMIC is limited by the
I.R.C.1446 One type of asset that may be owned is a qualified mortgage
which is secured by an interest in real property, the value of which is equal
to at least eighty percent of the amount of the mortgage loan.1447 As a
consequence, any transfer of a mortgage loan to a REMIC requires a careful
focus on the value of the real property securing the loan to be certain it is
adequate to make the loan a qualified mortgage for REMIC purposes.1448
The plaintiff in Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v. Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, LLP had hired the defendant law firm to advise it on an
ongoing basis concerning how to comply with the REMIC requirements.1449
On one pool of loans, the defendant law firm issued an opinion that the
package was REMIC-qualified for federal income tax purposes, and
included language in the underlying agreement signed by the plaintiff
warrantying that each loan was a qualified mortgage loan for REMIC
purposes.1450
One of the loans in this mortgage pool became worthless within three
years of the date of an appraisal valuing it at $68 million.1451 After
litigation, the plaintiff was forced to repurchase this worthless loan for over
$67 million pursuant to its warranty.1452 It seems the real property securing
the loan was not worth near eighty percent of the amount of the loan. 1453
The appraisal of the property securing this loan was questionable on its
face, since approximately $37 million of the $68 million appraised value
was attributable to equipment and intangibles—not real property.1454 In
addition, another relatively contemporaneous appraisal was later discovered
that valued the underlying real property for property tax assessment
purposes at under $3 million.1455
1444
See generally Marshall D. Feiring, 741-2d T.M., REMICs, FASITs and Other MortgageBacked Securities. A-1.
1445
I.R.C. § 860A (2012).
1446
I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2012).
1447
Id.; I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012).
1448
See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012).
1449
No. 116147/06, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2161, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012).
1450
Id. at *6.
1451
Id. at *7.
1452
Id. at *12.
1453
See id.
1454
Id. at *5.
1455
Id. at *8–9.
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This action ensued, in which the plaintiff asserted the defendant was to
blame for the loss because (1) it did not properly advise the plaintiff
concerning the requirements for appraisals that were necessary to establish
that a mortgage loan was qualified property for a REMIC; and (2) because
it did not properly perform the necessary due diligence requisite to issuing
its opinion that this pool of mortgage loans was REMIC-qualified since it
did not review the appraisal for this loan.1456 In response, the defendant
asserted it relied on the expertise of the plaintiff’s mortgage bankers
concerning property valuations.1457 In Nomura, the court denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because many factual issues
remained to be decided.1458

10. Miscellaneous
There are several cases that mention seemingly viable tax malpractice
claims, but which do not explore the underlying facts in meaningful detail
and which were decided on non-substantive grounds. These cases are
presented in tabular form.
Case Name
Burtoff
1459
Faris

v.

Diamond
Island
Marina,
Inc.v. Grabel,
Schnieders,
Hollman &
Co.1462

1456

Tax Malpractice Claim

Disposition

Defendant negligently drafted and
implemented a disclaimer of an
1460
inheritance.
Incorrect advice by accountant that
transfer of property to the mortgagee
bank would not have negative tax
1463
consequences.
This apparently
implicates cancellation of
indebtedness income and I.R.C.
1464
§ 108.

Claim barred by statute of
1461
limitations.
Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment
1465
denied.
There are
1466
triable issues of fact.

Id. at *13.
Id. at *36.
1458
Id. at *65–66.
1459
935 A.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
1460
Id. at 1088.
1461
Id. at 1090.
1462
No. 08–0025–DRH, 2009 WL 3769775 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2009).
1463
Id. at *1.
1464
I.R.C. § 108 (2012).
1465
Diamond Island, 2009 WL 3769775, at *2.
1457
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GUS
Consulting
GMBH v.
Chadbourne
& Parke,
1467
LLP

Defendant attorneys failed to advise
plaintiff it was illegal under Russian
law to invest in a Russian natural gas
company by means of a simple
1468
partnership structure.

Summary judgment for
defendant affirmed because
of a prior arbitration and
because no admissible
evidence about proximate
1469
cause was introduced.

Kay v.
McGuire
Woods,
1470
LLP

Incorrect advice from attorney as to
structure of sale of stock in a
1471
business,
and failing to give
adequate information to allow
plaintiff to make an informed
1472
decision.
Accountant sued client for unpaid
1475
fees.
Client countersued asserting
accountant gave wrong advice not to
collect sales tax on equipment
1476
installed in new construction.

Case remanded back to
1473
state court.

Morrow Cash
Heating &
Air, Inc. v.
1474
Jackson

Osowski v.
1479
Howard

1466

Defendant accountant who acted only
as a return preparer for plaintiff and
her business failed to inform her that
her sons had taken the business from
her when they incorporated the

Directed verdict for
accountant on counterclaim
1477
reversed.
There was a
bona fide issue whether the
statute of limitations had
1478
run.
Court affirmed summary
judgment for defendant
since defendant owed no
duty to inform plaintiff and
also on statute of limitation

Id.
905 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2010).
1468
Id. at 159.
1469
Id. at 159–60.
1470
No. 2:11–cv–00341, 2012 WL 1067555 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2012).
1471
Id. at *1.
1472
Id. at *3.
1473
Id. at *5.
1474
239 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. 2006).
1475
Id. at 9.
1476
Id.
1477
Id. at 9–10.
1478
Id. at 10.
1479
No. 2010AP2260, 2011 WI App 155 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011).
1467
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Sanders v.
Bressler,
Amery &
1482
Ross, P.C.

Sonicblue,
Inc. v.
Pillsbury
Winthrop
Shaw
Pittman,
1487
LLP
Trolly Corp.
v.
1490
Boohaker

1480
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business that was previously a
1480
partnership.
Defendant attorney failed to timely
obtain an agreement with the
Environmental Protection Agency
thereby preventing the tax free sale of
a property/purchase of another
property to qualify for tax free
1483
treatment under I.R.C. § 1031.

Counsel for bankrupt corporation
failed to inform bankrupt corporation
that it need to file timely tax
1488
returns.

Adverse tax consequences resulted
from how the defendant attorney
structured a transaction in which two
investors bought into plaintiff and an
1491
earlier investor was bought out.

[Vol. 66:3
1481

grounds.

Defendant’s motion to
1484
dismiss granted.
As
spouses and children of the
owners of the property
involved, they had no
privity to bring malpractice
1485
cause of action.
They
also were not third party
beneficiaries entitled to
bring a breach of contract
1486
action.
Defendant’s motion to
1489
dismiss denied.

Affirms summary judgment
to defendant on statute of
1492
limitations grounds.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *5, *7.
1482
No. 03CV5283DRHWDW, 2006 WL 319303 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006).
1483
Id. at *1. The basic mechanics of I.R.C. § 1031 are described supra text accompanying
notes 1292–1294.
1484
Sanders, 2006 WL 319303, at *6.
1485
Id.
1486
Id. at *7.
1487
Bankruptcy No. 03–51775–MM, 2008 WL 2875407 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 23, 2008).
1488
Id. at *8.
1489
Id. at *13.
1490
938 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
1491
Id. at 159.
1492
Id. at 161.
1481
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Before concluding this section, I wish to take note of two cases that I
think of as “oddball” but that may be worth brief mention. Holtkamp v.
Parklex Associates is part of an extended dispute between the limited
partners and the general partner in a partnership that owned a valuable
parcel of real property.1493 The gist of the dispute is a claim by certain
partners that the general partner and others colluded to defraud the plaintiffs
of their rightful portion of the proceeds from the sale of the property. 1494
Among the allegations are assertions of fraudulent tax returns prepared by
certain accountants with assistance or participation of certain attorney
defendants.1495 It is uncertain, though, whether these returns were actually
filed or whether they were simply shown to or given to the plaintiffs but
never filed.1496
Sorenson v. H & R Block, Inc. is a case I previously characterized as
diabolically fascinating1497 and it continues to fulfill this description.1498 The
original case involved a suit against defendant H & R Block and one of its
employees seeking $5 million in damages.1499 The gist of the complaint was
that the employee allegedly contacted the tax authorities before the
plaintiff’s tax return was filed and notified them the plaintiff would be
filing incorrect 1993 income tax returns.1500 On the ensuing audit, the
employee also allegedly voluntarily gave the tax auditor internal H & R
Block documents suggesting the return was fraudulent.1501 Subsequently,
both the IRS and Massachusetts audited the plaintiffs for several tax
years.1502 A criminal investigation by the IRS also ensued.1503 Although
many causes of action were asserted,1504 the plaintiffs were successful only
on a breach of contract claim, and for a rather technical violation of the
Massachusetts False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.1505 The total
1493

No. 14514/2006, 2011 WL 621122, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2011).
See id. at *2.
1495
Id. at *3.
1496
See id. at *3, *11, *12.
1497
Malpractice II, supra note 1 at 1025.
1498
See generally NO. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27,
2002), aff’d, 107 F. App’x 227 (1st Cir. 2004).
1499
Id. at *2.
1500
Id. at *11–12.
1501
Id. at *12.
1502
Id. at *8, *10.
1503
Id. at *11.
1504
Id. at *3–4.
1505
Id. at *61.
1494

752

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

damages recovered by the plaintiffs was $630.1506 Under the Massachusetts
False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the plaintiffs were also entitled to
attorney’s fees.1507 In the most recent case, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s
fees and costs totaling over $180,000.1508 The court, however, only awarded
them $18,900.1509 Diabolically fascinating indeed!

IV. CONCLUSION
The most notable developments in the decade examined occurred in the
generic tax shelter area. Government data indicates that many thousands of
tax shelter products were sold.1510 However, apart from the several class
actions that have been settled,1511 which did not supply useful substantive
input for this article, I quickly realized that most of the reported cases dealt
with procedural matters, which, while interesting and illuminating
regarding how these products were marketed and effectuated, again did not
supply useful input. It seems highly probable that redress for many of the
“victimized” purchasers of ineffective shelters was determined by
arbitration or unreported decisions. Paradoxically, during most of the rather
long gestation period for this article, I was left with only a handful of cases
that even touched on substantive issues.1512 Towards the end of the process,
along came the rather prodigious Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP, which
finally reached a judgment on the merits.1513
Yung, while very significant, especially as long as it remains the only
case to reach the merits, may not yet be the final word. First, there is the
matter of an appeal. Especially in light of the magnitude of the punitive
damages, an appeal is likely. While the judge spent many pages illustrating
the egregious conduct of the defendant and justifying the size of the
punitive damages awarded, $80 million of punitive damages and punitive
damages equal to four times the compensatory damages, might simply be

1506

NO. 99-10268-DPW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23590, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2005).
Id. at *3–4.
1508
Id. at *1.
1509
Id.
1510
See supra note 7.
1511
See supra note 14.
1512
See supra Part II. D. Apart from Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 07-CI-2647 (Ky. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf (not
designated for publication).
1513
See Yung, No. 07-CI-2647, at *209.
1507
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too much for an appellate court to accept.1514 Similarly, the trial judge’s
invalidation of the engagement letter’s attempt to limit damages to the
$900,000 fee paid, while most logical, and seemingly correct, might be a
weak point on appeal.1515 The compensatory damages seem mostly
noncontroversial, except with respect to the interest of a little over $5
million awarded.1516 As occurred in Amato v. KPMG, LLP, the court treated
the award of interest as rather mechanical, and failed to appreciate the three
approaches to awarding interest currently extant.1517 But, if challenged on
appeal, the court could simply be seen as following the traditional majority
view on this issue,1518 though without explicitly focusing on it.
Yung is totally fascinating both in how meticulously and extensively the
court recounted the repetitive egregious conduct of the defendant, and in
how the court responded with its compensatory and punitive damage
awards. It should be remembered, however, that Yung involved very
extreme and egregious facts—the defendant was selling a product that was
not yet fully thought through or developed and which, in fact, was totally
flawed, while at the very same time promising a very conservative and
careful taxpayer that the product was 100 percent kosher.1519 In addition, the
existence of the e-mail evidence documenting exactly who did what and
when is most significant in that the facts were definitively established
beyond any peradventure.1520 Other similar situations very likely may not
enjoy this level of factual certainty.
As indicated in Part II, E above, where an attorney or accountant who
really was part of the group which developed a shelter or who was
otherwise part of the group selling the shelter and this fact was hidden so
that he or she was portrayed as an independent professional, liability should
be reasonably certain to ensue.1521 The precise ground for liability—i.e.,
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, perhaps
1514

See id. at *194–209.
See id. at *191.
1516
See id. at *210.
1517
See No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006). The
court’s brief consideration of whether the amount of damages was liquidated so as to support an
award of interest, seemed, if anything, to be inconsequential. See Yung, No. 07-CI-2647, at *176–
77.
1518
In my survey of the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment, I did not find any
explicit precedent in Kentucky. See Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 30.
1519
See generally Yung, No. 07-CI-2647.
1520
See generally id.
1521
See supra Part III. E.
1515
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RICO—may differ depending on the precise facts involved and the
jurisdiction. It would seem liability is much less certain when the advisor
functioned in the traditional role of the disinterested advisor. If a taxpayer
retains such a tax professional to advise about the efficacy of a tax shelter
product and the advisor errs and issues an opinion that the shelter is morelikely-than-not-valid, will liability ultimately be imposed on the advisor?
What about the error in judgment rule?—at least where the error was not
egregious? What about the intrinsic weakness of a more-likely-than-not
opinion, the lowest threshold of an acceptable opinion? Hopefully, some
authority will address these issues soon.
During this past decade a number of cases have arisen in the benefit
plan area. These cases really are very similar to the generic tax shelter
cases. Many benefit plans that were too good to be true were developed and
sold as valid benefit plans. These situations, like the generic tax shelters,
were marketed to individual business owners who likely knew or sensed
they were really shelters rather than legitimate benefit plans. But, being in a
decade of excesses, where people would try almost anything to avoid taxes
especially where there was some facially valid imprimatur of legality, these
plans abounded. While these situations could easily have been characterized
as a type of generic tax shelter, they were treated separately herein because
they typically involved a specific IRC section and so could easily be
categorized by code section. Here, as with the generic tax shelters, many
players who seemed blameworthy and who should have been found liable,
avoided responsibility on statute of limitations and other non-substantive
grounds.1522
As in my past studies, the specific areas that seem to have generated the
most cases are the estate planning/estate and gift tax area and the late filing/
non-filing and negligent preparation areas.1523 There still seems to be a
rather steady stream of cases involving planning or drafting errors in the
estate planning area.1524 In the late filing/non-filing and negligent
preparation areas, the errors typically involve a more general type of
sloppiness or inattentiveness rather than “tax” errors.1525 Beyond these, the
errors seem to cover many different areas of tax practice, which do not lend
themselves to ranking.

1522

See supra Part III. E.1.
Malpractice I, supra note 1, at 641-42; Malpractice II, supra note 1, at 1089-90.
1524
See supra Part III. D.2.
1525
See supra Parts III. B.1 and 2.
1523
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In the generic tax shelter area, the holdings in Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb,
Greene & MacRae, LLP and Rosenbach v. The Diversified Group, Inc. are
noteworthy and surprising.1526 Carroll held that the purchasers of an
ineffective generic tax shelter could not prove they suffered any damages
caused by the promoter of the shelter because they had amended their
original return on which the shelter deduction was claimed and paid the
additional taxes and interest.1527 This goes against the well-established
principle of mitigation of damages. It punishes the plaintiffs who acted
responsibly and sought to limit their damages.
In Rosenbach, the defendants who sold the plaintiffs an ineffective
generic tax shelter sought contribution from the plaintiffs’ tax counsel and
plaintiffs’ accounting firm that prepared the return on which the shelter loss
was reported.1528 The defendants asserted that the tax counsel erred in
advising the plaintiffs whether to apply for amnesty.1529 They also asserted
that the accounting firm lacked a reasonable basis for reporting the shelter
loss on the plaintiffs’ tax return.1530 While it seems ludicrous and the height
of “chutzpah” for the seller of a bad tax shelter who repeatedly vouched for
the efficacy of the shelter to claim the plaintiffs’ return preparer should
have known better than to believe him, the court upheld the denial of the
motions to dismiss the third part claims brought by the plaintiffs’ tax
counsel and accounting firm.1531
Finally, Penner v. Hoffberg, Oberfest, Burger & Berger answers a
longstanding question in the tax malpractice area: whether any recovery is
available when a tax advisor makes an error that triggers an audit that
uncovers other unrelated tax deficiencies?1532 The court answered no!1533 It
held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover the cost of defending an audit
where there is no evidence that any erroneously reported item created a tax
liability that would not otherwise have existed.1534

1526
Carroll, 623 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Rosenbach, 926 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div.
2011); see supra text accompanying notes 192–199; and notes 186–191.
1527
Carroll, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
1528
Rosenbach, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
1529
Id. at 52.
1530
Id.
1531
Id. at 51.
1532
844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007); see supra text accompanying notes 676–685.
1533
Id.
1534
Id. at 554.

